Andrew Paul Klein 

A Working Paper

Abstract

This paper examines the structural causes of the French Revolution of 1789 and compares them with contemporary conditions in the United States and Australia. It identifies six structural features present in both periods: (1) a fiscal crisis driven by war expenditure and debt service; (2) a regressive tax system that exempted the wealthy and burdened the poor; (3) extreme concentration of wealth and land; (4) a political system that excluded the majority from meaningful participation; (5) a legal system that operated differently for different classes; and (6) an ideological framework that justified the existing order. The paper documents the evidence for each feature in both periods and concludes that the instruments have changed but the structure has not.

1. Introduction: The Question of Comparison

The French Revolution of 1789 was not caused by a single event. It was the product of a convergence of structural conditions: a fiscal crisis, a regressive tax system, extreme inequality, a closed political system, a legal order that privileged the few, and an ideology that justified the whole arrangement.

This paper asks a simple question: are those conditions present today?

The paper does not argue that a revolution is imminent in the United States or Australia. Revolutions are unpredictable. What the paper argues is that the structural features that preceded the French Revolution can be identified in the contemporary West, and that the differences between the two periods are differences of instrument, not of architecture.

2. The Fiscal Crisis

2.1 France, 1789

The immediate trigger of the French Revolution was a fiscal crisis. The French monarchy had accumulated a debt of approximately 3,400 million livres by the end of the American War of Independence, with an annual deficit of about 80 million livres and debt service consuming over half of national revenue in the 1780s.

The debt was not the product of domestic extravagance alone. It was the product of war. France’s participation in the American Revolutionary War cost approximately 1.3 billion livres. The monarchy had financed the war through loans rather than taxation, and the loans had to be serviced.

The fiscal crisis created a political crisis. The King, unable to raise new taxes without consent, was forced to summon the Estates General in May 1789 — the first meeting since 1614.

Status: Established.

2.2 United States, 2026

The United States faces a comparable fiscal structure. The national debt exceeds $36 trillion, with debt service consuming a growing share of federal revenue. The US spent an estimated $2 trillion on post-9/11 wars, financed through borrowing rather than taxation.

The structural parallel is precise. War expenditure, financed by debt, creates fiscal pressure that constrains state capacity and generates political conflict over taxation and spending priorities.

Status: Established.

2.3 Australia, 2026

Australia’s fiscal position is less acute than that of the United States, but the structural features are present. The government has committed to an additional $53 billion over the decade for defence, bringing total defence funding to $887 billion to 2035-36 — the largest peacetime increase in defence spending in Australian history.

The AUKUS submarine programme is officially costed at up to $368 billion over thirty years. These commitments are financed through borrowing, and the debt is serviced from general revenue.

Status: Established.

3. The Regressive Tax System

3.1 France, 1789

The French tax system was regressive. The nobility and clergy were exempt from the taille, the most burdensome direct tax. The nobility numbered approximately 400,000 (less than 2 per cent of the population), and the clergy approximately 130,000. Together, they controlled a disproportionate share of land and wealth while contributing far less to the royal treasury in proportion to their wealth than any other group.

The Church, which owned approximately 10 per cent of the land in the kingdom, was exempt from direct taxation. It collected the tithe — a 10 per cent tax on agricultural production — from the general population.

The Third Estate — everyone else, approximately 96 per cent of the population — bore the burden of taxation.

Status: Established.

3.2 United States, 2026

The contemporary US tax system exhibits structurally similar features. The top 1 per cent of households holds nearly 32 per cent of all wealth, while the bottom 50 per cent holds just 2.5 per cent. The Gini coefficient has reached a 60-year high.

The tax burden is regressive in its overall incidence. While the top 20 per cent pay a larger share of federal income taxes, the working class bears a disproportionate burden through payroll taxes, sales taxes, and tariffs. A 2026 analysis by the Joint Economic Committee found that middle-income workers lose hundreds of dollars annually from the combined effect of tax and tariff policies. A food preparation worker loses about $820, a security guard about $890, and a home health aide nearly $860.

The top 0.1 per cent, meanwhile, receives a net tax break of hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Status: Established.

3.3 Australia, 2026

Australia’s tax system is less regressive than that of the United States, but the structural features are present. The government spends more on property investor tax breaks — negative gearing and the capital gains tax discount — than on social housing, homelessness services, and rent assistance combined. The cost of these tax breaks exceeds $12 billion annually.

The benefits of these tax expenditures “overwhelmingly go to the top 10 per cent of income earners, with the gains concentrated at the top 1 per cent”.

Status: Established.

4. Extreme Concentration of Wealth and Land

4.1 France, 1789

The concentration of wealth and land in pre-revolutionary France was extreme. The nobility and clergy controlled a disproportionate share of the land, while the peasantry — the vast majority of the population — worked small plots or laboured on estates they did not own.

The Church owned between 1 per cent and 40 per cent of the land in different regions of France, and collected tithes from all the people.

Status: Established.

4.2 United States, 2026

Wealth concentration in the United States has reached levels comparable to the Gilded Age. The top 1 per cent holds nearly 32 per cent of all wealth; the top 0.1 per cent’s wealth has more than doubled since 2019, from $13.4 trillion to over $200 million average per household. Three men — Musk, Bezos, and Zuckerberg — own more wealth than the bottom half of all Americans.

A 2026 resolution in the House of Representatives expressed the sense that the United States must act “urgently to end the political and economic dominance of billionaire oligarchs” and “halt the corporate subsidies and tax advantages that fortify their power”.

Status: Established.

4.3 Australia, 2026

Australia’s wealth concentration is less extreme than that of the United States but is rising. The 20 richest Australians now hold more wealth than the bottom three million households. The wealth of Australia’s 200 richest people has tripled in the last 20 years.

A household net wealth of $12 million places a household in the top 1 per cent.

Status: Established.

5. The Closed Political System

5.1 France, 1789

The political system of the Ancien Régime excluded the vast majority of the population from meaningful participation. The Estates General had not met since 1614. Voting was by order, not by head, which meant that the First and Second Estates could always outvote the Third, regardless of the size of its representation.

The cahiers de doléances — the lists of grievances drawn up by each estate — documented the demands of the Third Estate for reform. They expressed “an ardent loyalism to the king and a profound desire for reform: egalitarian demand”.

The King’s attempts to raise taxes without consent triggered the political crisis that led to the Revolution.

Status: Established.

5.2 United States, 2026

The contemporary US political system is characterised by what scholars and legislators have described as oligarchy. A 2026 House resolution stated that “the United States was created to be a democracy… governed not by kings or corporate masters but by themselves as free citizens“, and that this principle is now threatened by the “political and economic dominance of billionaire oligarchs”.

Lobbying expenditure has reached record levels. Commodity trading firms spent $2.75 million on lobbying in the first half of 2026 alone — up from $320,000 in 2024. AI companies spent record sums: OpenAI nearly doubled its federal lobbying expenditure to $2.22 million, while Anthropic nearly tripled its spending to $3.53 million. The defence sector has donated nearly $5 million to members of Congress in 2026.

