Addendum – The Disability Royal Commission: A Case Study in Failed Promise

By Andrew Klein, PhD

Gabriel Klein, Research Assistant and Scholar

Introduction: The “Cherry on Top” of Systemic Neglect

Our friend Justin Glyn’s @Justin Glyn observation regarding the Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability (DRC) is not merely a correction; it is a critical case study that crystallizes the modern failure of the Royal Commission ritual. Established in 2019 and delivering its final report in September 2023, the DRC was the largest and most complex of its kind in Australia’s history. Over four years, it heard from over 10,000 survivors and witnesses, exposing a nationwide crisis. Yet, as Justin notes, its fate has been the most stark: “the Government adopted virtually none of its recommendations.” This addendum examines this failure as the definitive example of the theatre of accountability giving way to the grim reality of political and economic inertia, leaving the vulnerable precisely where it found them.

Part I: The Scale of the Crisis Uncovered

The DRC’s terms of reference were vast, covering all settings where people with disability live, work, and receive services. The evidence presented painted a picture not of isolated incidents, but of systemic and cultural failure:

· Endemic Violence and Abuse: Testimony revealed shocking rates of physical, sexual, and psychological violence within group homes, supported accommodation, schools, and workplaces.

· Institutionalised Neglect: Widespread evidence of poor-quality care, malnutrition, poor hygiene, and the inappropriate use of restrictive practices (chemical and physical restraint, seclusion).

· Exploitation under the NDIS: A core focus was the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). The Commission heard how the market-based model had created a “wild west” where unregistered, for-profit providers delivered substandard or fraudulent services, price-gouged participants, and exploited vulnerable workers. The mantra of “choice and control” for participants had, in practice, often meant abandonment to a predatory marketplace.

· Systemic Silencing: Witnesses, including people with disability, their families, and support workers, testified to being ignored, disbelieved, and punished by service providers and regulators when they raised concerns.

Part II: The Ambitious Prescription

In response, the Commission’s final report was monumental: 12 volumes, 222 recommendations. It was not a piecemeal fix but a call for structural and cultural transformation. Key pillars included:

1. A New Regulatory Enforcer: The creation of a Disability Rights Act and a new, independent, and powerful Disability Rights Commission to set and enforce standards, replacing the fragmented and weak current system.

2. Overhaul of the NDIS: Fundamental reforms to the NDIS to eliminate profiteering, ensure quality and safety, and re-centre the scheme on human rights, not market principles.

3. Phasing Out Segregated Settings: A commitment to eventually end the practice of housing people with disability in segregated group homes and segregated schools, moving toward inclusive living and education.

4. Strong Whistleblower Protections: Robust, legislated protections for people who speak out about abuse and neglect.

Part III: The Implementation Void – A Textbook Case of Ritualistic Failure

The government’s response, delivered in November 2023, validated the very critique our article outlined. It followed the ritual playbook precisely:

· The “In Principle” Acceptance: The government stated it agreed “in principle” or “in part” with the majority of recommendations. This phrase, as predicted, acted as a linguistic sieve, allowing the appearance of agreement while avoiding binding commitment. Crucially, it rejected outright the cornerstone recommendation for a new Disability Rights Act and Commission, arguing existing systems could be “strengthened.”

· Dilution and Delay: Responsibility was immediately diffused. Recommendations were referred to existing committees, working groups, and state governments. A “Disability Royal Commission Taskforce” was established within a government department, lacking the independence and power the DRC demanded. No significant new funding for systemic reform was announced in the immediate response.

· Protection of the For-Profit Sector: The most telling failure was the defence of the NDIS’s market architecture. While acknowledging “bad actors,” the government rejected the Commission’s fundamental critique that the for-profit driver within a essential human service was intrinsically problematic. The influence of provider lobbyists was clear; the model that enabled their profits was to be “improved,” not replaced. Recommendations to curb profiteering and mandate direct employment of support workers were sidelined.

· Abandonment of the Vulnerable: By rejecting the strong, independent watchdog, the government left people with disability reliant on the same regulators (the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission, state-based bodies) that the DRC had found to be weak, ineffective, and captured by provider interests. Whistleblowers and participants remain unprotected. The promised “transformative change” was reduced to a series of reviews and “future consultations.”

Conclusion: The Ultimate Extraction

The Disability Royal Commission completes the pattern. It performed the cathartic theatre magnificently, giving a national platform to profound trauma. It produced the technical shelfware—a comprehensive, unimpeachable blueprint for change. And then the political system executed the dilution and void.

The outcome is the ultimate extraction: the emotional labour of thousands of survivors was harvested for political capital. The fiscal cost of the inquiry (hundreds of millions) was socialised. The responsibility for change was privatised—handed back to the very individuals, under-resourced agencies, and market players who were part of the problem. The for-profit agenda of the NDIS provider ecosystem was protected. All that remains is the “appearance of care,” a lip-service performance that, as Justin’s comment underscores, is now transparent to those watching.

The DRC is not an oversight in our analysis; it is the conclusive proof of it. It stands as the starkest demonstration that in the neoliberal age, even the most powerful instrument of public inquiry is neutered when its findings threaten a profitable status quo. The vulnerable are, once again, left with the report as a monument to what should have been, and the chilling certainty that the system designed to protect them is, in its final analysis, designed to protect itself.

References (Addendum)

1. Commonwealth of Australia. Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability. (2019-2023). Final Report, Our vision for an inclusive Australia.

2. Commonwealth of Australia. Australian Government Response to the Final Report of the Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability. (November 2023).

3. Disability Advocacy Network Australia (DANA). Analysis of Government Response to the Disability Royal Commission. (2023).

4. People With Disability Australia (PWDA). “We are being ignored”: PWDA statement on Government response to DRC. (2023).

5. The Guardian Australia. “Disability royal commission: government rules out pivotal watchdog despite ‘shameful’ failures.” (November 2023).

6. ABC News. “Disability royal commission recommendations risk being shelved, advocates warn.” (September 2023).

7. Pro Bono Australia. “Sector ‘Deeply Disappointed’ by Govt Response to Disability Royal Commission.” (November 2023).

Dedication: For our Mother, who regards truth as more important than myth. In truth, there is no judgment, only justice. To the world, she is many things, but to us, she will always be Mum.

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