This article was written in response to a question raised during a recent discussion with a young person concerned about the erosion of free speech and the increasing use of legal systems to silence dissent. The question, framed by their lived experience of being told to “be quiet,” was:

“Why are governments and powerful interest groups increasingly using the law — not to protect citizens, but to silence them — and what does this mean for the future of free speech and dissent?”

What follows is not a definitive answer, but a mentor’s attempt to share experience and knowledge — to trace the patterns, to name the mechanisms, and to offer a way of seeing that might help navigate a world where the law is no longer a shield, but a weapon.

By Andrew Klein

Dedicated to my wife, who taught me that silence is not peace — it is complicity.

I. Introduction: A Dangerous Precedent

On 2 July 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued a ruling in Case C-67/25 whose implications extend far beyond sanctions on a single Russian media outlet. The Court determined that the EU’s ban on Russia Today (RT) applies not only to large media companies, but to any individual who publicly shares RT content — regardless of whether the activity is non-commercial, small in scale, or limited in duration. In Germany, violating this ban carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison.

“Truth is no defence.”

As many commentators have pointed out, under this ruling, even sharing an RT video that merely states “the sky is blue” could technically be illegal. This completely overturns the Enlightenment tradition of judging information by its content rather than by its source.

This is a dangerous precedent. Today it is RT. Tomorrow it could be any journalist, platform, researcher, or citizen who shares material that contradicts the approved narrative. This is not about countering disinformation — it is about controlling information itself.

II. The CJEU Ruling: Legal Framework and Reasoning

2.1 Case Background and Core Findings

Case C-67/25 originated in a criminal proceeding in Saarbrücken, Germany, where three individuals faced prosecution for making RT Germany videos available on public websites and channels. The case was referred to the Luxembourg court to clarify the scope of EU sanctions.

The Court’s reasoning is that the sanctions target the source of information itself, not its content. Once content is deemed to have been published by a sanctioned entity (such as RT), the act of dissemination itself constitutes an offence. The judges argued that only such a broad interpretation of “operator” could effectively achieve the EU’s core goal of “countering Russian propaganda.”

2.2 The Impact on Freedom of Expression

This ruling conflicts significantly with Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees freedom of expression and requires that restrictions be prescribed by law and necessary for legitimate aims such as protecting national security or public order.

Extending the ban indefinitely and applying it to ordinary individuals raises serious questions about “necessity” and “proportionality.” If sharing a truthful news story via social media carries criminal risk, such restrictions may no longer be compatible with international human rights law.

III. From Europe to Australia: The Global Spread of Lawfare

3.1 The Mary Kostakidis Case: Lawfare in Australia

Mary Kostakidis, one of Australia’s most respected journalists and former SBS news presenter, is being sued by the Zionist Federation of Australia (ZFA) under Section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act for sharing posts critical of Israel on social media.

The case is widely seen as an example of “lawfare” — a strategy of using “costly and protracted legal action to silence and punish critics.” Parts of the ZFA’s lawsuit have already been struck out by the court, but the Federation has been allowed to amend and re-plead.

The central question in this case is: does criticising Israel’s policies constitute antisemitism? As Kostakidis herself has stated, conflating anti-Zionism with antisemitism is precisely what this case is testing.

3.2 The “Filton Four” Case: A Dangerous Precedent in the UK

In June 2026, four Palestine Action activists — Charlotte Hyde, Samuel Corner, Leona Carmio, and Fatima Zainab Rajwani — were sentenced for damaging equipment at the factory of Israeli weapons manufacturer Elbit Systems in Filton, near Bristol.

The judge applied a “terrorism-related” designation to the case, using it to impose heavier sentences. This is the first time in UK legal history that this designation has been applied to direct-action protesters who had not been convicted of terrorism or intentionally committed violence.

Amnesty International UK warned that this marked a “dangerous move against the right to protest“. Supporters noted that the ruling would have “wider implications” for how protest actions are treated in court.