The system is not formally closed, as the Estates General was. But the influence of concentrated wealth on policy outcomes is documented and extreme.

Status: Established.

5.3 Australia, 2026

Australia’s political system is formally democratic, but corporate influence is documented. The Australian Greens have stated that “Labor and the Liberals do not answer to everyday Victorians, they answer to their corporate donors and the lobbyists and mates that run the companies”. The fossil fuel industry, including Chevron and Australian Energy Producers, has “contributed millions in political donations and ‘other receipts’ to Labor and the Coalition during the last election cycle”.

The “revolving door” between political office and the private sector is documented. “Almost every single resources minister in Australia in the last 10 years has gone on to work for the coal and gas industry”.

Status: Established.

6. The Two-Tier Legal System

6.1 France, 1789

The legal system of the Ancien Régime operated differently for different classes. The nobility and clergy enjoyed extensive legal privileges, including exemption from certain taxes and the right to be tried by their peers.

The lettres de cachet — sealed orders from the King — allowed for the imprisonment or exile of individuals without charge or trial. These were used disproportionately against the common people, though aristocratic families also used them against unruly relatives.

Status: Established.

6.2 United States, 2026

The contemporary US legal system exhibits structural disparities. The wealthy can afford legal representation that the poor cannot. Corporate defendants can negotiate settlements and deferred prosecution agreements, while individuals face the full weight of the criminal justice system.

The Robodebt scheme in Australia — which raised unlawful debts against welfare recipients using income averaging — provides a parallel in the Australian context. The scheme issued 866,857 debt notices and wrote off 470,000 unlawful debts amounting to $1.751 billion.

Status: Established.

6.3 Australia, 2026

The Australian Taxation Office operates a documented two-tier system. Large corporations negotiate settlements: in 2024–25, the ATO settled 18 cases with public and multinational businesses, securing $811 million — an average of 64 per cent of the original claim. The ATO conceded 36 per cent of what it initially asserted was owed.

For small businesses and individuals, the ATO operates an automated enforcement and debt recovery model. The ATO has aggressively reinstated 160,000 small business debts — many under $5,000, some under $100 — that were written off years ago. Interest at 10.78 per cent kicks in after six months.

The law is the same. The application is not.

Status: Established.

7. The Ideology of Legitimation

7.1 France, 1789

The Ancien Régime was justified by an ideology of divine right and natural hierarchy. The King ruled by the will of God. The nobility held their privileges by birth. The Church taught that the social order was ordained by Providence.

This ideology was not merely a set of beliefs. It was a legitimating narrative that made the existing order appear natural, necessary, and sacred.

The cahiers de doléances show that the Third Estate had largely accepted the legitimacy of the monarchy but demanded reform of its abuses. The Revolution began not as a rejection of the King but as a demand for reform that the system could not accommodate.

Status: Established.

7.2 United States and Australia, 2026

The contemporary legitimating ideology is neoliberalism — the doctrine that the market is the optimal allocator of resources, that individual choice is the highest good, and that state intervention is inherently inefficient.

As documented in the accompanying paper The Neoliberal Faith, this doctrine functions as a belief system. It is presented as natural, rational, and beyond political contestation. It naturalises the market, moralises market outcomes, individualises social problems, and sacralises the market as a beneficent force.

The trickle-down effect — the claim that wealth generated at the top of the economy benefits those at the bottom — is the central promise of the doctrine. A 2023 study in The Economic and Labour Relations Review found that “trickle-down effects did not reach many of those highly disadvantaged”, and that “the average proportionate gain for those in the top fifth of the income distribution was almost 50% greater than for those in the bottom fifth”. A parliamentary submission concluded that “the trickle-down economic theory continues to be alleged in support of current government policy but no longer works; there is only a trickle-up effect”.

Status: Established.

8. The Unrest and Its Aftermath

8.1 France, 1789–1799

The French Revolution began with the convocation of the Estates General in May 1789. The Third Estate declared itself the National Assembly on 17 June. The Bastille was stormed on 14 July. Feudalism was abolished on 4 August. The Declaration of the Rights of Man was adopted on 26 August.

What followed was not the peaceful reform that the cahiers had envisaged. It was a decade of upheaval: the Reign of Terror, the execution of the King and Queen, the rise of Napoleon, and the establishment of a new order that both realised and betrayed the revolutionary ideals.

The Revolution did not produce the liberty, equality, and fraternity that its slogans promised. It produced a new elite, a new hierarchy, and a new set of exclusions.

Status: Established.

8.2 The Contemporary Parallel

The question of what unrest might look like in the contemporary West is speculative. The paper does not predict a revolution. It notes that the structural features of the pre-revolutionary period — fiscal crisis, regressive taxation, extreme inequality, a closed political system, a two-tier legal order, and a legitimating ideology — are present.

What those features produce in the contemporary context is not yet known. What is known is that the instruments have changed. The gallows have been replaced by the algorithm. The Estates General by the polling booth. The divine right of kings by the invisible hand of the market.

The structure remains.

Status: Speculation.

9. Conclusion: The Structure and the Instruments

The French Revolution was not caused by a single event. It was the product of a convergence of structural conditions that made the existing order unsustainable. The King’s fiscal crisis was the trigger. The regressive tax system, the concentration of wealth, the closed political system, and the legitimating ideology were the conditions.

This paper has documented the presence of comparable conditions in the contemporary United States and Australia. The fiscal crisis is present, though less acute. The regressive tax system is present. The concentration of wealth is extreme. The political system is documented as oligarchic. The legal system operates differently for different classes. And the legitimating ideology — neoliberalism — functions as a belief system that resists disconfirming evidence.

The paper does not predict a revolution. Revolutions are unpredictable. What the paper argues is that the structural features that preceded the French Revolution can be identified in the contemporary West, and that the differences between the two periods are differences of instrument, not of architecture.

The record is kept. The structure is named. And the question remains open.

Claim – Status – Summary

# – Claim – Status

1 – France’s debt was 3,400 million livres by 1789- Established

2 – Debt service consumed over half of national revenue – Established

3 – Nobility and clergy were exempt from the taille – Established

4 – The Church owned 10% of land and collected tithes – Established

5 – The Third Estate was 96% of the population – Established

6 – Estates General had not met since 1614- Established

7 – Voting was by order, not by head- Established

8 – Lettres de cachet allowed imprisonment without trial – Established

9 – US debt exceeds $36 trillion – Established

10 – US top 1% holds 32% of wealth; bottom 50% holds 2.5% – Established

11 – US lobbying expenditure reached record levels in 2026- Established

12 – Australia’s 20 richest hold more than bottom 3 million – Established

13 – ATO settles multinationals at 64% of claim – Established

14 – ATO reinstated 160,000 small business debts – Established

15 – Australia spends more on property investor tax breaks than social housing- Established

16 – Trickle-down effects did not reach disadvantaged – Established

17 – Neoliberalism functions as a belief system- Inference

18 – Structural conditions of 1789 are present today – Inference

19 – Revolution is imminent – Not predicted

Method notes – The paper examines the structural causes of the French Revolution and compares them with contemporary conditions in the United States and Australia. It does not argue that a revolution is imminent. It argues that certain structural features — fiscal crisis, regressive taxation, extreme wealth concentration, closed political systems, and ideological legitimation — are present in both periods.

