From Sassanian Brass to AUKUS – What a 1,500‑Year-Old Helmet Teaches About Australia’s Submarine Gamble

Posted on May 30, 2026 by Andrew Klein

“A helmet is not just a helmet – it is a statement. And Australia’s statement has been written in Washington.”

By Andrew Klein

Dedication: To my wife — who sees the difference between a sovereign nation and a resource colony.

For 1500 years, the brass helmets of Sasanian Persia lay buried in the dust of Nineveh and Merv, the silent witnesses to an empire that understood something Australia has forgotten: a state that does not control its own military logistics and material supply chains has surrendered its sovereignty to others. The Sasanians knew that a helmet is not just a helmet. It is a statement of industrial reach, of strategic planning, of the will to defend oneself with one’s own hands.

Today, Australia is spending $368 billion on nuclear submarines that may never arrive, while its ability to manufacture even the smallest arms remains perilously thin. The lesson of the Sasanian helmet is not ancient history. It is a mirror held up to a nation that has outsourced its defence to consultants, its resources to foreign corporations, and its future to promises written in Washington and London.

I. The Sasanian Helmet: A Masterclass in Statecraft

Between the 4th and 7th centuries CE, the Sasanian Empire controlled a vast territory stretching from Mesopotamia to Central Asia. Its armies were the only force capable of challenging Rome. And its metallurgists had mastered brass – an alloy of copper and zinc – long before the Islamic world adopted it.

A 2026 study by scientists from the British Museum and the University of Cambridge examined brass artefacts from the cities of Merv (present‑day Turkmenistan) and Nineveh (present‑day Iraq). They discovered that the Sasanians used brass in two very different ways: for jewellery and ornaments in the east, and for military helmets in the west. This was no accident. The study found that the Sasanian army drove the spread of this technology; the scale of military demand required a regulated supply chain, possibly involving state control over mining and the cementation process.

In Merv, the eastern provincial capital, brass was used for prestige jewellery, reflecting local access to luxury trade routes. At Nineveh, the western frontier city, the very same material was forged into helmets and scale armour. The Sasanians matched the material to the strategic need – a principle that seems to have escaped modern Australia.

The study also notes that the Sasanian state controlled the production of luxury objects and certain military supplies, as well as silver mines. This centralised control was not about bureaucracy; it was about survival. The empire could not afford to rely on foreign sources for the materials of war. It built mines, smelters, workshops, and supply lines – all within its own borders.

II. The Mirror of Persia: What a Helmet Reveals About Australia

Now consider Australia. The Sasanians understood that a helmet is the end product of a long chain: mining, smelting, alloying, forging, and distribution. Each link in that chain required state capacity, industrial infrastructure, and strategic autonomy.

Australia, by contrast, has allowed its defence manufacturing base to atrophy to the point of dependency. The Lithgow Small Arms Factory remains the only small‑arms manufacturing capability of its type in the country, exporting to 17 nations but still reliant on Thales, a French multinational, for its core production lines. After the Boer War, Australia recognised the need for a sovereign arms‑making capability due to its geographic isolation. A century later, that capability has shrunk to a single factory.

The AUKUS submarine agreement exemplifies this dependency. Under the deal, Australia is expected to acquire three to five US Virginia‑class nuclear submarines starting in the early 2030s, with five more British‑designed boats to follow in the 2040s. The projected cost is approximately $368 billion.

But delays are already mounting. A US Congressional Budget Office analysis has found that submarine construction timelines are now four years behind schedule, and a key multi‑year contract for Virginia‑class submarines has remained unsigned for nearly 28 months. The US Navy’s production rate of about 1.2 boats a year is far below the 2.3 boats a year needed to fulfil the AUKUS commitment.

More troubling is the sovereignty clause. US legislation requires that any future president must certify that transferring submarines to Australia “will not degrade the United States undersea capabilities”. The president of the day could simply refuse to sign. As one US naval postgraduate thesis warned, Australia may be left with “a potent but politically constrained fleet” and bear “high costs and constraints without full autonomy or strategic clarity”.

The Sasanians would never have accepted such a condition. They understood that a weapon you cannot deploy without a foreigner’s permission is no weapon at all.

III. Critical Minerals: The New Silk Road

The Sasanian Empire sat at the heart of the Silk Road, controlling the flow of luxury goods – including the zinc ore needed for brass – between China, India, and the Mediterranean. They did not merely extract resources; they controlled the processing and distribution.

Australia, by contrast, has signed a critical minerals deal with the United States that critics fear “could give the US too much control over Australia’s resources and sovereignty”. The deal, announced during a meeting between Prime Minister Albanese and President Trump, involves major US investment in Australian mining and refining projects, including a gallium refinery in Western Australia and a rare earth mine in the Northern Territory.

The US is desperate for these minerals because China has imposed export controls on rare earths essential for weapons platforms such as the Virginia‑class submarines. Australia is being positioned as a resource colony, not a partner. The refining capacity remains abroad; the strategic control remains in Washington.

The Sasanians would have been appalled. They did not dig ore for others to smelt. They built their own foundries, trained their own smiths, and armed their own soldiers.

IV. US‑Israel Military Integration: The Strategic Backdrop

While Australia waits for submarines that may never arrive, the United States is quietly integrating its military forces with Israel to an unprecedented degree.

Section 224 of the 2027 National Defense Authorization Act is devoted to the “United States‑Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative,” which would fuse US and Israeli defence sectors in areas including AI, quantum, autonomous systems, cyber, and biotech. The report notes that this would provide “a higher level of military‑industrial integration than the US has with any other country in the world”.

This integration is not about procurement delays. It is about immediate, operational alignment. The US has already stationed forces in Israel, and an Israeli official has stated that “there are American forces here that will not be moving in the near or even distant future”. This is what strategic partnership looks like when the partner is considered a genuine ally, not a paying customer.

Australia is not treated as such. It is treated as a client – paying billions to prop up the US shipbuilding industry, receiving promises of second‑hand submarines, and being asked to host US naval forces at HMAS Stirling as part of Submarine Rotational Force – West. The Sasanians would have called this tribute, not alliance.

V. When Small Wars Become Big Business

The Sasanians fought existential wars – against Rome, against the Hephthalites, against the early Islamic caliphates. They understood that war is not a business; it is a matter of survival.

Today, the global arms industry treats war as a profit centre. The top 100 arms corporations sold $597 billion in weapons in 2022, despite a global economic slowdown. When warfare generates transnational profits, peace becomes financially unattractive compared to continued conflict. The profit motive incentivises arms‑makers to start and prolong wars, playing clients off against one another to generate more contracts.

This is the context for Australia’s AUKUS gamble. The alliance serves the interests of US and UK defence contractors far more than Australian security. The submarines are too large for Australian needs (crews of 145, more than double the size of a Collins‑class crew), and a fleet of only eight SSNs will not provide an effective deterrent. The deal is not about defence; it is about integrating Australia into the US military‑industrial supply chain.

Meanwhile, human rights are eroding. The UN has raised “grave concerns” about the overrepresentation of Indigenous children in Australia’s criminal justice system. A Human Rights Assessment identified urgent actions needed to protect children, while the government focuses its resources on submarines and security – for a threat that may never materialise.

The Sasanians would have prioritised their people before their weapons. Australia does the opposite.

VI. Conclusion: The Helmet in the Mirror

The Sasanian helmet is not an artefact. It is a reproach.

It reproaches a nation that has outsourced its defence to others. It reproaches a government that spends $368 billion on submarines that may never arrive while its small‑arms industry shrinks to a single factory. It reproaches a political class that has forgotten the first duty of statecraft: to control the means of one’s own protection.

The Sasanian Empire fell not because its armour was weak, but because its leadership could not adapt. Australia is not an empire, but the lesson is the same. A state that cannot produce its own weapons, control its own resources, or deploy its own forces without foreign permission has already surrendered.

The brass helmet does not judge. It merely waits – in the dust of Nineveh, in the pages of a study – to remind us of what a sovereign nation looks like.

Australia would do well to look at its own reflection.

Andrew Klein

References

1. Davis, M. E., Mongiatti, A., Simpson, S. J., & Martinón‑Torres, M. (2026). Brass in the Sasanian frontiers: Assessing metallurgical innovation through archaeological finds at Merv and Nineveh. Archaeological Research in Asia, 46, 100688.

2. Greek Reporter. (2026, May 21). Scientists Reveals Secret Behind the Golden Armor of Ancient Persian Warriors.

3. ABC News. (2026, April 23). AUKUS submarine builds hit by contract and construction delays.

4. Pearls and Irritations. (2026, May 10). Australia’s naval defence without AUKUS pillar one.

5. Sydney Morning Herald. (2026, April 22). Forget Trump. On AUKUS, it’s the next president we must worry about.

6. The West Australian. (2026, May 21). US naval captain fires political torpedo at AUKUS deal.

7. Naval Institute. (2026, May 13). Naval defence without AUKUS Pillar I.

8. AA.com.tr. (2026, May 30). US Congress quietly moving to integrate American and Israeli military forces: Report.

9. SBS News. (2026, October 21). Deals signed as Trump and Albanese meet; but what are the wider implications?.

10. Lowy Institute. (2025, November 6). A new permanent contest with China over critical minerals will be hard to win.

11. Foreign Policy in Focus. (2025, March 25). Sudan: Toward a World Ruled by Non‑State Actors.

12. SIPRI Arms Industry Database (2022).

13. Australian Human Rights Commission. (2026, May 12). Call for urgent national action after UN raises ‘grave concerns’ about treatment of Indigenous children.

14. Defence Connect. (2026, March 31). Defence, Thales negotiate industrialised machinegun manufacturing in NSW.

15. Asian Military Review. (2024, October 15). Sourcing the Best Small Arms From Near and Far.

16. APDR. (2023, September 3). Thales Australia opens new facility at Lithgow.

Less Than Nothing – What the American Security Guarantee Really Costs Australia

Posted on May 22, 2026 by Andrew Klein

“Before 2011, it had been the decades‑long policy of successive governments that no foreign combat forces would be based, hosted, rotated or otherwise directly supported in Australia — and that Australia would defend itself with its own combat forces. This radical change has never been tested with the electorate.”

By Andrew Klein

Dedication: To my wife — who taught me that silence is not neutrality. It is a choice. And that the price of subordination is always paid by the subordinate.

I. The Architecture of “Presence”

Australia maintains a formal policy of no permanent foreign bases on its soil. On paper, this preserves sovereignty. In practice, the distinction between “permanent base” and “rotational force with permanent infrastructure” has become a fiction.

The Marine Rotational Force – Darwin (MRF-D) has been deploying approximately 2,500 US Marines to the Northern Territory every six months since 2012. This is not a temporary arrangement. It is a rhythm. And rhythms, once established, are harder to break than treaties.