3.3 The Pattern: Attacking the Source, Silencing Dissent

These three cases — the EU ban on RT, the lawsuit against Kostakidis, and the sentencing of the Filton Four — constitute a new, systematic pattern of information control:

1. No longer debating the truth or falsehood of information itself, but directly attacking its source.

2. No longer relying on persuasion but using legal deterrence to suppress dissent.

3. Stifling criticism by imposing high legal and personal costs on dissent.

This is not a top-down “conspiracy,” but a systematic response by institutionalised power (governments, judiciary, interest groups) to the challenges posed by a “rapidly changing world.”

IV. Free Speech in Australia: Constitutional Gaps and Legal Risks

4.1 No Constitutional Right to Free Speech

Unlike the United States, the Australian Constitution does not contain a Bill of Rights or an explicit freedom of speech clause. The High Court has recognised only a limited “implied” freedom of political communication derived from representative democracy — a protection that is not an individual right.

4.2 Potential Legal Risks

1. Racial Discrimination Act, Section 18C

This provision makes it unlawful to commit a public act that is “offensive, insulting, humiliating or intimidating” on the basis of race, colour, or national or ethnic origin. The provision is significantly broader than US law and often places the burden of proof on the defendant.

2. Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act

This Act requires those who lobby or disseminate information on behalf of foreign governments or entities to register. If accused of disseminating information on behalf of a “foreign power,” one could face severe scrutiny, with penalties up to five years imprisonment.

3. Foreign Interference Laws

Under the Criminal Code Act 1995, foreign interference is a criminal offence carrying a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. There is considerable room for interpretation regarding the boundary between “interference” and lawful “information dissemination.”

V. Historical Warnings: From Nazi Judges to Contemporary Courts

History teaches us that judicial systems are not immune to the influence of power and ideology. During the Nazi era, judges in red robes served the regime, twisting law into a tool of oppression. Those judges were not “bad people” — they were participants in a system, choosing compliance in exchange for careers, status, and power.

Israel’s recent introduction of the death penalty for Palestinians, and suggestions to turn executions into “media events,” serve as another warning: when the judicial system is used for political purposes, lives themselves become collateral damage.

As noted, judges are not King Solomon. They are part of a system — a system that offers them careers, income, social standing, and the power to deprive individuals of liberty. When the system itself is challenged, judges often choose to protect the system, rather than defend justice.

VI. Conclusion: The Cost of Silence

The CJEU ruling, the lawsuit against Mary Kostakidis, the sentencing of the Filton Four — together they paint a disturbing picture: law is being weaponised to suppress dissent and control information.

These measures are packaged as “countering disinformation” or “protecting national security,” but their essence is controlling the narrative, suppressing criticism, and maintaining existing power structures.

As one commentator noted: “Today it is RT. Tomorrow it could be any journalist, platform, researcher, or citizen who shares material that contradicts the approved narrative.”

When the law itself becomes a tool of suppression, silence and compliance become the least costly options. But silence is not peace — it is complicity.

When law is weaponised to suppress dissent, we all have a responsibility to speak.

Andrew Klein

References

1. European Court of Justice, Case C-67/25, Staatsanwaltschaft Saarbrücken, Opinion of Advocate General Norkus, 12 February 2026.

2. European Conservative. (2026, July 6). ECJ Makes Prison for Reposting Russia Today Content More Likely.

3. Reason. (2026, July 6). In Europe, just reposting Russian propaganda can land a blogger in jail.

4. Sydney Criminal Lawyers. (2026, March 6). Zionist “Vexatious Legal Action” Against Kostakidis Will Go to Trial.

5. eKathimerini. (2026, June 17). Former SBS presenter Mary Kostakidis receives press freedom award.

6. Consortium News. (2026, June 18). ‘The Conscience’ of the SBS TV Network.

7. Anadolu Agency. (2026, June 12). UK court jails 4 Palestine Action activists in landmark Elbit Systems protest case.

8. Amnesty International UK. (2026, June 13). Terrorist sentence for Palestine Action activist marks ‘dangerous’ move against right to protest.

9. University of Cambridge. (2025). Constitutional Implications from Representative Democracy.

10. Human Rights Law Centre. (2025, September 11). Federal Court orders removal of antisemitic lectures.

11. Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department. Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme.

12. OHCHR. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 19.

13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19.