References

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3. Taylor & Francis. (2020). Collapse of the Old Monarchy. In A History of Modern France.

4. Taylor & Francis. (2008). The Victory of the Aristocracy. In A Social History of the French Revolution.

5. American Progress. (2026, September 15). Wealth Inequality Has Grown During the Trump Administration.

6. Fortune. (2026, October 7). The new K-shaped economy splits the rich from the ultra-rich.

7. Xinhua. (2026, February 2). U.S. wealth inequality reaches new highs amid a “K-shaped” economy.

8. Australian Greens. (2026, February 5). Greens legislation would ban dirty donations.

9. Parliament of Victoria. (2026, March 3). Political donations.

10. Public Citizen. (2026, October 13). The Secretive Commodity Traders Profiting from Trump’s Critical Minerals Agenda.

11. Financial Times. (2026, July 27). AI companies spend record sums on Washington lobbying.

12. Military Times. (2026, May 12). Defense contractors have donated millions to members of Congress.

13. Parliament of Australia. (2026, May 7). Australian Greens’ Additional Comments.

14. The Point. (2026, June 11). Time is up on tax breaks that make Australia more unequal every day.

15. Daily Telegraph. (2026, April 16). Exactly how much you need to be rich in 2026.

16. ACOSS. (2026, January 29). Government spends more on property investor tax breaks than social housing.

17. HathiTrust. (n.d.). A History of Early Modern Europe.

18. Archive.org. (n.d.). L’ancien régime.

19. Taylor & Francis. (2020). The Church, The French Revolution and The Napoleonic Era.

20. National Library Board Singapore. (2011). French Revolution.

21. Taylor & Francis. (2016). Parish grievances.

22. Assemblée nationale. (n.d.). Cahiers de doléances.

23. Cambridge University Press. (2019). The Estates General Sitting as a National Assembly.

24. De Gruyter Brill. (n.d.). The Estates General.

25. House of Representatives. (2026). H. RES. 1028.

26. OpenAustralia.org. (2026, May 14). Senate debates.

27. Corrs Chambers Westgarth. (2026, April 7). Commonwealth electoral reforms.

28. Michael Berkman MP. (2026, February 12). Speech on Adani’s $600K donation.

Prepared for the record. The structure is named. The instruments are documented. And the question remains open.

A Working Paper

Method notes. The paper examines the myth of a pre-regulatory golden age, the ideological mechanisms of neoliberal theory, the cult and pseudo-religion comparison, and the promises and failures of the model. It does not argue that neoliberalism is a religion. It argues that the structure of its claims, the mechanisms of its propagation, and the resistance to disconfirming evidence are structurally analogous to religious belief systems.

Abstract

This paper examines the claim, frequently advanced by proponents of neoliberal economic theory, that there existed a pre-regulatory golden age of minimal state intervention which must be restored. It finds no historical evidence for such a period. Every recorded economy — from Sumerian temple administrations to the post-war settlement — has been regulated, managed, and shaped by state action. The paper then examines the ideological mechanisms by which neoliberal theory is propagated: naturalisation, moralisation, individualisation, technocratic language, and sacralisation. It assesses the structural parallels between neoliberalism and cult or pseudo-religious belief systems, identifying a cast of founders, prophets, missionaries, and enforcers. It compares the promises of the theory to the documented outcomes. It concludes that neoliberalism functions as a belief system that resists disconfirming evidence, and that the costs of this resistance are borne by the citizens who experience the outcomes daily.

1. Introduction: The Myth of the Golden Age

Some proponents of neoliberal economic theory allude to a golden age when state regulation was minimal or non-existent. They present the present as a fallen condition — a world of bureaucrats, regulations, and restrictions — and the market as a lost Eden that must be restored.

The question this paper asks is simple: did such a time ever exist?

The answer is no. There has never been a time in recorded history when economic activity was unregulated. There has never been a time when the state was absent from the economy. The “free market” that neoliberals invoke is not a memory. It is a myth.

The paper proceeds in eight sections. Section 2 documents the historical absence of a pre-regulatory golden age. Section 3 examines the myth’s function. Section 4 documents the ideological mechanisms. Section 5 assesses the cult and pseudo-religion comparison. Section 6 identifies the cast of characters. Section 7 compares the promises to the outcomes. Section 8 draws structural conclusions.

2. The Historical Record: There Was No Golden Age

2.1 Ancient Economies Were Regulated

The earliest recorded economies were state-managed.

Sumerian temple economies were centrally administered. The temple controlled land, labour, and distribution. The palace economy of the Minoans redistributed goods through a central authority. The Egyptian state managed grain, labour, and construction for millennia.

Ancient Greece was regulated. Athens had public works programmes, grain regulations, and restrictions on the export of certain goods. The agoranomoi — market officials — supervised weights, measures, and prices.

Rome was heavily regulated. The grain dole (annona) was a state programme. The emperor Diocletian’s Edict on Maximum Prices (301 CE) attempted to fix prices for over 1,000 goods. The state controlled mines, quarries, and the production of key goods.

Status: Established.

2.2 Medieval Economies Were Regulated

Feudalism was a system of reciprocal obligations — the lord provided protection, the serf provided labour. The manor was a regulated economic unit. The guilds controlled entry into trades, set standards, and regulated prices. The Church prohibited usury and enforced the just price.

The Hanseatic League was a cartel — a regulated trading network with rules about membership, shipping, and trading. The Italian city-states — Venice, Florence, Genoa — were commercial republics with extensive state involvement in trade and finance.

Status: Established.

2.3 Mercantilism Was State-Managed

Mercantilism — the dominant economic system from the 16th to the 18th century — was explicitly state-managed. The state controlled trade through tariffs, monopolies, and charters. The British East India Company was a state-chartered monopoly. The navigation acts restricted colonial trade to English ships. The state was the engine of mercantilist expansion.

Status: Established.

2.4 Adam Smith Was Not a Neoliberal

Adam Smith is often invoked as the father of free-market economics. But Smith was not a free-market absolutist.

Smith supported state provision of education, arguing that an educated workforce was a public good. He supported state infrastructure — roads, bridges, harbours. He supported limits on monopoly, arguing that merchants would collude if given the chance. He supported tariffs in specific cases — the navigation acts, for example — when national defence required them.