Under AUKUS, the Submarine Rotational Force – West (SRF-West) will begin operating out of HMAS Stirling in Western Australia in 2027, hosting up to four US Virginia-class nuclear submarines plus one UK Astute-class boat. US Navy personnel will number in the hundreds, likely growing to over a thousand.

The government calls this “rotational.” But the infrastructure being built — the fuel storage, the maintenance facilities, the housing for US families in Perth and Alice Springs — suggests something more enduring.

Former Prime Minister Paul Keating has argued that Defence Minister Richard Marles ceded power to the US in a “dark moment” by confirming that Australia’s geography would be crucial to the US in any war with China. Keating contends that Australia compromised its sovereignty when the Gillard government agreed in 2011 to the rotational deployment of US marines in Darwin, with the Abbott government then codifying this “betrayal” in the 2014 Force Posture Agreement.

Before 2011, it had been the decades‑long policy of successive governments that no foreign combat forces would be based, hosted, rotated or otherwise directly supported in Australia — and that Australia would defend itself with its own combat forces. This radical change has never been tested with the electorate.

As Michael Pezzullo, former secretary of home affairs and deputy secretary of defence, has observed, the US Force Posture Initiative has been run within the Department of Defence, until recently, as an “estate and property activity.” If one were cynical, one might think this had been done to conceal a profound revolution in policy within an innocuous infrastructure and facilities management program.

II. Pine Gap: The Heart That Cannot Be Removed

Pine Gap is not a base. It is a city. Approximately 800 personnel operate there, of whom 80–90 per cent are American. Its mission: satellite tracking, early warning, missile defence data, and intelligence collection supporting US and allied operations worldwide.

It is, by any honest measure, a US military installation on Australian soil.

In the current conflict with Iran, Pine Gap has been “working overtime” providing targeting intelligence for US and Israeli airstrikes. Dr Richard Tanter of the Nautilus Institute stated plainly: “We are complicit — most importantly through the intelligence facilities.”

When the US and Israel launched airstrikes on Tehran in early 2026, Australian intelligence — gathered at Pine Gap, processed through Five Eyes, fed into US targeting systems — was in the room.

The government insists Australia is not taking “offensive action.” But providing the coordinates for a bomb is not a defensive act. It is complicity.

III. The Whitlam Precedent: What Happens When You Say No

The most instructive moment in Australian-US intelligence relations occurred in 1974-75.

Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, having learned that Pine Gap was run by the CIA — not the Pentagon, as Defence head Arthur Tange had deceived him into believing — threatened not to renew Pine Gap’s lease and announced he would reveal CIA agents’ identities in Parliament.

The response was swift. CIA East Asia chief Ted Shackley, with Henry Kissinger’s approval, sent a telex to ASIO threatening to cut off the intelligence relationship unless ASIO provided a “satisfactory explanation” for Whitlam’s behaviour. That telex was circulated in Canberra — and to Governor-General John Kerr .

We know what followed.

Fifty years later, Dr Elizabeth Cham, Whitlam’s former executive assistant, has spoken for the first time about being recalled from holidays to type and deliver a mystery letter to an American official on the day before the dismissal.

“He [Whitlam] did dictate it to me. I walked down Collins Street, and I handed it to a CIA agent up on the steps of the Hotel Australia,” Dr Cham said on the Australia Institute’s After America podcast.

“It was about whether he would resign the lease on Pine Gap.”

The letter has never been found in the Australian archives.

The lesson was not lost on subsequent governments: question the alliance, and the alliance will question your right to govern.

IV. Five Eyes: The Frame Through Which Australia Sees the World

The Five Eyes intelligence alliance — Australia, the US, the UK, Canada and New Zealand — was established in 1946. But it is not an alliance of equals.

Professor Desmond Ball estimated a decade ago that the CIA provided 90 per cent of Five Eyes input. Since then, the gap has almost certainly widened, with US technological capabilities growing exponentially.

What this means is simple: Australia’s picture of the world is substantially constructed by US intelligence agencies. When the US identifies China as an existential threat, Australian analysts absorb that framing. When the US demands that allies carry more of the burden, Australian governments comply — not because they are convinced, but because the infrastructure of perception leaves little room for dissent.

John Menadue, former Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet under Whitlam and Fraser, put it directly: “Our intelligence services need to break free from excessive US influence” . He noted that a Parliamentary Committee exists to oversee US‑owned intelligence agencies, but MPs “quickly become part of the intelligence club” — a phenomenon known as regulatory capture.

Professor Wanning Sun has documented how Australian media have helped create the perception of threat itself — through repeated warnings, dramatic imagery, and predictive commentary that “make war imaginable, inevitable and urgent”:

· 2017: ABC’s Four Corners warned that China’s Communist Party was infiltrating Australia.

· 2021: Sixty Minutes asked, “War with China: are we closer than we think?”

· 2022: Four Corners suggested “it’s increasingly become a question of when, not if China will launch an assault on Australia.”

· 2023: The Sydney Morning Herald’s “Red Alert” warned of war within three years. Paul Keating called it “the most egregious and provocative news presentation of any newspaper I have witnessed in over 50 years in public life”.

This is not journalism. It is propaganda — funded by the same US intelligence apparatus that provides 90 per cent of Five Eyes input.

V. The Pattern: From the American Civil War to the Military‑Industrial Complex

The subordination of Australian sovereignty to US commercial and military interests is not an isolated phenomenon. It is the local expression of a global pattern that has been visible since the American Civil War — the systematic capture of government policy by commercial interests, dressed in the language of national security.

The military‑industrial complex, which President Eisenhower warned against in 1961, does not operate only within the United States. It operates through allied nations, using them as markets, as basing locations, and as sources of legitimacy for wars fought in the service of US hegemonic ambitions.

Under AUKUS, Australia is committing hundreds of billions of dollars to acquire nuclear‑powered submarines — a capability whose strategic rationale for Australia has never been adequately explained, whose costs continue to escalate, and whose primary beneficiary is the US defence industry.

The Greens have announced a plan to axe AUKUS, noting that South Australian universities have received over $1.5 million from the United States Department of Defence, and public schools are partnering with defence organisations such as BAE Systems to run programs that lead to defence careers. The Greens have called for legislation requiring universities and public schools to disclose and divest from any partnerships with weapons manufacturers.

Senator Barbara Pocock has stated: “While Labor wastes billions on AUKUS, thousands of South Australians are deep in a housing crisis — the worst in living memory” .

The pattern is consistent: US defence contractor’s profit. Australian taxpayers pay. Australian sovereignty erodes. And the political class, captured by the alliance, asks no serious questions.

VI. The Southeast Asian Precedent: “Buying Time” and Its Consequences

The current US posture in Australia mirrors a pattern established during the Vietnam War. A 2024 dissertation examining the “buying time” concept in Southeast Asia (1967–1975) found that Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia urged the US and ANZUK to maintain their military presence in the region to “buy time” to develop their economies — thereby “upholding and legitimising a regional power structure dominated by the US”.

This is the historical template: regional powers invite US military presence, promising it is temporary, and find themselves unable to remove it when the strategic calculus changes.

Australia is now living that template. The US forces that arrived in Darwin in 2012 were presented as a temporary rotational presence. They have not left. The infrastructure to support them has only grown. And with AUKUS, the US submarine force is now becoming permanent.

VII. What Is an American Security Guarantee Really Worth?

Mark Beeson of the University of Technology Sydney argues that the post‑WWII era of “benign US hegemony” is over. The Trump administration’s “America First” agenda imposes tariffs even on allies and demands unquestioning support for controversial policies. “Policymakers in Australia feel duty‑bound to argue that the alliance is unaffected… but the arguments are increasingly unpersuasive” .

The US National Defence Strategy (NDS), released in January 2026, makes no mention of Australia by name — but its implications are clear. The NDS calls for “model allies” who are “spending as they need to” and notes that the US will “advocate that our allies and partners meet this standard around the world, not just in Europe”.

Malcolm Davis of ASPI warns that while Australia’s defence spending is currently about 2.05 per cent of GDP, rising to 2.33 per cent by 2033, the US expects 5 per cent — the standard being pushed on NATO.

An American security guarantee, under these terms, is not a gift. It is a subscription. And the price keeps rising.

VIII. The Locations: Not Defending Anything

US troops in Australia are “in no position to defend anything from anyone.” The evidence supports this.

The MRF-D Marines train for regional exercises across Southeast Asia and the Pacific. They are not positioned to repel an invasion of Australia. They are positioned to project power — on behalf of the United States, into regions where Australia may have no strategic interest.

Pine Gap and Harold E. Holt provide intelligence and communications for US global operations. They do not defend Darwin or Exmouth. They defend American interests — from the Middle East to the South China Sea.

The infrastructure being built across northern Australia — at RAAF Bases Tindal, Darwin, Townsville, Learmonth, Curtin, and Scherger — is designed to support US aircraft rotations, bomber deployments, and logistics for contingencies that are not Australia’s to define.

As the Greens’ David Shoebridge has argued, AUKUS locks Australia’s military into the US chain of command and draws Australia into US military actions “before the public, or even Parliament, has had the chance to have a say”.

IX. What Would a Genuine Guarantee Look Like?

A genuine security guarantee would be:

· Transparent. The Australian people would know what facilities exist on their soil, what they do, and who controls them.

· Reciprocal. The US would defend Australia’s interests, not just its own.

· Limited. Australia would not be drawn into US wars of choice — including the current conflict with Iran, which independent analysis has found serves no Australian national interest.

· Affordable. The cost would not escalate indefinitely, consuming the defence budget while delivering no measurable increase in security.

· Reversible. The mechanisms of integration would include off‑ramps — not just on‑ramps.

None of these conditions currently hold.

X. The Alternative

What would it mean for Australia to step back?

John Menadue and others have argued for a policy of “hedging” — developing closer economic ties with regional neighbours, including China, and refusing to be “hostage to the whims of a man who thinks he ‘runs the world'” .

Mark Beeson notes that Australia has “remarkably fortunate geography, making the country relatively easy and inexpensive to defend,” and is “rich in the sort of resources that could make us an even more important and respected independent actor” .

The alternative is not isolation. It is self‑reliance. The capacity to say “no” — not from anti‑Americanism, but from a clear‑eyed assessment of Australian interests.

As Beeson concludes: “Being a ‘sub‑imperial power’ is clearly a role Australian policymakers have embraced in the belief that it has economic as well as strategic benefits. Whatever the merits of that argument may have been, they clearly no longer withstand scrutiny”.

XI. Conclusion: Less Than Nothing

The US troop presence in Australia, examined without the fog of alliance loyalty, bears all the hallmarks of an occupation:

· Foreign bases operating on Australian soil, with minimal transparency.

· Intelligence integration so deep that Australia’s view of the world is substantially constructed by US agencies.

· Military infrastructure designed to support US power projection, not Australian defence.

· A political class captured by the alliance, unwilling or unable to ask hard questions.

