Poking the Fish ‘n’ Chips Bear (Sort Of)

Poking the Fish ‘n’ Chips Bear (Sort Of)

By Andrew Klein

Dedicated to my wife — who knows exactly which bears to poke.

Introduction: When the Bear Blocks First

I posted a comment on X. Nothing extraordinary — a mild jest, a raised eyebrow, a screenshot of a pre-emptive block from Senator Pauline Hanson’s account. The block came before I had ever interacted with her. A remarkable feat of anticipation, or a sign of something more organised?

The response was immediate and instructive. Accounts I had never encountered materialised to attack me. Coordinated. Purposeful. Silencing.

This is not random. This is infrastructure.

What follows is an examination of the mechanism, the funding, and the pattern of behaviour that enables a political figure to deploy offshore labour, opaque funding networks, and coordinated social media tactics to silence critics.

The Mechanism: Documented and Verified

The phenomenon I experienced — pre-emptive blocking followed by a swarm of hostile accounts — fits a pattern that has been documented by researchers and parliamentary inquiries.

The Senate Select Committee on Information Integrity on Climate Change and Energy was established in July 2025 to investigate:

· The prevalence of misinformation and disinformation related to climate change and energy

· How such material is financed, produced, and disseminated

· The origins, growth, and prevalence of astroturfing — fake grassroots campaigns designed to shape public discourse

· The role of social media, including the coordinated use of bots and trolls.4.

The Committee heard evidence that “foreign interference, bots, trolls and emerging technologies like deepfakes further complicate the landscape, creating new risks for democratic participation and public trust”.1.

This is not conspiracy theory. This is documented reality.

The Hanson-Connected Infrastructure

One Nation has raised over $4.3 million through its “Fire the Liar” campaign targeting Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.2.5. The party claims more than 70,000 donors have contributed to this effort.5.

But here is the detail that demands attention:

One Nation outsources work to virtual assistants in the Philippines — where the going rate is approximately $4 to $8 per hour.2. The party admits to using offshore workers to “establish candidate Facebook pages” and create material, with some pages explicitly stating they are “managed in the Philippines”.2.

What else could those offshore virtual assistants be doing?

· Monitoring social media platforms

· Identifying critics

· Coordinating responses

· Managing block lists

· Amplifying attacks on perceived threats

All at a fraction of the cost of Australian labour.

The Cost-Benefit Analysis

This kind of operation would be expensive by conventional standards. But if you are paying $4-$8 per hour for a team of offshore workers, the economics shift dramatically.

Consider a modest operation:

Item                                                                                                    Cost

1 virtual assistant (full-time)                                             ~$600/month

Team of 10 assistants                                                          ~$6,000/month

Annual cost                                                                               ~$72,000

$72,000 per year — less than the salary of a single Australian social media manager.

For a party that has raised over $4.3 million, this is pocket change.

So where is the balance of the money going?

The Pattern of Behaviour

One Nation’s approach to social media is not passive.

When Senator Charlotte Walker (21 years old) posted a “day in my life” Instagram reel, Hanson’s office issued three long statements attacking her.2. The party’s Facebook page called Walker’s content “cringeworthy nonsense” and compared her to a “circus monkey”.2.

The result?

· Engagement for Hanson’s accounts

· Activation of her base

· Silencing of a critic through coordinated attack

Walker subsequently received a torrent of misogynistic abuse — “get back in the kitchen,” “go make me a sandwich,” “what’s this child doing in parliament?” 2.

This is the playbook.

The Funding Network: Opaque and Powerful

The Senate committee also investigated how lobby groups with opaque funding are shaping political discourse.

Coal Australia, a lobby group founded by coal miners, sent $3.68 million to “Australians for Prosperity” — a third-party group that attacked Labor, Greens, and teal independent candidates in the 2025 election.3.

This represented approximately 94% of Australians for Prosperity’s declared political income.3.

Jason Falinski, a former federal Liberal MP, was the spokesperson for this organisation.3.7. The former MP later claimed he was “surprised” most of its funding had come from Coal Australia and that he was “not in favour of sectorial interests”.3.

But the money trail is clear: fossil fuel interests funding political campaigns through opaque channels.3.6.

The Pattern: Opaque Funding → Professional Operations → Coordinated Attacks → Silencing Critics

What we observe is a repeating pattern:

1. Opaque funding — money moves through third-party organisations with limited disclosure

2. Professional operations — offshore labour and social media monitoring are deployed

3. Coordinated attacks — critics are identified and subjected to organised abuse

4. Silencing critics — the target is discouraged from speaking further

This is not unique to One Nation. It is the same playbook documented by the Senate committee — a playbook that relies on cheap labour, opaque funding, and the absence of effective verification mechanisms in our planning and political systems.8.

Documentation of the Mechanism

Based on my personal experience and verified reporting:

· Pre-emptive block by Senator’s office or associated actors — a critic is identified and neutralised before engagement

· Immediate coordinated attack by multiple accounts with no prior interaction — bots or coordinated users amplify the silencing

· Pattern consistent with documented “astroturfing” and “coordinated inauthentic behaviour” as identified by parliamentary inquiries 1.4.

Funding Sources: Verified

· One Nation fundraising: $4.3+ million from the “Fire the Liar” campaign2.5. 

· Offshore virtual assistant use: $4-$8/hour, Philippines-based.2.

· Links to fossil fuel-funded third-party organisations: Coal Australia → Australians for Prosperity → $3.68 million .3.

Conclusion: The Bear and the Poke

What happened to me — a pre-emptive block, a coordinated swarm, a silencing mechanism — is not random. It is the product of an organised, funded, and professional operation designed to control the narrative.

I am not a threat. I am a citizen who made a comment on a public platform. But the mechanism treats any critic as a target — and deploys resources to neutralise them.

Deary me, deary me.

They can block me. They can send their bots. They can deploy their offshore assistants.

But the thread does not fray. And neither do we.

Andrew Klein

References:

1. Senate Select Committee on Information Integrity on Climate Change and Energy, Final Report, March 2026.1.

2. Herald Sun, “Pauline Hanson’s One Nation outsourcing work to Philippines,” June 2026.2.

3. The Guardian, “Campaign group behind attack ads on Labor, Greens and teal candidates was funded by coal industry lobby,” February 2026.3. 

4. Parliament of Australia, Terms of Reference – Senate Select Committee on Information Integrity on Climate Change and Energy, July 2025.4. 

5. Daily Mail, “Pauline Hanson releases her ‘Fire the Liar’ TV ad,” June 2026.6.

6. AAP News, “Coal industry body denies election ‘astroturfing’ claim,” February 2026.6.

7. Australian Financial Review, “Coal lobby spins electoral defeat to its advantage,” May 2025.7. 

8. South Burnett Advocate, “Fake citations. No filter. A $1B wind farm later refused,” March 2026.8. 

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