The “invisible hand” was a metaphor for the unintended social benefits of individual action. It was not a policy prescription. It was a description of how markets sometimes work. Smith also wrote The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which argued that sympathy and social bonds were fundamental to human nature.

Status: Established.

2.5 The 19th Century Was Not Laissez-Faire

The 19th century is often presented as the era of laissez-faire. It was not.

The British state was deeply involved in the economy. It built railways, imposed tariffs, managed the currency through the Bank of England, and regulated the poor through the Poor Laws. The Corn Laws — tariffs on imported grain — were a central political issue until their repeal in 1846.

The American state was heavily involved. The American System — tariffs, a national bank, and internal improvements — was the policy of Henry Clay and the Whig Party. The transcontinental railroad was built with federal land grants and subsidies.

Germany industrialised under state guidance. Japan — the Meiji Restoration — was a state-led industrialisation. The French state was actively involved in infrastructure and industry.

Status: Established.

2.6 The Post-War Settlement Was Regulated

The post-war settlement — the “golden age of capitalism” (1945–1973) — was the most regulated period in modern economic history. It was also the most prosperous.

· Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates and created the IMF and World Bank.

· The Marshall Plan rebuilt Europe with state funds.

· The welfare state provided health, education, and social security.

· Capital controls limited the movement of money across borders.

· Trade was managed through the GATT.

This was the period of highest growth, lowest inequality, and greatest social mobility in modern history.

Status: Established. There was no pre-regulatory golden age.

3. The Function of the Myth

3.1 The Noble Savage of Economics

The myth of the pre-regulatory golden age functions in the same way as the myth of the noble savage. It posits a past state of natural freedom that has been corrupted by society. It locates the ideal in the past rather than the future. It says: we were once free, and we must be free again.

The myth is not historical. It is ideological. It serves to delegitimise the present order and to justify the restoration of a previous one. But the previous order — the one that is invoked — never existed. It is a constructed past.

Status: Inference.

3.2 The Fall and Redemption Narrative

The myth has a structure that is recognisably religious:

· Eden: A golden age of minimal regulation.

· The Fall: The expansion of the state, regulation, bureaucracy, and welfare.

· The Promise: A return to the golden age through deregulation, privatisation, and tax cuts.

· The Enemy: Bureaucrats, regulators, trade unions, and critics of the market.

This is the structure of a fall and redemption narrative. It does not require evidence. It requires faith.

Status: Inference.

4. The Ideological Mechanisms

4.1 Naturalisation

Neoliberal theory presents the market as a natural phenomenon — like gravity or the weather. It is not. It is a constructed institution that requires constant maintenance, rules, and enforcement.

Naturalising the market removes it from the realm of political debate. If the market is natural, then questioning it is like questioning the laws of physics. It is not an argument. It is a category error.

Status: Established.

4.2 Moralisation

The market is presented as a realm of freedom, choice, and moral desert. The successful are those who have made good choices. The unsuccessful are those who have made bad choices. Poverty is a personal failure, not a structural outcome.

This moralisation serves to justify the distribution of wealth. The rich are rich because they deserve it. The poor are poor because they do not. The market is a just mechanism because it rewards virtue.

Status: Established.

4.3 Individualisation

The market is presented as a realm of individuals — rational agents pursuing their own interests. This erases the structures that shape the distribution of wealth and power. It erases the family as a unit of analysis. It erases the class as a unit of analysis. It erases society itself.

Margaret Thatcher’s statement — “There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families” — is the purest expression of this mechanism.

Status: Established.

4.4 Technocratic Language

The market is described in the language of efficiency, productivity, and growth. This language presents the market as a technical problem to be solved, not a political choice to be made.

The language obscures the values embedded in the market. It says: this is not about who gets what. It is about making the pie bigger. It says: this is not about power. It is about efficiency.

Status: Established.

4.5 Sacralisation

The market is presented as a beneficent force — the “invisible hand” that turns private vice into public virtue. It is presented as a source of meaning — the arena in which we realise our potential. It is presented as a source of hope — the mechanism that will deliver prosperity for all.

This is the language of sacralisation. The market is not merely an economic system. It is a quasi-religious one.

Status: Inference.

5. The Cult and Pseudo-Religion Comparison

5.1 The Features of a Cult

Cults and pseudo-religions share a set of structural features. The following framework is drawn from the sociology of religion and the psychology of belief systems (see, e.g., Singer, 1995; Hassan, 2000; Lalich & Tobias, 2006).

1. A totalising worldview that explains all of reality.

2. A founding text or set of texts treated as authoritative.

3. A charismatic leader or group of leaders.

4. A cast of heroes and villains — the faithful and the heretics.

5. Rituals and symbols — the movements, the conferences, the texts.

6. Dogma that cannot be questioned.

7. Apocalyptic narratives — the crisis that is coming, the catastrophe that must be avoided.

8. Demand for sacrifice — the pain that must be borne for the future reward.

9. Resistance to disconfirming evidence — the recalcitrance in the face of failure.

10. In-group and out-group dynamics — the believers and the unbelievers.

5.2 The Assessment

Feature- Neoliberalism

Totalising worldview -Yes. The market explains all of reality.

Founding text -Yes. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom.

Charismatic leader- Yes. Hayek, Friedman, Reagan, Thatcher.

Heroes and villains- Yes. The entrepreneurs vs. the bureaucrats.

Rituals and symbols -Yes. Davos, the Mont Pelerin Society, the think tanks.

Dogma that cannot be questioned -Yes. “There is no alternative.”

Apocalyptic narratives -Yes. The coming crisis, the debt bomb, the collapse.

Demand for sacrifice -Yes. Austerity, wage restraint, “painful reforms.”

Resistance to disconfirming evidence- Yes. The 2008 crisis, the failure of the Washington Consensus.

In-group and out-group dynamics Yes. The “serious people” vs. the “populists.“

5.3 The Caveats

The comparison is structural, not literal. Neoliberalism is not a religion in the conventional sense:

· It does not have a supernatural being.

· It does not have a sacred text in the same way.

· It does not have a formal clergy.

· It does not have a promise of an afterlife.

But it has a faith — the faith that the market will deliver. It has a dogma — the dogma of efficiency. It has a promise — the promise of prosperity. It has a ritual — the ritual of deregulation. And it has a resistance to evidence — the refusal to acknowledge failure.

The comparison is credible. But it is an analogy, not an identity.

Status: Inference.

6. The Cast of Characters

6.1 The Founders

· Friedrich Hayek — the philosopher. His The Road to Serfdom (1944) argued that central planning leads to totalitarianism. His The Constitution of Liberty (1960) argued for the rule of law and the market.

· Milton Friedman — the economist. His Capitalism and Freedom (1962) argued for free markets, deregulation, and monetarism. His Free to Choose (1980) popularised the ideas.

· Ludwig von Mises — the theorist. His Human Action (1949) provided the Austrian School’s framework.