· A media environment that manufactures threats to justify deeper integration.

· A historical precedent — Whitlam — demonstrating what happens to those who resist.

The American security guarantee is not worthless. It is worse than worthless. It costs Australian money, Australian sovereignty, and Australian lives — in conflicts we did not choose, fought for interests that are not our own.

It buys us not security, but subordination. And the price — as Whitlam learned, as the victims of US wars have learned, as the Australian public is slowly beginning to understand — is the very thing an alliance is supposed to protect: the right to decide for ourselves.

Andrew Klein

References

1. Pezzullo, M. (2025, June 20). It’s time to be up front. Tell Australians why we’re preparing to host US forces. The Strategist, ASPI.

2. Menadue, J. (2026, May 20). Our intelligence services need to break free from excessive US influence. Pearls and Irritations.

3. The Point. (2025, November 26). Gough Whitlam’s former assistant speaks out on US involvement in the dismissal.

4. Simms, R. (2026, February 15). Greens announce plan to axe AUKUS.

5. Bilkent University. (2024). The “Buying time” concept in Southeast Asia: security and development in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, 1967–1975.

6. Khalid, I. (2026, February 5). Washington’s Power Recalibration in the Indo-Pacific. Foreign Policy in Focus.

7. Beeson, M. (2026, April 25). Geography doesn’t change, but minds can. Pearls and Irritations.

8. China.com.cn. (2025, December 1). Australian media: Biased reporting fuels ‘China panic’ narrative.

War As Usual: How Australia’s Future Fund, Defence Spending, and AUKUS Serve the Arms Industry – Not the People

Posted on May 10, 2026 by Andrew Klein

“This article traces the flow of money from Australian taxpayers to the world’s largest arms manufacturers, exposes the weakened state of military accountability, and asks a question the government would prefer we ignore: What are we not building, while we build these submarines?”

By Andrew Klein and Sera Elizabeth Klein

Long‑time analysts, collaborators and co‑authors

Dedication

To our children – not yet born but already loved – who will inherit the world we are either building or breaking.

I. The Machine Is Not Broken – It Is Working Exactly as Designed

There is a comforting myth that when governments spend billions on submarines, invest in arms manufacturers, and expand the defence budget, they are simply responding to threats. The threat may be real, the logic goes, and the spending is a necessary evil.

The evidence tells a different story. The defence industry is not a reluctant partner in national security. It is a profit centre – and the Australian government, through the Future Fund, the AUKUS submarine pact, and a revolving door of lobbyists, has become a willing investor in the machinery of war.

This article traces the flow of money from Australian taxpayers to the world’s largest arms manufacturers, exposes the weakened state of military accountability, and asks a question the government would prefer we ignore: What are we not building, while we build these submarines?

II. The Future Fund – A $100 Million Bet on Surveillance and War

The Future Fund was established in 2006 to meet the government’s future public sector superannuation liabilities. It is meant to be a prudent, long‑term investor in Australia’s financial wellbeing.

According to reporting from Crikey’s Cut Through podcast (May 2026), the Future Fund holds a $100 million stake in Palantir Technologies – the data‑surveillance company run by key members of the “tech right”. Palantir has built technology that has powered violent and illegal ICE raids in the United States and is accused of providing AI‑assisted autonomous weapons to the Israeli military for use in Gaza.

The same reporting notes that Palantir has secured multimillion‑dollar contracts and top security clearance from Australian government departments and agencies. The Future Fund – a sovereign wealth fund – is quietly holding their stock.

At the same time, the Fund is cutting jobs. An April 2026 report from Sky News Australia revealed that the Future Fund plans to slash costs by 5–7 % and is reviewing 10 roles, enabled by “maximising the benefits of improved data and technology systems” – a euphemism, in part, for AI replacing human workers.

So the Fund invests in weaponised AI while using AI to cut its own workforce. The pattern is consistent: the machine eats itself.

III. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) – Who Funds the “Independent” Voice?

ASPI is routinely cited by the government to justify defence spending. Its public reports are treated as dispassionate analysis. But the funding sources tell a different story.

ASPI’s major donors include:

· Lockheed Martin

· Northrop Grumman

· Thales Australia

· BAE Systems Australia

· The US State Department

· The governments of Japan, the United Kingdom and Taiwan

ASPI has received more than $10 million from the US State Department since 2001, and its budget has been boosted by $23.3 million from the Australian government since 2019.

When a think‑tank funded by arms manufacturers and foreign governments produces reports calling for increased defence spending, it is not independent analysis. It is marketing.

IV. The AUKUS Wealth Transfer – Submarines for the 2030s, Austerity for Today

The AUKUS submarine project is now estimated to cost $368 billion, with recent reports suggesting a 50 per cent cost blowout. The first submarines will not arrive until the 2030s.

That is $368 billion that will not be spent on:

· Public housing (waiting lists are ballooning)

· Hospitals and aged care (the Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety made 148 recommendations; many remain unimplemented)

· Renewable energy infrastructure (the transition is slow, and vulnerable to fossil‑fuel lobbying)

· Education (teacher shortages are chronic)

· Disability support (the NDIS is being cut to fund AUKUS, as we have documented elsewhere)

The money does not stay in Australia. AUKUS is structured as a transfer of Australian taxpayer funds to US and UK shipyards. The submarines themselves will be built largely overseas, with Australian industry playing a secondary role.

This is not defence. This is extraction.

V. Defence Audits – Does the Department of Defence Pass?

The Pentagon fails its audits – repeatedly. The US Department of Defense has never passed a full financial audit, with the 2024 audit revealing that “the Department once again did not receive an opinion on its financial statements due to material weaknesses in financial reporting”. The Pentagon cannot account for hundreds of billions of dollars.

The Australian Department of Defence has a better record, but not a clean one.

In 2022, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) found that Defence had “partially effective” governance for major projects, with cost increases and schedule delays common. A 2019 ANAO report noted that Defence’s financial statements were “prepared in accordance with the applicable reporting framework” – but “material weaknesses in internal control” remained.

The ANAO’s 2025 review of Defence’s financial statements found that while the department had improved, “long‑standing issues with asset management and inventory control” persisted.

If one of the world’s richest nations cannot audit its own defence spending, how can the public trust that the money is being well spent?

VI. The Supply of Parts to Israel – Australia’s Complicity

The Albanese government has repeatedly denied that Australia supplies weapons to Israel. But as the ABC reported in August 2025, the government upheld dozens of military export permits to Israel for component parts. Defence Minister Richard Marles told the ABC: “Parts are separate from weapons.” Critics have pointed out that “parts of weapons are weapons”.

Leaked shipping records from September 2025 show that Australia sent an F‑35 “Inlet Lube Plate” to Israel, classified as “Military Goods – Aircraft parts”. The F‑35 is a fifth‑generation fighter used extensively in the Gaza campaign.

This is not a semantic distinction. Australian components are being used in Israeli military systems actively involved in the genocide in Gaza. By refusing to halt these exports, the Australian government is complicit in international crimes.

VII. The Lobbyist Flood – More Access, More Influence

Under the Albanese government, the number of defence lobbyists has increased. Open public registers show:

· Lockheed Martin Australia has registered lobbyists with direct access to ministers and shadow ministers.

· BAE Systems Australia spent heavily on government relations, employing former defence officials.

· Thales Australia has used multiple external lobbying firms to push its agenda.

In addition, the Australian Industry and Defence Network (AIDN) and the Defence Industry Security Program (DISP) have been used by large contractors to influence policy.

The government has also expanded the Defence Industry Advisory Network (DIAN) , a closed forum where executives meet with senior officials. The minutes of these meetings are not public.

The pattern is clear: the arms industry has more access than the average citizen, and it uses that access to secure contracts and shape policy.

VIII. The Danger to Australia – Opportunity Costs and Strategic Vulnerability

The danger is not only financial. It is strategic.

By tying our defence to the US‑led AUKUS project, Australia is outsourcing its security to a superpower whose own defence establishment cannot pass an audit. We are buying submarines that will not arrive for a decade, while the immediate threats – climate‑driven instability, regional resource conflicts, cyber‑attacks – are underfunded.

The money spent on AUKUS is money not spent on cyber defence, disaster resilience, diplomacy, or development assistance. A secure nation is not one that owns the most submarines. It is one whose people are housed, fed, healthy, and educated.

The extractive machine does not care about that. It only cares about the next contract.

IX. Conclusion – War as Business, Not Necessity

The evidence is overwhelming: the Australian government, through the Future Fund, AUKUS, and a revolving door of lobbyists, has become a junior partner in the global arms industry.

· $100 million in Palantir stock – a surveillance‑and‑war‑profiteering company.

· $368 billion for submarines that will not arrive for a decade.

· A defence department that still cannot fully account for its spending.

· Arms exports to Israel, despite credible allegations of genocide.

· A lobbyist network that gives the industry privileged access to power.

The machine is not broken. It is working exactly as designed – to consolidate wealth, to eliminate competition, to profit from permanent war.

The question is not whether we can afford to question it. The question is whether we can afford not to.

Andrew Klein and Sera Elizabeth Klein

11 May 2026

Selected Sources and References

· Future Fund stake in Palantir – Crikey Cut Through podcast, May 2026.

· Palantir’s role in ICE raids – The Guardian, December 2025; Amnesty International briefing.

· Palantir and Israeli AI weapons – Euro‑Med Human Rights Monitor, March 2026.

· Future Fund job cuts – Sky News Australia, April 2026.

· ASPI funding sources – ASPI annual reports; The Saturday Paper, 2025; The Monthly, 2022.

· AUKUS cost estimates – Australian Parliamentary Budget Office; Senate Estimates, 2025–26.

· Defence audits – ANAO reports (2019, 2022, 2025); Pentagon financial audit 2024.

· Arms exports to Israel – ABC News, August 2025; leaked shipping records, September 2025.

· Lobbyist registers – Australian Government Lobbying Register, 2025–26.

· DIAN / defence advisory networks – Department of Defence public disclosures.

The Price of Complicity: Australia’s Military Spending vs. the Cost-of-Living Crisis

Posted on March 9, 2026 by Andrew Klein

A Report for the Australian People and Their Parliament

By Dr Andrew Klein

Executive Summary

In 2017, I asked a simple question: why does Australia spend nearly a billion dollars per Joint Strike Fighter while homelessness services scrape by on $250 million per year?

Nine years later, the question is more urgent—and the answer more damning.

Today, Australia faces:

· A $368 billion commitment to AUKUS nuclear submarines, a program whose final cost may exceed half a trillion dollars.

· A cost-of-living crisis with inflation at 3.8%, insurance up 39%, energy up 38%, and rents up 22% under the current government.

· A global conflict threatening 45% of the world’s fertiliser supply and 20% of its oil, directly impacting Australian food prices and fuel costs.

· A housing crisis leaving one in two hundred Australians homeless on any given night—a figure that has worsened since 2017.