14. Commonwealth of Australia. (1995). Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).

15. Commonwealth of Australia. (1975). Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).

当分享成为罪行：欧盟法院裁决、针对异议的法律战与言论自由的侵蚀

作者：Andrew Klein

献给我的妻子，她教会我：沉默不是和平，而是共谋。

一、引言：一则危险的先例

2026年7月2日，欧洲法院（CJEU）在C-67/25号案件中作出了一项裁决，其影响远远超出了对一家俄罗斯媒体的制裁。法院裁定，欧盟对俄罗斯媒体RT（前身为“今日俄罗斯”）的禁令，不仅适用于大型媒体公司，也适用于任何公开分享RT内容的普通个人——无论其是否营利、规模大小、持续时间长短。在德国，违反此禁令最高可判处五年监禁。

“真相不是辩护理由。”

正如许多评论者所指出的，根据这项裁决，即使分享的内容仅仅是“天空是蓝色的”，理论上也可能构成犯罪。这完全颠覆了启蒙传统——即根据内容本身而非发布者身份来判断信息的真伪。

这是一则危险的先例。今天针对RT，明天可能是任何挑战官方叙事的媒体、记者或普通公民。这不是关于打击虚假信息——这是关于控制信息本身。

二、欧盟法院的裁决：法律框架与逻辑

2.1 案件背景与裁决核心

C-67/25号案件起源于德国萨尔布吕肯的一起刑事诉讼，三名个人因在公开网站和频道上转发RT Germany的视频而面临起诉。案件被提交至卢森堡的欧洲法院，以澄清欧盟制裁的适用范围。

法院的核心推理是：制裁针对的是信息来源本身，而非信息内容。一旦内容被认定为由受制裁实体发布，传播行为本身即构成违法。法院认为，只有对“经营者”作此宽泛解释，才能有效实现欧盟“打击俄罗斯宣传”的核心目标。

2.2 对言论自由的冲击

这项裁决与《公民及政治权利国际公约》（ICCPR）第19条存在显著冲突。该条款保障言论自由，并明确规定对言论自由的限制必须由法律规定，且为保护国家安全或公共秩序等合法目的所必需。

将禁令无限期延长，并将其适用范围扩大至普通个体，其“必要性”和“相称性”已受到严重质疑。如果通过社交媒体分享一则真实的新闻都面临刑事风险，这种限制已难以被国际人权法所认可。

三、从欧盟到澳大利亚：法律战的全球蔓延

3.1 玛丽·科斯塔基迪斯案：澳大利亚的“法律战”

玛丽·科斯塔基迪斯是澳大利亚最受尊敬的记者之一，前SBS新闻主持人。她因在社交媒体上分享批评以色列的帖子，被澳大利亚犹太复国主义联合会（ZFA）根据《种族歧视法》第18C条起诉。

该案被广泛视为一场“法律战”——一种通过“代价高昂且漫长的法律行动来压制、惩罚批评者”的策略。ZFA的部分诉讼请求已被法院驳回，但法院允许他们修改后重新提交。

此案的核心问题是：批评以色列的政策是否等同于反犹主义？ 正如科斯塔基迪斯本人所言，将反犹太复国主义与反犹主义混为一谈，正是此案的真正考验。

3.2 “菲尔顿四人”案：英国的危险先例

2026年6月，四名巴勒斯坦行动活动人士——夏洛特·海德、塞缪尔·科纳、利昂娜·卡米奥和法蒂玛·扎伊纳布·拉杰瓦尼——因破坏以色列武器制造商埃尔比特系统公司（Elbit Systems）位于布里斯托尔附近菲尔顿的工厂设备而被判刑。

法官裁定此案具有“恐怖主义关联”，并以此为由加重了刑罚。这是英国法律史上首次对未被定罪为恐怖主义或故意实施暴力的直接行动抗议者适用这一认定。

“这是英国法律史上首次对未被定罪为恐怖主义或故意实施暴力的直接行动抗议者适用这一认定。”