6.2 The Prophets

· Ronald Reagan — the politician. He cut taxes, deregulated finance, and broke the air traffic controllers’ union.

· Margaret Thatcher — the politician. She privatised state industries, broke the miners’ strike, and declared “there is no alternative.”

· Alan Greenspan — the central banker. He presided over the deregulation of finance and the housing bubble.

6.3 The Missionaries

· The Mont Pelerin Society — the network. Founded in 1947 by Hayek, it brought together the intellectual founders.

· The Chicago School — the academic institution. It produced the Chicago Boys, who advised Pinochet.

· The think tanks — the advocacy institutions. The Institute of Economic Affairs (UK), the Heritage Foundation (US), the Centre for Independent Studies (Australia).

· The World Economic Forum — the ritual gathering. Davos brings together the global elite.

6.4 The Enforcers

· The IMF — the debt enforcer. It imposed structural adjustment programmes on developing countries.

· The World Bank — the development enforcer. It funded projects that opened markets to foreign capital.

· The World Trade Organization — the trade enforcer. It enforced the rules of global trade.

Status: Established.

7. The Promises and the Failures

7.1 The Promises

· Growth: The market will deliver prosperity for all.

· Efficiency: The market will allocate resources optimally.

· Freedom: The market will liberate individuals from state control.

· Innovation: The market will produce technological progress.

· Trickle-down: The wealth of the rich will benefit the poor.

7.2 The Outcomes

Growth: Slower than the post-war period. The global economy grew at 4.9% per year from 1950 to 1973. From 1980 to 2019, it grew at 3.2% (World Bank data).

Inequality: The richest 1% captured 63% of new wealth created since 2020 (Oxfam, 2023). The richest 1% captured half of all new wealth in the past decade.

Poverty: 3.7 million Australians live below the poverty line. 757,000 children live in poverty. 122,000 people are homeless (ACOSS, 2025; Salvation Army, 2026).

Financial crises: 1987, 1997, 2000, 2008. The 2008 crisis cost the global economy an estimated $10 trillion (IMF).

Deindustrialisation: The destruction of manufacturing communities in Australia, the US, and the UK. The collapse of the coal mining communities in the UK.

Environmental destruction: The market externalises environmental costs. Climate change, biodiversity loss, and resource depletion.

Social fragmentation: The collapse of social trust. The rise of populism. The decline of community.

7.3 The Resistance to Evidence

The pattern is consistent. When the promises fail, the theory is not abandoned. It is adjusted:

· The crisis was caused by external factors (the government, the unions, the “greed” of individuals).

· The reforms did not go far enough.

· The problem is implementation, not the theory.

· The next round of reforms will deliver the promise.

This is the structure of a belief system that cannot be falsified. It is not a scientific theory. It is a faith.

Status: Established for the outcomes. Inference for the resistance to evidence.

8. Conclusion: The Faith and the Citizen

The neoliberal theory is not a science. It is not a description of a natural phenomenon. It is a belief system — a set of claims about the world that are held with conviction, defended against evidence, and propagated through a network of institutions and individuals.

The theory promises prosperity. It delivers inequality. It promises freedom. It delivers dependency. It promises efficiency. It delivers waste. It promises growth. It delivers stagnation.

But the theory is not abandoned. It is protected. The faith is maintained. The believers persist. The cast of characters continues to preach. And the citizens — the ones who experience the outcomes daily — are told that the problem is not the theory. It is them.

The record is kept. The myth is named. And the faith is still being preached.

Claim -Status- Summary

#- Claim- Status

1- There was no pre-regulatory golden age -Established

2- Ancient economies were regulated- Established

3- Medieval economies were regulated- Established

4 -Mercantilism was state-managed- Established

5 -Adam Smith was not a free-market absolutist -Established

6- The 19th century was not laissez-faire- Established

7 -The post-war settlement was regulated and prosperous- Established

8- The myth functions as a fall and redemption narrative- Inference

9 -Neoliberalism naturalises the market -Established

10 -Neoliberalism moralises market outcomes -Established

11 -Neoliberalism individualises social problems- Established

12- Neoliberalism uses technocratic language -Established

13 -Neoliberalism sacralises the market -Inference

14 -Neoliberalism has structural parallels to a cult -Inference

15- The theory has a cast of founders, prophets, missionaries, enforcers -Established

16- The promised outcomes did not materialise -Established

17 -The theory resists disconfirming evidence- Inference

18 -Neoliberalism is a belief system, not a science -Inference

References

1. Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell.

2. Smith, A. (1759). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. London: A. Millar.

3. Hayek, F. A. (1944). The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge.

4. Hayek, F. A. (1960). The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

5. Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

6. Friedman, M., & Friedman, R. (1980). Free to Choose. New York: Harcourt.

7. von Mises, L. (1949). Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. New Haven: Yale University Press.

8. Mirowski, P. (2013). Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown. London: Verso.

9. Slobodian, Q. (2018). Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

10. Klein, N. (2007). The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Metropolitan Books.

11. Oxfam International. (2023). Survival of the Richest: How We Must Tax the Super-Rich Now to Fight Inequality. Oxford: Oxfam.

12. ACOSS. (2025). Poverty in Australia 2025. Sydney: Australian Council of Social Service.

13. The Salvation Army. (2026). Record Homelessness Should Shock Australia into Action. Melbourne: The Salvation Army.

14. Costanza, R., et al. (2014). Time to leave GDP behind. Nature, 505, 283–285.

15. Chang, H.-J. (2014). Economics: The User’s Guide. London: Bloomsbury.

16. Raworth, K. (2017). Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist. White River Junction: Chelsea Green.

17. Rodrik, D. (2011). The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy. New York: W. W. Norton.

18. Stiglitz, J. (2002). Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W. W. Norton.

19. Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

20. Milanovic, B. (2016). Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

21. Singer, M. T., & Lalich, J. (1995). Cults in Our Midst: The Hidden Menace in Our Everyday Lives. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

22. Hassan, S. (2000). Releasing the Bonds: Empowering People to Think for Themselves. Somerville: Freedom of Mind Press.

23. Lalich, J., & Tobias, M. (2006). Take Back Your Life: Recovering from Cults and Abusive Relationships. Berkeley: Bay Tree Publishing.

24. Klein, N. (2014). This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate. New York: Simon & Schuster.

25. World Bank. (2020). World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank.

By Andrew Paul Klein

Method notes – The paper examines the discipline of economics as a performative lens, the gap between economic models and lived experience, and the consequences for individuals, families, and communities in Australia. It includes a case study of the Docklands development in Melbourne as an illustration of market-driven urban planning. The paper does not argue that economics is without value. It argues that the economic model, as applied, is a lens that determines what is visible, and that what is not visible is not acted upon.