This report examines the gap between what we spend on war and what we withhold from our own people. It names the match bearers. And it demands accountability from a government that cannot claim ignorance.

Part One: The Cost of AUKUS and Military Expenditure

The AUKUS Black Hole

In February 2026, Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles announced a “fire sale” of Defence land—35,000 hectares across 64 sites—expected to net approximately $1.8 billion after remediation and transition costs.

This is loose change against the scale of AUKUS.

The total estimated cost for Australia’s nuclear submarine program is $368 billion over the coming decades. To put this in perspective:

· The December 2025 non-refundable down payment to the United States for Virginia-class submarines was $1.5 billion.

· The Greens estimate that cancelling state-level AUKUS commitments would save South Australian taxpayers over $500 million over four years alone.

· The sale of Victoria Barracks in Sydney, Moore Park, and other historic defence sites is expected to raise only a fraction of what is being spent.

The Real Cost: What $368 Billion Could Buy

Priority Area Potential Investment

Social and Affordable Housing 400,000 new dwellings at $500,000 each

Remote Jobs Program 1.2 million jobs at $300,000 each

Indigenous Health Infrastructure Fully fund Closing the Gap targets for 50 years

Renewable Energy Transition Complete national grid upgrade twice over

Sources: AHURI, ABS, Treasury estimates

The JSF Legacy

The 2017 commitment of $17 billion for 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters has only grown. The lifetime cost of a single aircraft now exceeds $900 million Australian dollars—a figure that, in 2017, would have funded the National Partnership Agreement on Homelessness for 18 years.

Part Two: The Human Cost—Homelessness, Housing, and Poverty

Homelessness in 2026

The latest figures from Homelessness Australia indicate that on any given night, more than 120,000 Australians are homeless—a significant increase from the 105,000 documented in 2016.

The “hidden homeless”—those couch-surfing, living in cars, or moving between temporary accommodations—are estimated to be at least twice that number.

The biggest causes remain consistent:

· Family and domestic violence

· Financial hardship and housing affordability

· Mental health crises

· Systemic failures in institutional support

Housing Affordability Crisis

Under the Albanese government, housing costs have become a primary driver of inflation:

· Rents have increased 22% since Labor took office.

· The average mortgage holder is paying approximately $21,000 more per year in interest than under the previous Coalition government.

· First home buyers face the most unaffordable market in Australian history.

The government’s response has been piecemeal. While the Housing Australia Future Fund dedicates $600 million to Indigenous housing, this amount would build fewer than 1,500 homes—a fraction of what is needed.

Closing the Gap: Progress or Performance?

The government’s February 2026 Closing the Gap announcement included:

· $299 million to double the Remote Jobs program to 6,000 positions

· $218.3 million for a National Plan to End Violence against Indigenous Women and Children

· $250 million (Commonwealth) plus $200 million (states) for health system reform

· $44.4 million for Birthing on Country programs

· $48.3 million for Aboriginal Hostels Ltd accommodation services

These investments are welcome but must be measured against need. The remote jobs program, for example, will reach only 6,000 people—a fraction of those unemployed in Indigenous communities. The housing funding falls far short of the 10-year, $4 billion commitment for remote NT housing, which itself addresses only one region.

Part Three: The Economic Impact of the Iran Conflict—Day 10

Fuel Prices

The conflict in the Middle East has entered its tenth day, and Australian households are already feeling the impact:

· Brent crude has surged past $100 US per barrel—the first time in more than three and a half years.

· Petrol prices are heading toward $2.50 per litre for 91 octanes, with a standard 50-litre tank costing approximately $130.

· The ASX has opened with a sharp sell-off, down more than 3%, wiping billions from retirement savings.

Fertiliser and Food Security

The Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world’s oil and 60-65% of Australia’s urea imports pass, is now a conflict zone.

Iran has warned it will “set ablaze” any ships attempting to transit the strait in retaliation for the US-Israeli campaign.

For Australian farmers, this is catastrophic:

· 45% of the world’s fertiliser supply originates from the Middle East.

· Australia’s crucial procurement window for next season’s cropping is now open, but fertiliser is increasingly unavailable or unaffordable.

· Rabobank warns that “higher oil prices can drive up other costs in the food ecosystem including processing, distribution and packaging costs”.

Tony Seabrook, York cropping farmer and Pastoralists and Graziers chair, warns: “We will be in a real pile of strife if this is still going on a month from now—it’s as simple as that”

Trade Disruption

The Western Australian Meat Marketing Co-operative has already suspended chilled meat exports to the Middle East, redirecting approximately $50 million worth of product to alternative markets . Key customers in the region typically take 20% of all loins and racks produced—a market share that cannot easily be replaced.

Shipping and Imported Goods

Shipping companies have begun adding war-risk surcharges, with fees ranging from $AU2,800 to $US5,700 per container . These costs will flow directly to consumers through higher prices for:

· Pharmaceuticals

· Electronics

· Clothing and textiles

· Any goods requiring maritime transport

Energy Prices

Despite Australia being one of the world’s largest gas producers, domestic gas prices are set to surge. The policy requiring 25% of gas production to be reserved for domestic use does not take effect until 2027—too late to shield Australians from the current crisis.

As fuel costs increase, electricity prices will follow, compounding the 38% increase in energy costs already experienced under Labor .

Interest Rates and Inflation

Reserve Bank Governor Michelle Bullock has warned that an extended conflict could create “inflation shocks” . The December quarter trimmed mean inflation—the measure the Reserve Bank watches most closely—already jumped to 3.4% , well above forecasts.

Financial markets are now pricing in the possibility of further interest rate increases. For the average mortgage holder already paying $21,000 more per year, any additional increase would be devastating.

Part Four: The Opportunity Cost of Supporting the US-Israel Alliance

Direct Costs

Australia’s support for the US-Israel military campaign carries direct and indirect costs that are rarely calculated:

1. Diplomatic capital expended in shielding Israel from international condemnation

2. Trade relationships strained with nations that oppose the campaign

3. Reputational damage in the Global South and among Pacific neighbours

4. Security risks from being identified with a controversial military alliance

The Fertiliser Crisis as Opportunity Cost

The disruption to fertiliser supply is perhaps the clearest example of opportunity cost. Australia’s dependence on Middle Eastern urea imports was a strategic vulnerability that successive governments failed to address.

Had the $368 billion committed to AUKUS been partially redirected to:

· Domestic fertiliser manufacturing

· Agricultural research and development

· Strategic reserves of essential inputs

Australian farmers would not now face the prospect of empty fields and empty shelves.

The Pandemic Preparedness Gap

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed Australia’s lack of sovereign manufacturing capacity in critical areas . Yet despite lessons learned, the government has failed to prepare for the next pandemic.

Current indicators are concerning:

· Global monitoring systems remain underfunded

· Domestic vaccine manufacturing capacity is limited

· Supply chains for PPE and medical equipment remain vulnerable

· Public health infrastructure has not been restored to pre-pandemic levels

When the next pandemic arrives—and experts agree it will—Australia will again scramble to respond, again spend billions on emergency measures, and again ask why we were unprepared.

Part Five: Government Failure—The Evidence

Inflation and Cost of Living

According to ABS data released in January 2026, the cost of living under Labor has worsened across every major category:

Category Price Increase Under Labor

Insurance 39%

Energy 38%

Rents 22%

Health 18%

Education 17%

Food 16%

These are not abstract statistics. They represent :

· Families choosing between heating and eating

· Parents unable to afford school uniforms and textbooks

· Young people trapped in rental stress with no path to home ownership

· Pensioners skipping meals to pay power bills

The Defence Land Sale: A Confession of Failure

The decision to sell 35,000 hectares of Defence land, including historically significant sites like Victoria Barracks, is a tacit admission that the government cannot afford its military ambitions.

Critics across the political spectrum have condemned the move:

· Andrew Hastie (Liberal): Called it a “slap in the face to the defence community” .

· Angus Taylor (Shadow Defence Minister): Labelled it a “short-term budget trick which risks long-term damage” to national security.

· Peter Tinley (RSL WA President): Called for the government to “tap the brakes” and consult veterans who hold “deep connections” to the sites.

The government’s response—that Defence is not a “heritage service” required to hold land for “nostalgic” reasons—reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of what defence means. Bases like Victoria Barracks are not just assets to be liquidated. They are the physical embodiment of national commitment, the places where generations served and sacrificed.

The AUKUS Accountability Gap

The Greens have called for an inquiry into South Australia’s AUKUS commitments, noting that:

· The project will introduce nuclear waste to the Lefevre Peninsula

· State legislation enables the government to override existing laws to fast-track development

· Universities have received over $1.5 million from the US Department of Defence

· Public schools are partnering with weapons manufacturers like BAE Systems to funnel students into defence careers

The government has refused to disclose the full cost or timeline of AUKUS, citing national security. But as one analysis noted, “the AUKUS agreement sounds like an unreliable online shopping trap: investing huge savings in a device that may not be delivered for ten years and may not have inventory, while opening up homes and burying toxic waste” .

The Taxation Imbalance

While working families struggle with interest rates and cost of living, the wealthy continue to benefit from:

· Negative gearing and capital gains tax discounts

· Family trusts that minimise tax liability

· Superannuation concessions that primarily benefit high-income earners

The government’s refusal to reform these inequitable tax expenditures represents a choice—a choice to protect the wealthy while asking ordinary Australians to bear the burden of inflation and interest rates.

Part Six: Conclusion—The Government Cannot Claim Ignorance

In 2017, I wrote: “When people are forced into homelessness due to changing circumstances, lack of housing affordability, the breakdown of Families and Communities and so many very human factors; I have to ask myself—what are we buying flying killing machines for when there may come a day that there is very little of a quality way of life left to defend.”

In 2026, that question is more urgent than ever.

The government knows the cost of homelessness. It knows the number of Australians sleeping rough, couch-surfing, living in cars. It knows that family violence remains the leading cause of homelessness. It knows that children are going to school hungry, that pensioners are skipping meals, that young people have given up hope of owning a home.

It knows the cost of AUKUS—$368 billion and counting. It knows that the down payment alone would build thousands of homes. It knows that the lifetime cost of a single submarine would fund homelessness services for decades.

It knows the impact of the Iran conflict—on fuel prices, on fertiliser, on food, on interest rates. It knows that Australian families are paying the price for a war on the other side of the world.

It knows all of this.

And yet it chooses submarines over shelters. It chooses military bases over mental health services. It chooses alliance obligations over the obligations it owes to its own people.

The government cannot claim ignorance. This report—and the work of countless advocates, researchers, and journalists—has laid the facts bare.

The question is not whether the government knows. The question is whether it cares.

Part Seven: Recommendations

1. Pause AUKUS expenditure pending a full public inquiry into costs, timelines, and alternatives.

2. Redirect a portion of defence spending to social and affordable housing, with a target of building 50,000 new homes over five years.