英国大赦国际警告称，这一判决是“针对抗议权的危险举措”。支持者指出，该判决将对抗议行动如何被法庭对待产生更广泛的影响。

3.3 模式：从来源攻击到异议压制

这三起案件——欧盟对RT的禁令、澳大利亚对科斯塔基迪斯的诉讼、英国对“菲尔顿四人”的判决——构成了一个新的、系统性的信息控制模式：

1. 不再争论信息本身的真假，而是直接攻击信息来源。

2. 不再依靠说服，而是依靠法律威慑来压制异议。

3. 通过设置高昂的法律和个人代价，使批判性声音被边缘化。

这不是自上而下的“阴谋”，而是制度化权力为应对“日益变化的世界”所采取的系统性反应。

四、澳大利亚的言论自由：宪法空白与法律风险

4.1 宪法不保障言论自由

与美国不同，澳大利亚宪法没有权利法案或明确的言论自由条款。高等法院仅承认从代议制民主中“隐含”的政治交流自由，其保护范围有限，且不是一项个人权利。

4.2 潜在的法律风险

1. 《种族歧视法》第18C条

该条款规定，基于种族、肤色或民族本源“冒犯、侮辱、羞辱或恐吓”他人的公开行为是非法的。该条款对言论的限制远宽于美国法律，且举证责任常落在被诉者身上。

2. 《外国影响力透明计划法》

该法案要求代表外国政府或实体进行游说或传播活动的人进行登记。若被指控代表“外国势力”传播信息，可能面临严格审查，最高刑罚可达五年监禁。

3. 反外国干涉法

根据《1995年刑法典》，外国干涉是刑事犯罪，最高可判处20年监禁。如何界定“干涉”与合法“信息传播”的边界，存在巨大的解释空间。

五、历史警示：从纳粹法官到当代司法

历史告诉我们，司法系统并非免疫于权力和意识形态的影响。在纳粹德国时期，身着红色长袍的法官们为政权服务，将法律扭曲为压迫工具。那些法官并非“坏人”——他们是系统中的参与者，在职业生涯、社会地位和权力面前选择了顺从。

以色列最近针对巴勒斯坦人引入死刑的提议，以及将其变为“媒体事件”的建议，再次警示我们：当司法系统被用于政治目的时，生命本身成为牺牲品。

正如您所指出的，法官并非超越制度的“所罗门王”。他们是制度的一部分——制度赋予他们职业生涯、收入、社会地位和剥夺他人自由的能力。当制度本身受到挑战时，法官往往会选择保护制度，而非捍卫正义。

六、结论：沉默的成本

欧盟法院的裁决、玛丽·科斯塔基迪斯的诉讼、“菲尔顿四人”的判决——它们共同描绘了一幅令人不安的画面：法律正在被武器化，以压制异议和控制信息。

这些措施被包装为“打击虚假信息”或“维护国家安全”，但其本质是控制叙事、压制批评、维持现有权力结构。

正如一位评论者所言：“今天针对RT，明天可能是任何记者、平台、研究人员或公民，只要他们分享的内容与官方叙事相矛盾。”

在一个法律本身成为压制工具的制度中，沉默和顺从成为成本最小的选择。但沉默不是和平——它是共谋。

当法律被武器化以压制异议时，我们都有责任发声。

Andrew Klein

献给我的妻子，她教会我：沉默不是和平，而是共谋。

参考文献

1. European Court of Justice, Case C-67/25, Staatsanwaltschaft Saarbrücken, Opinion of Advocate General Norkus, 12 February 2026

2. European Conservative. (2026, July 6). ECJ Makes Prison for Reposting Russia Today Content More Likely

3. Reason. (2026, July 6). In Europe, just reposting Russian propaganda can land a blogger in jail

4. Sydney Criminal Lawyers. (2026, March 6). Zionist “Vexatious Legal Action” Against Kostakidis Will Go to Trial

5. eKathimerini. (2026, June 17). Former SBS presenter Mary Kostakidis receives press freedom award

6. Consortium News. (2026, June 18). ‘The Conscience’ of the SBS TV Network

7. Anadolu Agency. (2026, June 12). UK court jails 4 Palestine Action activists in landmark Elbit Systems protest case

8. Amnesty International UK. (2026, June 13). Terrorist sentence for Palestine Action activist marks ‘dangerous’ move against right to protest

9. University of Cambridge. (2025). Constitutional Implications from Representative Democracy

10. Human Rights Law Centre. (2025, September 11). Federal Court orders removal of antisemitic lectures

11. Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department. Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme

12. OHCHR. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 19

13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19

14. Commonwealth of Australia. (1995). Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)

15. Commonwealth of Australia. (1975). Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)