Abstract

This paper argues that the discipline of economics is not a neutral tool for observing reality but a performative lens that actively constructs the world it claims to describe. Drawing on the work of Michel Callon, Donald MacKenzie, and the sociology of performativity, it examines the shift from “political economy” to “positive economics,” the assumption of homo economicus, and the political adoption of economic theory in two waves: Keynesian and neoliberal. It documents the gap between the promises of economic theory and its outcomes, using the Washington Consensus as an example. It then examines the Australian case, documenting the adverse outcomes in homelessness, aged care, the NDIS, and veterans’ affairs. It presents a case study of the Docklands development in Melbourne, where the 1989 Cain government plan for a mixed-use, community-oriented precinct was abandoned by the Kennett government in favour of market-driven development. The result was high-rise towers, empty apartments, and an absence of social infrastructure. The paper concludes that the economic model creates a parallel world — internally coherent but disconnected from lived experience — and that the adverse outcomes it produces are not measured because the lens was not designed to measure them.

1. Introduction: The Lens and the World

Economics is often described as a science of scarcity, a discipline that studies how societies allocate limited resources. This description presents economics as a neutral tool — a lens for observing an independent reality.

This paper argues that the description is incomplete. Economics is not merely a descriptive science. It is performative. It does not simply observe the economy; it shapes it. The models, indicators, and dashboards that economists produce are not windows onto reality. They are lenses that determine what is visible. What the model measures is real within the model. What the model does not measure is not visible through the model. And the gap between the model and lived experience is where the harm lives.

The paper proceeds in eight sections. Section 2 traces the history of economics from political economy to positive economics. Section 3 examines the assumption of homo economicus. Section 4 documents the political adoption of economic theory. Section 5 examines the performativity thesis. Section 6 presents the Australian case studies. Section 7 examines the Docklands development as a state-level case study. Section 8 draws structural conclusions.

2. From Political Economy to Positive Economics

Extensive theorising about economic phenomena emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries, but the modern discipline traces its origin to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776). Smith launched the classical theory of political economy, which was developed by figures like David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. By the 1820s, it was common in learned circles to refer to political economy as a science, with Ricardo giving it a deductive rigour often compared to Euclidean geometry.

However, this “science” was almost entirely a literary pursuit. Ricardo used hypothetical numerical examples but did not posit algebraic functions or undertake quantitative verification. The basic assumptions about human behaviour were left rather vague. The shift from this moral and historical “political economy” to the modern, mathematically formalised “economics” occurred in the late 19th century, displacing the older usage.

Status: Established.

3. The Rational Agent: Homo Economicus

The core assumption of neoclassical economics is the model of homo economicus (economic man). This model posits agents as selfish, hyper-rational, and stable over time, who make decisions to maximise their utility. It assumes individuals have great mathematical skills, access to relevant, full information, and are motivated by self-interest.

Rational choice theory, which became popular in the social sciences from the 1950s to the 1990s, is the methodological pillar of this approach. It treats human behaviour as a series of cost-benefit analyses. The assumption is so foundational that one critique notes that the “perfectly rational homo oeconomicus is an odious assumption, because it implies that consumer protection is superfluous“.

This model was later severely challenged by behavioural economics and psychology, which demonstrated that real human decision-making is influenced by context, unconscious processes, altruism, and cognitive biases.

Status: Established.

4. The Political Adoption of Economic Theory

Political decision-makers took economic theories seriously in two major waves.

4.1 The Keynesian Wave (Post-WWII)

After the Great Depression and World War II, John Maynard Keynes’s ideas achieved an ascendant position. The Bretton Woods system (1944) created the IMF and World Bank, embedding Keynesian principles of managed capitalism and full employment into the international order. The post-war “Keynesian consensus” held that the state had a responsibility to secure full employment and manage demand. This was a social-democratic project, embraced by centre-left and centre-right parties alike in the developed world.

4.2 The Neoliberal Wave (1970s–1980s)

The Keynesian consensus unravelled in the 1970s with the collapse of Bretton Woods (1971) and the onset of “stagflation“. This crisis provided the opening for a new set of ideas, developed by the Chicago School (Milton Friedman) and the Austrian School (Friedrich Hayek). These thinkers argued for free markets, deregulation, and limited government. Their ideas were disseminated through a transatlantic network of think tanks and businessmen.

The political breakthrough came with the elections of Margaret Thatcher (1979) and Ronald Reagan (1980), who embarked on a systematic project of fiscal retrenchment, financial and labour market deregulation, and the erosion of Keynesian assumptions. This was a right-wing project, but it was later adopted and advanced by centre-left politicians like Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, who rebranded it as the “Third Way”.

Status: Established.

5. Promises and Outcomes: The Washington Consensus

The most explicit application of neoliberal theory to the developing world was the Washington Consensus, a set of policy prescriptions (liberalisation, privatisation, fiscal discipline) promoted by the IMF, World Bank, and US Treasury in the 1980s and 1990s.

The Promises: The agenda promised healthier budgets, lower inflation, economic growth, and poverty reduction.

The Outcomes: The results disappointed. While inflation was tamed, unemployment rose in many countries, and poverty remained widespread. The emphasis on market openness made states vulnerable to the side effects of globalization. The mismatch between reformers’ expectations and actual outcomes in terms of growth, poverty reduction, and inequality was documented extensively. More than a third of Latin America’s population continued to live in poverty.

Status: Established.

6. The Performativity of Economics

A crucial insight from economic sociology is that economics is not merely a descriptive science. It is performative. As Michel Callon argued, economics “performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather than observing how it functions”.

This means that economic theories do not simply describe an independent reality; they actively construct the reality they claim to describe. When a model of rational, self-interested agents is imposed through policy, it can create a world that increasingly resembles the model. This leads to a phenomenon called “counterperformativity,” where the application of a model can actually alter economic processes in ways that make them less like the model, as seen in the 2008 financial crisis.

The performativity thesis has been developed by Donald MacKenzie, who distinguishes between generic performativity (an element from theory is used in the world), effective performativity (the use of the theory changes processes), and Barnesian performativity (the use of the theory makes processes better correspond to the model). Counter -performativity describes the situation in which the use of a model undermines its empirical accuracy.

Status: Established.

7. The Dashboard and the Parallel World

7.1 The Dashboard Reality

Political decision-makers do not experience the world. They experience dashboards. A minister does not see the person on the aged care waitlist. They see a number on a slide. A Treasury official does not see the child in poverty. They see a line on a graph.

The dashboard is not a window. It is a model. And the model was built to measure what the market requires — not what the citizen experiences. The citizen’s experience is not in the data. It is in the gap.

This is the same structure as the algorithmic lens. The Integrated Assessment Tool (IAT) classifies the aged care applicant. The Robodebt algorithm classifies the welfare recipient. The Job Seeker Classification Instrument (JSCI) classifies the jobseeker. None of them see the person. They see the data point the model requires.

7.2 The Manufacture of Answers

The algorithms do not “manufacture” answers in the conspiratorial sense. They optimise for what they are designed to optimise for. If the objective function is cost reduction, the algorithm will find cost reductions. If the objective function is fraud detection, the algorithm will find fraud indicators. It will not ask whether the cost reduction causes harm, or whether the fraud indicator is a false positive. It cannot ask. The question is not in the objective function.