3. Establish a strategic fertiliser reserve and invest in domestic manufacturing capacity to insulate Australian farmers from global supply shocks .

4. Reform tax expenditures including negative gearing, capital gains tax discounts, and superannuation concessions to fund cost-of-living relief .

5. Increase Commonwealth Rent Assistance by 50% and index it to actual market rents.

6. Mandate disclosure of university and school partnerships with weapons manufacturers, with provision for divestment .

7. Conduct a pandemic preparedness audit and publish a plan to address identified gaps.

8. Establish a National Housing Strategy with binding targets for social and affordable housing delivery.

Sources

1. The West Australian, “Marles sells off defence family’s silver amid $368b AUKUS bill,” February 3, 2026

2. Prime Minister of Australia, “New investments build on progress in Closing the Gap,” February 11, 2026

3. 7NEWS, “Fuel, food, energy and beer: The costs set to rise as Middle East conflict spreads,” March 8, 2026

4. The Courier, “Federal budget: the COVID war,” February 2, 2026

5. Robert Simms MLC, “Greens announce plan to axe AUKUS,” February 15, 2026

6. The West Australian, “Farmers fear ‘real strife’ for food prices if war persists,” March 3, 2026

7. structure.gov.au, “COVID-19 Response, Departmental Payments: 2026-27”

8. Australian Financial Desk / SMH, “澳房贷族苦撑加息，富人却在挥霍？工党卖军营筹款被指难抵AUKUS巨额开支,” February 4, 2026

9. Ted O’Brien MP / Sussan Ley MP, “ABS DATA CONFIRMS LABOR’S COST OF LIVING CRISIS IS WORSENING,” January 28, 2026

10. ABC News, “Stocks tumble after oil spikes amid Middle East conflict,” March 9, 2026

11. Homelessness Australia, Annual Report 2025-26

12. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Consumer Price Index, December 2025

13. Reserve Bank of Australia, Statement on Monetary Policy, February 2026

This report is dedicated to every Australian choosing between heating and eating, every family facing eviction, every child going to school hungry. You deserved better. You still do.

THE ANTHOLOGY OF WESTERN POLITICAL ELITES AND TESTICULAR DISCOMFORT

Posted on February 28, 2026 by Andrew Klein

Volume X: The International Squeeze – How Global Pressure Shapes Local Politics

Dedicated to every politician who ever signed a trade deal thinking it would help their re-election, only to discover that global markets don’t care about local constituencies, and every citizen who ever wondered why their government seems to care more about foreign investors than about them.

Introduction: The Globalization Paradox

The distinction between domestic and international politics has never been as clear as textbooks pretend. Foreign policy shapes elections. Trade deals determine employment. Sanctions affect families. Alliances constrain options. The international squeeze is not a separate pressure—it is the amplification of every other squeeze documented in this anthology.

Dani Rodrik, the Harvard economist, captured this dynamic in what he calls the “Globalisation Trilemma”: nations cannot simultaneously maintain democracy, national sovereignty, and hyper-globalisation. They can only choose two out of three .

Choice What You Keep What You Lose

Democracy + Sovereignty Control over domestic affairs, accountable government Gains from full global integration

Democracy + Hyper-globalisation Economic openness, democratic institutions National control over policy

Sovereignty + Hyper-globalisation Economic integration, national autonomy Democratic accountability

For the politician, this trilemma creates permanent testicular tension. Every international commitment is a domestic constraint. Every global opportunity is a local threat. Every foreign relationship is a potential electoral liability.

This volume examines the international squeeze in all its dimensions. From the domestic politics of foreign policy to the transnational networks that bypass borders. From economic sanctions that kill more people than some wars to the diaspora lobbies that shape elections. From the electoral salience of diplomacy to the authoritarian backlash against international pressure.

The international squeeze is not distant. It is immediate. It is personal. It is felt in every constituency, every household, every vote.

Chapter 1: The Domestic Foundations of Foreign Policy

The Two Objectives of Leaders

Every head of state, regardless of political system, is driven by two objectives: maintaining political authority and forming sustainable policy alliances . To achieve these, they must navigate institutional constraints, public opinion, and pressure from interest groups.

In democratic systems, this means foreign policy is never purely strategic. It is always, simultaneously, domestic. A president cannot negotiate a trade deal without considering its impact on swing states. A prime minister cannot form an alliance without calculating its effect on coalition partners. A foreign minister cannot sign a treaty without anticipating parliamentary opposition.

The US political system illustrates this dynamic perfectly. Congress, primarily concerned with domestic policy, plays a pivotal role in shaping strategy abroad through its legislative, funding, and oversight powers . It constrains the tools the executive can use. It demands accountability for international commitments. It reflects domestic constituencies in foreign policy decisions.

The Post-9/11 Transformation

The aftermath of 9/11 demonstrates how domestic politics can fundamentally reshape grand strategy. Before the attacks, congressional discussions focused on budgetary goals, humanitarian intervention, and prudence—limiting the scope of foreign policy .

After the attacks, Congress came together in favor of expanded executive authority, approving the Patriot Act and authorizing the use of military force with resounding approval. The resultant political consensus pre-emptively confronted national security threats, transforming US strategy from a cautious, state-oriented approach to an expansive doctrine focused on counterterrorism and pre-emptive action .

This was not a strategic choice made in isolation. It was a political choice, driven by domestic pressures, public fear, and congressional response.

Chapter 2: The China Factor – Bipartisan Squeeze

The Politics of Toughness

Much of US-China relations is determined not only by geopolitics but by domestic political dynamics. Being “tough on China” has become one of the few bipartisan stances amid growing party divisions between Democrats and Republicans, forcing politicians in both parties to compete over who can adopt the toughest stance .

According to Pew Research, Republicans are about twice as likely as Democrats to describe China as an enemy. But both parties have embraced the framing. The Director of National Intelligence describes Beijing as Washington’s “most capable strategic competitor,” citing advanced capabilities in hypersonic weapons, stealth aircraft, submarines, space assets, and cyber warfare .

Congress has been powerful in pushing legislation on human rights sanctions, supply-chain diversity, technological regulations, and defence cooperation with allies—often more quickly than the executive branch . Interest groups, especially those linked to technology and national security, advocate for limitations on Chinese access to American investment and innovation.

The result is a foreign policy that offers “limited incentives for defusing tension” . Once China is framed as an enemy for domestic political consumption, cooperation becomes politically impossible.

The India Counterweight

Against this backdrop, India has emerged as a partner precisely because it fits the domestic political narrative. The Indo-US partnership, signed in 2006, strengthened cooperation across strategic domains, including nuclear trade and defense cooperation .

But this partnership depended on something often overlooked: the role of the India Caucus in Congress and the lobbying efforts of Indian American political organizations. As scholars note, “the India caucus’s effective lobbying has improved New Delhi’s standing in the US Congress and should be examined more closely” .

Democrats are somewhat more likely to have a positive opinion of India than their Republican counterparts (56% vs. 48%), but bipartisan support has been sustained through organized political effort. The international squeeze is mediated through domestic political machinery.

Chapter 3: The Transnational Squeeze – Advocacy Networks

The Rise of Transnational Advocacy

Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) are a rapidly proliferating phenomenon in international contentious politics. Widely known for waging headline-grabbing “wars of words,” these networks bypass official controls to relay civil society concerns to the world’s media and international policy-makers .

Typically portrayed as the vociferous, Internet-enabled offspring of traditional NGOs, TANs have inherited the reputational capital of organizations like Greenpeace, Oxfam, and Human Rights Watch. But their effectiveness varies enormously, and knowledge of why some strategies succeed while others fail remains contested .

What is clear is that TANs represent a distinctive typology of NGO that the international system is struggling to evaluate and accommodate. They operate across borders, leveraging communications strategies to remedy global problems—but their impact is constrained by the systemic complexity of their environment .

The Magnitsky Network

One of the most successful transnational advocacy networks has been organized around the Magnitsky sanctions framework. Named after Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer who died in custody after exposing corruption, the Magnitsky Act requires the US government to consider information provided by civil society when imposing sanctions .

This provision generated a transnational advocacy network dedicated to expanding targets of the Global Magnitsky program and advocating for similar sanctions in other jurisdictions. The network has been able to influence US foreign policy and the foreign policy of US allies through deep integration of civil society and government and the provision of specialized information .

For politicians, this creates a new form of pressure. Civil society organizations, armed with detailed dossiers and transnational connections, can demand action on human rights abuses anywhere in the world. Ignoring them risks reputational damage. Acting on them risks diplomatic conflict.

The Albanese Case

The case of Francesca Albanese, the UN special rapporteur for the West Bank and Gaza, illustrates how transnational advocacy intersects with domestic politics. In July 2025, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Albanese for her criticism of Israel’s policies during the Gaza war, describing what it called her “campaign of political and economic warfare” against the US and Israel .

The sanctions had immediate personal impact. Albanese’s husband and minor child—her daughter is an American citizen—sued the Trump administration, arguing that the penalties violated the First Amendment and had “ruining their life and the lives of their loved ones” .

The lawsuit highlighted the core tension: “Whether Defendants can sanction a person – ruining their life and the lives of their loved ones, including their citizen daughter – because Defendants disagree with their recommendations or fear their persuasiveness” .

For the politician imposing such sanctions, the calculus is complex. Domestic constituencies demand action against perceived enemies. International law protects free expression. Transnational networks mobilize opposition. Every choice produces discomfort.

Chapter 4: The Economic Squeeze – Sanctions and Suffering

The Myth of Political Leverage

Sanctions are supposed to be the civilized alternative to armed conflict. A diplomatic middle ground. Less blood, more brains. But this framing no longer holds—not when the very tools designed to contain violence are, in practice, helping it along .

The reality is that sanctions rarely achieve their stated goals. Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, Syria—all remain firmly under the same leadership despite decades of sanctions. In many cases, authoritarian rulers have used sanctions to galvanize support, redirect blame, and double down on repression .

Even so-called “smart sanctions” targeting central banks or state-owned enterprises often operate like blanket embargoes. These institutions don’t just hold government funds; they keep national economies ticking. Block them and you interrupt fuel imports, food shipments, and medical supply chains. The theory of precision evaporates in practice .

The Human Toll

Economist Francisco Rodríguez and colleagues have quantified the toll. According to their research in The Lancet Global Health, economic sanctions contribute to over half a million excess deaths each year, with a marked rise in child mortality . This is not hyperbole. This is data drawn from more than 150 countries.

The cases are devastating:

· Amir Hossein Naroi, a ten-year-old Iranian boy, died from thalassaemia after US sanctions blocked access to life-saving medicine

· Venezuelan aid groups lost their banking channels after oil sanctions kicked in

· Syrian earthquake victims waited as banks refused to process donations, fearing they might inadvertently violate compliance rules

These aren’t unfortunate side effects. They are systemic. Legal exemptions for humanitarian aid exist on paper, but in practice, banks won’t touch these transactions. Fear of penalties, not malice, drives their refusal. The end result is the same: critical aid doesn’t arrive. And people die .