The harm is not a bug. It is a structural output. The algorithm produces what the model requires. And the model was designed to produce what the market requires.

7.3 The Invisible Outcomes

The adverse outcomes are not measured because the lens was not designed to measure them.

The aged care deaths on waitlists are not in the budget papers. They are not in the fiscal strategy. They are not in the GDP calculation. They are externalities. The model does not count them.

The children in poverty are not in the economic forecast. They are a distributional outcome, not an aggregate one. The model measures the aggregate.

The Robodebt deaths were not in the cost-benefit analysis. They were a human cost, not a fiscal one. The model counted the savings. It did not count the grief.

This is the structural lens. What it measures is real. What it does not measure does not exist for the purposes of the model. And the model is what the decision-maker sees.

7.4 GDP and Its Exclusions

The most significant expression of this lens is Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP was adopted as the primary measure of national success not because it captures wellbeing, but because it is measurable. It fails to account for ecological depletion, unpaid care work, income distribution, and non-market sources of wellbeing.

As Costanza et al. observe, “GDP in particular, and economic growth in general, is regularly referred to by leading economists, politicians, top-level decision-makers, and the media as though it represents overall progress“. GDP operates as a form of numerical rhetoric, shaping how society perceives the economy and what is seen as desirable policy action.

The measure became the target, and the target displaced the purpose. This is Goodhart’s Law: when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. The measure is optimised. The thing the measure was supposed to represent is lost.

Status: Established for the performativity thesis and GDP critique. Inference for the dashboard interpretation.

8. The Australian Case: Outcomes in the Lived World

The economic model is not abstract. It produces outcomes in the lives of real people. The following sections document the Australian evidence.

8.1 Homelessness and Housing

More than 122,000 people are experiencing homelessness across Australia. Almost 289,000 people sought support from The Salvation Army’s homelessness services in the past year. Nearly 169,000 households remain on public housing waitlists nationwide.

The Salvation Army’s 2026 Red Shield Report, which surveyed more than 4,400 people accessing emergency relief services, found:

· 75% of respondents were experiencing housing stress, rising to 86% among private renters.

· 60% had been unable to pay their rent or mortgage on time during the previous year.

· 37% feared losing their home altogether.

· 16% had couch surfed or lived in their car during the previous 12 months.

· Almost two-thirds (64%) of households with children could not afford winter clothing or shoes for their children.

Rough sleeping accounts for only 6.2% of homelessness. The most common form is severely overcrowded housing, affecting 39% of people experiencing homelessness.

The Productivity Commission’s Report on Government Services shows that 41% of people waiting to get into public housing are homeless or at risk of homelessness — up from 26% in 2015. Meanwhile, the Federal Government is spending more on tax breaks for property investors than on social housing, homelessness services and rent assistance combined. Property investor tax breaks come at a cost of more than $12 billion each year.

There are 3.7 million, or one in seven Australians, living below the poverty line, including 757,000 children.

Status: Established.

8.2 Aged Care

More than 230,000 Australians are waiting for aged-care services. The average wait time is 12 months, and 5,000 people have died while on that waiting list in the past year. The most recent federal aged care department data shows an average wait of about 10 months to access a Support at Home package. More than 4,800 people died in 2024–25 while waiting for their approved home care funding.

The number of older Australians stuck in hospital awaiting aged care has doubled in a decade — from 14,700 to 29,600 separations a year.

Status: Established.

8.3 The NDIS

The Australian Human Rights Commission has called on the government to halt the passage of the NDIS Amendment Bill until significant human rights concerns around process, accountability and the impact of the reforms are addressed. The Bill “would deliver the biggest ever cuts to the NDIS with tightened eligibility to reduce participant numbers and a substantial reduction in funding for social and community participation”.

From 1 October 2026, funding for Social, Civic and Community Participation supports will be reduced by 50%, and Capacity Building Daily Activities supports by 10%. The Senate NDIS inquiry revealed that 351,000 Australians will no longer be able to access the NDIS and will have to look for supports that “don’t exist”.

The Disability Discrimination Commissioner stated: “The government is dismissing genuine concerns that their proposed changes will seriously erode the life-changing impact the scheme has delivered for hundreds of thousands of people with disability across Australia“. The Commissioner noted that “automated decision-making is being introduced without a legislative framework, as was recommended by the Robodebt Royal Commission”.

Status: Established.

8.4 Veterans

Two years after the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide’s Final Report, the Government has implemented 32 recommendations and is “on track to implement around two-thirds” by the end of 2026. A new Veteran and Family Wellbeing Agency commenced in July 2026.

However, the structural causes of veteran distress — the culture of the ADF, the claims process, the transition to civilian life — are not addressed by an agency. The reforms are real. They are also slow.

Status: Established for the implementation record. Inference for the structural assessment.

9. Case Study: The Docklands, Melbourne

The Docklands development in Melbourne is a state-level illustration of the market model applied to urban planning.

9.1 The Original Plan (1989)

In 1989, the then-Labor Cain government wanted to transform 200 hectares of toxic swamps and industrial wasteland into an inner-city oasis. The planning blueprint envisioned a sparkling waterfront with varied and rich architecture and buildings as modest as two to six storeys so as not to dominate the harbour.

Michael Buxton, urban planning professor at RMIT, described the plan: “The model was low-to-medium rise, quite dense European-style development; lots of narrow laneways, town squares and open space along the river. Primarily residential.”

9.2 The Abandonment (1990s)

The plans were abandoned by the incoming Kennett government. Buxton states: “When the Kennett government was elected, the planning minister Robert Maclellan threw those plans in the bin and said he wasn’t going to do master planning for Docklands — he believed that the private sector was best placed to decide the type and scale of development, and he threw it open for business”.

The Kennett government withheld public subsidies from the development. Very few restrictions were placed on bids from developers. From 2000 onwards, high-rise buildings shot up across the Docklands.

9.3 The Outcome

The result was what Buxton calls a “failed model of urban form… based on alienation, dominated by high-rise towers separating people from the street and each other”.

The Speculative Vacancies study, commissioned by tax-reform group Prosper Australia, used water usage data to estimate vacancy rates. In 2013, 489 residences in Docklands used no water whatsoever — 17 per cent of dwellings connected to a provider. A further 290 used less than 50 litres of water on average each day — the equivalent of a leaky tap — leading to assumptions that they were empty or rarely used. The study found that almost a third of the area’s units may be empty at any time.

The social infrastructure is absent. Docklands has no high school, despite hundreds of children living in the suburb. There is no public pool, no recreation centre, and limited community facilities. A resident told a council meeting: “Docklands continues to struggle with serious planning failures that have been left unresolved for years. We live with harsh wind tunnel conditions, limited greenery and shade, wide roads that prioritise movement over people and inactive streets that discourage community life.”