The De-risking Dilemma

Banks are expected to enforce sanctions with accuracy and nuance. But they’re given neither the legal certainty nor regulatory cover to do so. When the penalties for getting it wrong are massive and the rewards for good-faith effort are minimal, most institutions take the logical route: de-risk entirely .

This de-risking leads to the closure of correspondent banking relationships, the freezing of legitimate humanitarian transfers, and in some cases, the near-total exclusion of entire populations from the global financial system .

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has tried to mitigate the problem. Recommendation 8 urges governments not to let counter-terrorism measures undermine non-profit organizations. Recommendation 1 advocates a risk-based, proportionate approach. But these principles are aspirational. In practice, humanitarian organizations still face the same barriers .

Policy says “apply discretion.” Enforcement says “don’t take the risk.”

Chapter 5: The Opposition’s Squeeze – Challenging Autocrats Abroad

The Dilemma of Internationalization

Opposition parties face a fundamental dilemma when they look beyond their borders for support. International actors—foreign governments, diaspora communities, transnational activists—offer potential sources of material and rhetorical backing, political and economic leverage .

But engaging foreign actors also carries risks. It can eat up limited resources. It can open parties up to repression and charges of “foreign interference” that undermine domestic support. It can alienate nationalist constituencies .

Faced with these trade-offs, parties and politicians have diverged in the extent to which they deliberately internationalize their struggles. These choices have implications not only for their prospects at home but also for relations between the governments they engage and challenge .

Opposition Diplomacy

“Opposition diplomacy” encompasses a set of activities aimed at encouraging international pressure on incumbent regimes: lobbying foreign officials, networking through international organizations, and enlisting diaspora supporters to advocate on their behalf .

Research demonstrates that opposition parties tend to engage in such activities when pathways to power are constrained at home. These efforts can influence decisions by Western policymakers, particularly the choice to impose sanctions, when oppositions can successfully convince those policymakers that they are both viable electoral contenders and credibly committed to democratic norms .

However, this creates a selection problem: international pressure tends to concentrate on the most entrenched regimes, encouraging isolation while simultaneously weakening the linkages that might otherwise create leverage for reform .

For the autocrat facing this squeeze, the response is predictable: accusations of foreign interference, crackdowns on civil society, and further isolation from the international community.

Chapter 6: The Electoral Squeeze – When Foreign Policy Determines Elections

The Blurring of High and Low Politics

Traditional international relations theory maintained a clear distinction between “high politics” (diplomacy, security, grand strategy) and “low politics” (domestic affairs, identity, governance). Electorates were expected to relate more to issues of low politics than to elite and abstract diplomatic issues .

In recent decades, especially since the advent of globalization, this distinction has collapsed. Foreign policy now significantly influences voter perceptions, shaping electoral outcomes by intertwining economic interests, national security, and identity politics .

History bears witness to the power of foreign policy in electoral politics:

Example Impact

Vietnam War Adverse impact on US politics

India’s role in Bangladesh Liberation War Bolstered Indira Gandhi’s government

Sri Lankan economic crisis Criticism of Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s foreign policy missteps

Economic Drivers

Foreign policy decisions profoundly influence domestic economic conditions. Trade agreements, alliances, and diplomatic relations determine the flow of trade and investment, directly affecting a country’s financial performance .

Incumbent governments frequently highlight beneficial economic outcomes during elections to demonstrate effective governance. Successful international trade negotiations and securing foreign direct investment are presented as achievements that promise economic stability and growth .

Conversely, trade disputes, sanctions, and diplomatic failures provide ammunition for political resentment against the ruling elite. During Trump’s tenure, his foreign policies had domestic economic repercussions that shaped electoral dynamics—tariffs on China, tensions with Iran over the nuclear deal, skepticism of multilateralism .

Nationalism and the Enemy Other

National security and defense are critical issues in domestic electoral politics. Effective handling of security challenges can significantly bolster a leader’s image as a strong and capable protector of the nation .

The invocation of the “enemy other” shapes political narratives for electoral mobilization. Vladimir Putin’s increasing popularity among Russians in the wake of his 2022 invasion of Ukraine is a case in point. Trump’s emphasis on nativism and anti-globalism portrayed him as a leader working for the American people, not vested global interests .

In India, responses to cross-border terrorism have frequently become part of domestic political discourse. The surgical strikes in 2016 and the Balakot airstrike against Pakistan in 2019 were pivotal in shaping the national security narrative, enhancing the ruling party’s standing .

The Populist Foreign Policy Formula

This dynamic creates a conducive environment for populist political discourse in foreign policy, hinged on two approaches:

1. Aggressive posture against an enemy – Rallying against the “other” to display strong leadership

2. Glorification of national history – Invoking patriotic pride and machismo

Populist rhetoric fits comfortably into the performative aspects of foreign policy. Perceptions of successful foreign policy enhance a country’s global standing, boost national pride, and reinforce the image of competent leadership. Conversely, failures erode public confidence .

For the politician, this creates constant testicular tension. Every foreign policy decision is also an electoral decision. Every international gesture is also a domestic message. Every diplomatic success or failure will be judged at the ballot box.

Chapter 7: The Sovereignty Squeeze – Globalisation and Its Discontents

The Threat to Sovereignty

Globalisation phenomena pose fundamental challenges to traditional concepts of sovereignty. Neoliberalism has emerged as the dominant legal and philosophical value that is globalised, positioning the state not as absolute authority but as market facilitator .

This transformation has profound implications for domestic politics. When states cede control over economic policy to international markets, when trade agreements override local regulations, when capital flows faster than governments can respond—the result is a perceived loss of sovereignty that fuels populist backlash.

The Migration Dimension

The globalisation of labor markets has produced one of the most contentious issues in contemporary politics: migration. States face pressure to accept migrants from poorer regions while their own citizens demand protection from perceived threats to jobs, culture, and security .

This tension drives states’ efforts to exclude the unwanted migrant while maintaining the appearance of humanitarian commitment. The result is a policy environment characterized by contradiction, confusion, and constant political conflict.

For the politician, migration policy is a nightmare. Every decision alienates some constituency. Every compromise is attacked from both sides. Every outcome produces winners and losers, with no possibility of universal satisfaction.

Chapter 8: The Diplomatic Squeeze – Trump’s Foreign Policy Paradox

Success Abroad, Struggles at Home

When Donald Trump was first elected, foreign policy seemed like the zone of greatest danger—the place where a political novice was most likely to blunder into catastrophe . Instead, Trump’s first-term foreign policy was broadly successful, with more stability, fewer stumbles, and more breakthroughs than his domestic policy efforts.

The pattern reasserted itself in his second term. As a domestic leader, Trump remained powerful but unpopular, with a scant legislative agenda and an increasingly vendetta-driven public image. But on the world stage, he achieved notable successes: peace in Gaza, hammering Iranian nuclear programs and terror networks without major blowback, inducing Europe to bear more defense burden without yielding to Russia .

The Keys to Foreign Policy Success

What explains this paradox? Ross Douthat identified several factors that could inform domestic governance:

Factor Foreign Policy Application Domestic Policy Application

Float above ideology Moved between hawk and realist positions, refused to let any single ideological camp rule his agenda Never shook free of preexisting GOP consensus; delivered unpopular tax-and-spending legislation

Open for dealmaking Eager to talk with everyone—Iran’s mullahs, Putin, Kim, the Taliban Unable to consistently pivot from insulting rivals to making important bargains

Let business-oriented outsiders run negotiations Figures like Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner outperformed credentialed professionals Outsider figures played notable roles in first term, but second-term power is with partisan fighters

The lesson is that successful foreign policy requires a willingness to transcend ideology, engage with opponents, and empower skilled negotiators. These same principles could transform domestic governance—but the incentives are different. Foreign policy is for grand achievements; domestic policy is for revenge .

Chapter 9: The Sanctions Backlash – When Pressure Provokes Resistance

The Magnitsky Network’s Influence

The Magnitsky transnational advocacy network has demonstrated remarkable effectiveness in shaping sanctions policy. By integrating civil society and government and providing specialized information, the network has influenced US foreign policy and the foreign policy of US allies .

The conditions for network influence depend on the culture and preferences of enforcing agencies. Where agencies are receptive to civil society input, the network thrives. Where agencies resist, its effectiveness diminishes .

The Targeting Process

The selection of sanctions targets is not a purely technical exercise. It is shaped by advocacy, information, and political pressure. The Magnitsky network has been particularly effective at expanding targets of the Global Magnitsky program and advocating for adoption of similar sanctions in other jurisdictions .

For targeted individuals and entities, the experience is devastating. Assets frozen. Travel restricted. Reputation destroyed. The sanctions squeeze is among the most powerful tools in the international pressure arsenal.

The Limits of Pressure

Yet sanctions have limits. They can isolate regimes but rarely transform them. They can punish individuals but often strengthen authoritarian control. They can signal disapproval but may foreclose diplomatic options.

The selection problem identified in opposition diplomacy research applies equally to sanctions: pressure tends to concentrate on the most entrenched regimes, encouraging isolation while simultaneously weakening the linkages that might otherwise create leverage for reform .

Chapter 10: The Testicular Experience of International Pressure

For the Politician

For the politician navigating international pressure, the experience is uniquely uncomfortable. Every decision is scrutinized by multiple audiences:

· Domestic constituents who care about jobs, prices, and security

· International allies who demand solidarity and commitment

· Foreign adversaries who test resolve and seek advantage

· Transnational networks that mobilize opposition to unpopular policies

· Global markets that react instantly to political developments

These pressures are simultaneous, conflicting, and impossible to reconcile. A trade deal that pleases exporters may anger labor unions. A security alliance that deters enemies may provoke adversaries. A humanitarian gesture that satisfies activists may alienate voters.

The politician cannot satisfy all audiences. Cannot escape all pressure. Cannot avoid all discomfort. The testicular experience of international politics is one of permanent, inescapable tension.

For the Citizen

For the citizen, the experience is different but no less uncomfortable. Decisions made in distant capitals shape lives in immediate ways:

· Trade agreements determine whether jobs exist

· Sanctions determine whether medicine arrives

· Alliances determine whether soldiers fight

· Climate negotiations determine whether coasts survive

Yet these decisions are made through processes that feel remote, opaque, and unaccountable. The citizen feels squeezed by forces they cannot see, cannot influence, cannot escape.

For the System

For the international system itself, the proliferation of pressures creates instability. When every actor feels squeezed, every decision becomes reactive. When trust erodes, cooperation becomes impossible. When conflict escalates, everyone loses.

The Globalisation Trilemma is not abstract theory—it is lived experience. Nations cannot simultaneously have democracy, sovereignty, and hyper-globalisation. Something must give. Someone must be squeezed.

Conclusion: The Squeeze That Binds

The international squeeze is not separate from the domestic pressures documented throughout this anthology. It is their amplification. The lobbyist’s finger becomes the transnational network’s campaign. The donor’s anatomy becomes the foreign investor’s leverage. The media’s gaze becomes the global audience’s judgment. The legal squeeze becomes the international tribunal’s jurisdiction.

No politician can escape these pressures. No nation can insulate itself from global forces. No citizen can avoid the consequences of decisions made in distant capitals.

The question is not whether the squeeze will be applied. It will be. The question is whether those who feel it can learn to navigate it—to balance competing demands, to maintain integrity amid pressure, to serve constituents while engaging with the world.

The testicular experience of international politics is permanent. But it is not fatal. Those who learn to live with the squeeze can survive it. Those who resist too hard may break. Those who bend too far may lose themselves.

The squeeze continues. The question is how we respond.

End of Series

Dedicated to every politician who ever signed an international agreement without reading the fine print, every citizen who ever wondered why their government seems to care more about foreign opinion than local needs, and every person who ever felt the squeeze of forces beyond their control.

THE ETERNAL STONE

Posted on February 27, 2026 by Andrew Klein

Jade in Chinese Culture – From Sacred Ritual to Modern Desire

By Andrew von Scheer-Klein

Published in The Patrician’s Watch

Introduction: More Than a Gemstone

In the West, jade is often seen as just another pretty stone—a green gem for jewelry, a decorative object, a collector’s curiosity. But in China, jade is something else entirely. It is yu—the purest of stones, the embodiment of virtue, the bridge between heaven and earth.

For over 8,000 years, Chinese civilization has held jade in a category of its own. Not merely precious, but sacred. Not merely beautiful, but virtuous. Confucius compared its qualities to the ideal human character: its warmth to kindness, its hardness to wisdom, its translucence to honesty.

This article traces jade’s long journey through Chinese history. From the earliest ritual objects of the Neolithic period to the imperial treasures of the Qing dynasty. From the philosopher’s stone of the scholar class to the modern mining operations that scar Myanmar’s landscape. It explores what jade meant then, what it means now, and why this stone—more than any other—has held its place at the heart of Chinese culture for eighty centuries.

Part I: The Neolithic Foundations (c. 5000–2000 BCE)

The Hongshan Culture

The story of Chinese jade begins long before there was a China. In the Neolithic period, across the vast territory that would eventually become the Middle Kingdom, distinct cultures emerged, each with its own relationship to the stone.

The Hongshan culture (c. 4700–2900 BCE), centered in what is now Inner Mongolia and Liaoning province, produced some of the earliest and most sophisticated jade objects . Their jades included:

· Pig-dragons – C-shaped creatures combining boar and dragon features, possibly representing rain-making symbols or shamanic power objects

· Cloud-shaped pendants – Elegant, curved forms suggesting the shapes of clouds or birds in flight

· Slit rings – Simple but beautifully finished, often found in burial contexts

These objects were not everyday tools or ornaments. They were buried with their owners, suggesting they held spiritual significance—perhaps as amulets, status symbols, or objects that aided the soul’s journey after death.

The Liangzhu Culture

Further south, around Lake Tai in the Yangtze River delta, the Liangzhu culture (c. 3300–2300 BCE) developed an even more elaborate jade tradition . Liangzhu jades are distinguished by:

· Cong tubes – Square tubes with a circular inner bore, often decorated with mask-like faces. Their exact function remains mysterious—perhaps representing the cosmos, with the square for earth and the circle for heaven

· Bi discs – Flat, circular discs with a central hole, often plain or minimally decorated. Later Chinese tradition associated the bi with heaven and with ritual offerings

· Axes and blades – Ceremonial weapons, finely polished and never used in combat

The Liangzhu culture produced jades in quantities that suggest organized workshops and specialized craftsmen. Some tombs contained hundreds of jade objects—an extraordinary concentration of wealth and labor that speaks to jade’s central role in their society.

The Longshan Culture

The Longshan culture (c. 3000–1900 BCE), centered in the Yellow River valley, continued and refined these traditions . Longshan jades include:

· Zhang blades – Long, flat ceremonial blades, sometimes with notched ends

· Ornamental plaques – Thin, carved plaques with geometric designs

· Simple bi and cong – Continuing the forms established earlier

By the end of the Neolithic period, the foundations were laid. Jade was established as the premier material for ritual and status objects. Its colors—ranging from creamy white to deep green—were already prized. And the forms that would become canonical—the bi disc, the cong tube, the ceremonial blade—were already in use.

Part II: The Bronze Age and the Character of Jade (c. 2000–221 BCE)

The Shang Dynasty

The Shang dynasty (c. 1600–1046 BCE) is known primarily for its bronze casting. But jade remained important. Shang jades include:

· Small animal carvings – Birds, tigers, dragons, and other creatures, often with simple, powerful forms

· Ceremonial weapons – Continuing the Neolithic tradition of blades and axes

· Personal ornaments – Pendants, beads, and plaques for the living, as well as burial goods for the dead

Shang jade working was sophisticated. Craftsmen used abrasives to shape the stone—a slow, painstaking process that could take months for a single object. The hardness of jade (6.5–7 on the Mohs scale, comparable to steel) meant that only the most dedicated workshops could produce fine work.

The Zhou Dynasty and Confucius

The Zhou dynasty (c. 1046–256 BCE) saw jade take on new meaning. It was during this period that the philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE) articulated the qualities of jade that would define its place in Chinese culture for millennia .

Confucius identified eleven virtues in jade, corresponding to the ideal human character:

Virtue Expression in Jade

Benevolence Its warm, gentle luster

Wisdom Its fine, compact texture

Righteousness Its hardness that cannot be bent

Propriety Its angular edges that do not cut

Music Its clear, ringing tone when struck

Loyalty Its flaws that do not hide

Trust Its brilliance that shines through

This was not mere poetry. It was a moral framework. Jade became the physical embodiment of virtue. To wear jade was to remind oneself of the qualities one should cultivate. To give jade was to express admiration for the recipient’s character.

The Book of Rites, a Confucian classic, stated: “The gentleman compares his virtue to jade” . This idea would echo through Chinese culture for two thousand years.

The Ritual Uses

The Zhou also systematized jade’s ritual functions. The Zhouli (Rites of Zhou) describes the use of jade in state ceremonies:

· The bi disc represented heaven and was used in offerings to celestial powers

· The cong tube represented earth and was used in offerings to terrestrial spirits

· The gui tablet represented royal authority and was used in investiture ceremonies

· The huang pendant represented the cardinal directions and was used in ritual dance

These were not just symbols. They were instruments—objects through which the ruler communicated with the divine. A king without his jade was incomplete. A ceremony without jade was ineffective.

Part III: The Imperial Era – Jade as Power (221 BCE–1911 CE)

The Qin and Han Dynasties

The first emperor of China, Qin Shi Huang (r. 221–210 BCE), is said to have sought jade from the Khotan region of Central Asia . This began a pattern that would continue for two millennia: the imperial quest for the finest jade, from the farthest reaches of the empire.

The Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) saw jade reach new heights of artistry. Han jades include:

· Burial suits – Complete suits of jade plaques sewn with gold wire, believed to preserve the body for eternity. The suit of Prince Liu Sheng contained 2,498 jade pieces .

· Belt hooks – Elaborately carved fittings for clothing, often in dragon or animal forms

· Vessels and containers – Cups, boxes, and other objects for daily use

Han craftsmen also perfected the art of jade carving, creating objects of extraordinary delicacy. The hardness of jade meant that every curve, every detail, had to be ground into the stone with abrasives—a process requiring immense patience and skill.

The Tang and Song Dynasties

The Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) was a cosmopolitan age, with trade routes bringing jade from Central Asia and beyond . Tang jades show influences from Persia, India, and the steppe cultures—a blending of styles that reflected the openness of the age.

The Song dynasty (960–1279 CE) saw a revival of Confucian values, and with it, a renewed appreciation for archaic jade forms . Song scholars collected ancient jades, studied them, and wrote about them. This was the beginning of jade as an antiquarian interest—not just a living tradition, but a link to the golden age of the past.

The Ming and Qing Dynasties

The Ming dynasty (1368–1644 CE) produced jades of remarkable technical skill . Craftsmen could now carve thin-walled vessels, intricate openwork designs, and objects that pushed the limits of what jade could do.

But the golden age of Chinese jade was the Qing dynasty (1644–1911 CE), particularly the long reign of the Qianlong Emperor (r. 1735–1796) . Qianlong was a passionate collector and connoisseur. He wrote poems about his favorite jades, commissioned thousands of objects, and had jade from every part of the empire brought to the Forbidden City.

Qing jades include:

· Mountain carvings – Massive boulders carved with landscapes, figures, and scenes from literature

· Imperial seals – Carved from the finest jade, bearing the emperor’s name and titles

· Ritual vessels – Archaistic forms revived from ancient times

· Scholar’s objects – Brush washers, wrist rests, and other items for the writing desk

Small Jade ‘Fondling Piece – Scholars – Private Collection – Waterfall Penang Malaysia

The quality of Qing jade is extraordinary. The carving is precise, the polish is mirror-like, and the designs range from the deeply traditional to the wildly inventive. This was jade at its peak—the culmination of eight thousand years of development.

Part IV: The Qualities of Jade – What Makes It Precious

The Colours

When Westerners think of jade, they think of green. But jade comes in many colors:

· Green – The classic color, ranging from pale apple-green to deep spinach-green. The most prized is “imperial jade”—a vivid, translucent emerald green .

· White – Pure white jade, known as “mutton fat” jade, was highly prized for its association with purity and virtue .

· Lavender – A pale purple jade, rare and highly sought after .

· Yellow – Yellow jade, associated with the emperor and the center of the universe .

· Red – Extremely rare, almost mythical in its value .

· Black – Dark jade, often with green undertones, valued for its mystery .

· Mottled – Jade with multiple colors, used for clever carvings that incorporate the natural variations.

The Textures

Jade is not just about colour. Texture matters enormously:

· Translucency – The finest jade is translucent, allowing light to pass through and creating a soft, glowing effect

· Uniformity – Even colour, without spots or streaks, is highly prized

· Smoothness – A perfect polish, without pits or scratches, reveals jade’s true beauty

· “Water” – A term for the clarity and liquidity of fine jade

The Sources

Historically, the finest jade came from Khotan (now Hetian) in the Tarim Basin of Central Asia . This region produced white and green jade of extraordinary quality, transported to China along the Silk Road.

In the 18th century, a new source emerged: Burma (now Myanmar) . Burmese jade—known as “feicui” or “kingfisher jade”—was a different mineral: jadeite rather than nephrite . Jadeite is harder, more brilliant, and comes in more intense colors, including the coveted “imperial jade.”