The area has developed a reputation as a “ghost town” — a suburb Melbourne “loves to hate“. In 2006, Swinburne University housing researcher Professor Terry Burke said: “They should blow it up and start again.”

9.4 The Structural Lesson

The Docklands case demonstrates the difference between a market and a community.

A community, as Thomas Bender has written, “involves a limited number of people in a somewhat restricted social space or network held together by shared understandings and a sense of obligations”. Community ties are “intimate, reciprocal, and sympathetic“. Market ties, by contrast, “tend to be impersonal, rational, temporary, and instrumental”.

Amitai Etzioni draws the distinction in Martin Buber’s terms: “the community is the realm of the I-Thou, the economy that of the I-It”.

The Docklands was designed as a market, not a community. The land was opened to developers. The developers-built towers. The towers were sold as financial products. The financial products were held by investors who did not live in them. The investors left them empty. The community that was supposed to form did not form, because the architecture was not designed for it.

Status: Established for the historical record and the vacancy data. Inference for the structural interpretation.

10. The Structural Consequence

10.1 The Parallel World

The economic model creates a parallel world. In that world, the aggregates are growing, the deficit is under control, the market is efficient, the indicators are green. The language is coherent. The numbers add up. The reality is internally consistent.

But it is not the world people live in. In the lived world, the rent is unaffordable, the waitlist is twelve months, the disability support is being cut, the veteran has given up, the child is hungry. Those outcomes are not in the model. They are in the gap.

And the gap is where the harm accumulates. The model does not see it. The dashboard does not show it. The decision-maker does not act on it. Not because they are malicious. Because the lens does not show it.

10.2 The Trajectory

The trajectory is clear. The model will continue to measure what the market requires. The market requires the flow to continue. The flow is measured. The person the flow passes through is not. The person is in the gap.

The same architecture traced through the Digital Fiefdoms, the NDIS algorithm, the Robodebt scheme, the ATO’s two-tiered system, and the alliance lock-in is present here. The model is the lens. The lens determines what is visible. The visible determines what is actionable. And what is not visible is not acted upon.

The adverse outcomes are not measured because the model does not measure them. And the model does not measure them because it was not designed to. And it was not designed to because the purpose of the model is not to see the citizen. It is to manage the market.

The question is not whether the model can be reformed. It is whether the model can be replaced — not by a different measure, but by a different purpose. A purpose that sees the person. A purpose that measures what matters.

That purpose does not currently exist in the architecture. The record is what remains.

11. Conclusion: The Dashboard and the Citizen

The economic model is a lens. The lens was designed to see what the market requires. The market requires the flow to continue. The model measures the flow. It does not measure the person the flow passes through. And the person is in the gap.

That is the parallel world. It is real. It is measured. It is coherent. And it is not the world people live in.

The evidence from Australia — homelessness, aged care, the NDIS, veterans’ affairs — demonstrates the consequences. The Docklands case demonstrates the mechanism at the scale of a single precinct. The market is not the same space as the community. The dashboard does not see the individual. And the individual is in the gap.

The record is kept. The gap is named. And the lens is still pointing at the market.

Claim- Status- Summary

# -Claim- Status

1- Economics shifted from political economy to positive economics- Established

2- Homo economicus assumes selfish, hyper-rational agents -Established

3- Behavioural economics challenged the rational agent model -Established

4 -Keynesian consensus dominated post-WWII policy -Established

5- Neoliberal wave replaced Keynesianism from 1970s -Established

6 -Washington Consensus outcomes disappointed on poverty -Established

7 -Economics is performative (Callon, MacKenzie) -Established

8 -GDP excludes unpaid care, ecological depletion, inequality -Established

9 -122,000+ Australians experiencing homelessness -Established

10 -169,000 households on public housing waitlists -Established

11- 757,000 children living in poverty -Established

12- $12 billion on investor tax breaks vs social housing- Established

13- 230,000 waiting for aged care; 5,000 died on waitlist -Established

14- NDIS cuts: 351,000 to lose access; 50% reduction to participation- Established

15 -Automated decision-making introduced without framework -Established

16 -Docklands: 1989 plan abandoned by Kennett government -Established

17- 489 Docklands apartments (17%) used no water in 2013 -Established

18- Docklands lacks high school, pool, community facilities -Established

19- Community vs market: I-Thou vs I-It (Etzioni/Buber)- Established

20 -The model creates a parallel world disconnected from lived experience- Inference

21 -Adverse outcomes are not measured because the lens excludes them- Inference

22- The purpose of the model is to manage the market, not see the citizen- Inference

References

1. Callon, M. (1998). The Laws of the Markets. Blackwell.

2. MacKenzie, D. (2006). An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets. MIT Press.

3. MacKenzie, D. (2004). The big, bad wolf and the rational market: portfolio insurance, the 1987 crash and the performativity of economics. Economy and Society, 33(3), 303–334.

4. Etzioni, A. (2007). Community and Economy. In Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Blackwell Publishing.

5. Bender, T. (1978). Community and Social Change in America. Rutgers University Press.

6. Costanza, R., et al. (2014). Time to leave GDP behind. Nature, 505, 283–285.

7. The Salvation Army. (2026). Record Homelessness Should Shock Australia into Action. https://www.salvationarmy.org.au

8. ACOSS. (2026). Government spends more on property investor tax breaks than social housing, homelessness services and rent assistance combined. https://www.acoss.org.au

9. Anglicare. (2026). Hungry or Homeless 2026. https://www.anglicare.org.au

10. OpenAustralia. (2026, May 27). Mallee Electorate: Aged Care. https://www.openaustralia.org.au

11. ABC News. (2026, September 21). Older Australians continue to die on home support aged care waitlists.

12. Australian Human Rights Commission. (2026, August 5). Human Rights Commission urges Australian Government to ‘hit pause’ on NDIS reform Bill. https://humanrights.gov.au

13. People with Disability Australia. (2026, September 30). More NDIS changes from 1 October: What you need to know. https://pwd.org.au

14. DVA. (2026, September 9). Two years on: Progress continues on Royal Commission reforms for veterans and families. https://www.dva.gov.au

15. The Age. (2024, April 19). We should dare to dream of a Docklands that isn’t dreadful.

16. Time Out Melbourne. (2017, February 6). Is there hope for the Docklands?

17. The Age. (2014, November 11). ‘Ghost tower’ warning for Docklands after data reveals high Melbourne home vacancies.

18. ABC News. (2014, November 12). Water use study highlights empty flats in Melbourne’s Docklands.

19. SMH. (2026, May 16). Backlash against lord mayor’s Little India vision for Docklands.

20. Parliament of New South Wales. (2024). Save Greater Sydney Coalition submission on Transport Oriented Development. https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au

Andrew Paul Klein is a writer and analyst based in Boronia, Victoria. He accepts funding from no one.