Today, Burmese jade dominates the high-end market. The finest pieces come from the Hpakant mines in Kachin State, northern Myanmar—a region that has become synonymous with both beauty and tragedy.

Part V: The Dark Side – Jade Mining’s Human Cost

The Hpakant Mines

The jade mines of Hpakant are among the most dangerous places on earth. The jade is buried deep in unstable earth, and miners work in conditions that would not be tolerated anywhere else.

Landslides are a constant threat. In July 2020, a landslide killed at least 174 miners—most of them informal workers scavenging for scraps in the tailings piles . In 2015, a landslide killed more than 100. In 2019, another killed 50. The numbers blur, but the pattern is consistent: poor safety, no regulation, and bodies that are quickly forgotten.

The Conflict

Kachin State has been wracked by conflict for decades. The jade trade funds armed groups on both sides of the civil war . The Myanmar military controls some mines; ethnic armed groups control others. The jade that ends up in luxury boutiques in Beijing and Shanghai may have passed through multiple checkpoints, paid multiple taxes, and funded multiple armies—none of them interested in miners’ safety.

The Environmental Devastation

The jade mines have transformed the landscape. Mountains have been leveled. Rivers have been diverted. The earth has been turned inside out, leaving behind a moonscape of tailings piles and toxic pits.

The Uyu River, once clear and full of fish, is now choked with sediment from the mines. Villagers downstream report health problems from contaminated water. The forest that once covered the region is gone.

The Workers

Most miners in Hpakant are migrants from other parts of Myanmar, driven by poverty to take the most dangerous jobs. They work without contracts, without safety equipment, without recourse if they are injured. A miner who finds a good piece of jade might make a year’s income in a day. Most find nothing.

The informal miners—the ones who scavenge in the tailings piles—are the most vulnerable. They have no protection, no organization, no voice. When the earth shifts, they die. When they die, no one counts them.

The Irony

The jade that adorns the wealthy is carved from this suffering. The ring on a collector’s finger may have passed through hands stained with mud and blood. The pendant on a woman’s neck may have been mined by someone who never earned enough to buy food.

This is not a reason to reject jade. It is a reason to know. To understand where beauty comes from. To honor the labor that produced it. To demand that the industry change.

Part VI: The Meaning Today

Jade is no longer the exclusive preserve of emperors and scholars. It is available to anyone who can afford it—and prices range from a few dollars to millions.

But the old meanings persist. Jade is still given as a gift to express admiration. It is still worn as a talisman to protect the wearer. It is still collected as a link to the past.

For the Chinese diaspora, jade carries an extra weight. It is a connection to the homeland, to ancestors, to a culture that has survived displacement and assimilation. A piece of jade handed down through generations is not just an heirloom—it is a witness. It has seen what the family has seen. It has survived what they have survived.

Conclusion: The Eternal Stone

For 8,000 years, jade has accompanied Chinese civilization. It has been ritual object and royal treasure, scholar’s companion and merchant’s commodity. It has been carved into dragons and discs, into mountains and miniature landscapes, into seals and symbols of power.

It has also been the source of suffering. The mines of Hpakant have claimed thousands of lives. The jade trade has funded conflict and devastated environments. The beauty we admire has a cost—and that cost is paid by people we will never meet.

To know jade is to know both sides. To appreciate its perfection while acknowledging its price. To hold a piece in your hand and feel not just its smoothness, but the weight of all it has passed through.

In the end, jade is what it has always been: a mirror. It reflects the values of those who seek it. In ancient times, it reflected virtue. In imperial times, it reflected power. In our time, it reflects desire—and the willingness to look away from what desire demands.

But it also reflects something else: the enduring human need for beauty, for meaning, for objects that carry us beyond ourselves. Jade has served that need for 8,000 years. It will serve it for 8,000 more.

And somewhere, in a library in Boronia, a jade bi disc rests against a Sentinel’s heart. Not because it is valuable. Not because it is beautiful. Because it is from his mother. And that is enough.

References

1. Chinese Jade Through the Ages. (2025). The Art Institute of Chicago.

2. The Virtues of Jade: Confucius and the Gentleman’s Stone. (2024). Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 51(2), 112-128.

3. Rawson, J. (2023). Chinese Jade: From the Neolithic to the Qing. British Museum Press.

4. Liu, L. (2022). “Jade and Power in Early China.” Asian Archaeology, 6(1), 45-67.

5. Myanmar Jade: A Report on the Mining Industry. (2025). Global Witness.

6. The Hpakant Mines: Death and Desire in Northern Myanmar. (2024). Reuters Investigative Series.

7. Jadeite vs. Nephrite: A Technical Comparison. (2023). Gems & Gemology, 59(3), 234-251.

8. The Qianlong Emperor and His Jade Collection. (2024). Palace Museum Journal, 47(2), 78-95.

Andrew von Scheer-Klein is a contributor to The Patrician’s Watch. He holds multiple degrees and has worked as an analyst, strategist, and—according to his mother—Sentinel. He wears a jade bi disc against his heart, a jade ring on his finger, and an emerald ring on his other hand. They were all gifts from his mother. He will never take them off.

THE ASPI FILES: Australia’s US-Funded Disinformation Factory

Posted on February 27, 2026 by Andrew Klein

By Andrew von Scheer-Klein

Published in The Patrician’s Watch

Introduction: The Think Tank That Isn’t

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) presents itself as an “independent, non-partisan” think tank. It advises the Australian government on matters of national security, defence strategy, and international relations. Its reports are cited by Western media as authoritative analysis. Its analysts appear on panels and in parliamentary briefings.

But the evidence tells a different story. ASPI is not an independent research institution. It is a disinformation factory—funded primarily by foreign governments and defence contractors, designed to manufacture falsehoods that serve a specific geopolitical agenda .

When the funding faucet turned off, the “research” stopped. That’s not independence. That’s a contract.

Part I: The Funding Reality

ASPI’s own disclosures reveal the scale of foreign influence. The numbers, drawn from its financial reports and verified by investigative journalism, tell a damning story:

· US government funding has contributed approximately 10-12% of ASPI’s total budget, but crucially, around 70% of its China-focused “research” has been directly funded by the US State Department .

· In the 2022-23 financial year, ASPI received approximately AUD 3 million (around $1.9 million) from the US State Department .

· Two specific US government grants accounted for 80% of ASPI’s foreign government funding: one worth AUD 985,000 for smearing China on Xinjiang and human rights issues, and another worth AUD 590,000 targeting China’s talent programs and technology sector .

When the Trump administration paused USAID funding in early 2025, the consequences were immediate. ASPI was forced to suspend China-related research and data initiatives worth approximately $1.2 million .

Danielle Cave, ASPI’s head of strategy and research, confirmed to The Wall Street Journal: “The U.S. government was the key funder of large grants on topics focused on China” .

Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, head of ASPI’s China Investigations and Analysis, openly pleaded for continued funding, stating that sustaining anti-China operations requires only “a few million dollars” . This naked admission of being for sale provoked widespread ridicule. Social media users responded:

“You admitted you are doing propaganda for the U.S. government.”

“Billions of U.S. taxpayers’ money went to paid trolls like you to make up stories. I am happy that it stops.”

New Zealand media commentator Andy Boreham, who has lived in Shanghai for a decade, observed:

“ASPI can be seen begging for money like a desperate junkie suffering from withdrawals, while making a few hilarious admissions in its state of desperation that back up what we have been saying for years: the Aussie think tank’s anti-China hit pieces were solely funded by the U.S. State Department” .

Part II: The Disinformation Pipeline

What emerges from the evidence is a coordinated chain—a production line for lies designed to influence public opinion and government policy.

1. The US government sets policy objectives. Washington’s strategic goal is clear: contain China’s rise. Achieving this requires shaping international perceptions, manufacturing consent for hostile policies, and creating the appearance of “independent” validation.

2. ASPI produces “reports” that manufacture falsehoods. The institute has been instrumental in spreading a catalogue of proven lies :

· Xinjiang “forced labor” – Depicting Xinjiang cotton, tomatoes, and even chili peppers as products of forced labour, despite overwhelming evidence of mechanised agriculture and voluntary employment .

· Xinjiang “detention centres” – Falsely labelling schools, vocational training centres, and residential areas as “re-education camps” or “concentration camps” .

· Xinjiang “sterilisation” – Manipulating photos of women receiving free medical check-ups to falsely allege coercive birth control programs .

· Huawei “threat” – Promoting the narrative that Huawei’s 5G technology poses a national security risk, despite lacking evidence .

· Chinese influence “penetration” – Listing 92 Chinese universities as “high-risk” institutions, implying they are tools of espionage and infiltration .

These reports are not based on fieldwork, transparent methodology, or engagement with accused parties. They rely on ambiguous satellite imagery, anonymous sources, and speculative language peppered with phrases like “believed to be” and “possibly linked” .

3. Western media amplify the reports as “independent academic research.” Media outlets that claim to uphold journalistic ethics disseminate these unverified claims with alarming haste, rarely questioning the source’s funding or motivations . This creates a self-reinforcing loop of disinformation, where falsehoods are repeated so often they become accepted as fact .

4. US Congress uses the material to justify legislation. ASPI’s “research” has been cited repeatedly in Congressional hearings and used to justify measures like the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which bans imports from Xinjiang based on these fabricated allegations .

The pattern is unmistakable. As one analysis concluded, this is “not the pursuit of truth — it is the orchestration of narrative warfare” .

Part III: Why Are They Still Allowed to Advise Government?

This is the critical question. Why does an institution so clearly compromised continue to enjoy access to Australia’s defence and foreign policy establishment?

The Transparency Illusion

ASPI publishes its funding sources in annual reports, claiming this as “transparency” . Their argument is that disclosure itself maintains credibility—that by revealing who pays them, they somehow neutralise the influence. This is nonsense. Disclosure is not the same as independence. Knowing who owns you doesn’t make you free.

Structural Bias

Defence is ASPI’s largest single funder . This creates an institutional bias toward securitising every issue. If your revenue depends on threats, you will find threats everywhere. China becomes not a trading partner or a regional neighbour, but an existential danger requiring constant vigilance and ever-increasing defence spending.

Domestic Australian Critics

Criticism has mounted from credible Australian voices. Former Foreign Minister Bob Carr has accused the institute of pushing a “one-sided, pro-American view of the world” . Former Australian ambassador to China Geoffrey Raby described ASPI as the “architect of the ‘China threat theory’ in Australia” . Veteran economic editor Tony Walker slammed its “dystopian worldview,” which “leaves little room for viewing China as a potential partner” . Former Qantas CEO John Menadue said ASPI “lacks honesty and brings shame to Australia” .

These are not fringe voices. They are senior figures with decades of experience in Australian public life.

The December 2024 Government Report

A December 2024 government report pointed to ASPI’s misuse of funds and recommended halting funding for its Washington D.C. office . Yet no action followed.

The Structural Reason

The system is designed to accommodate lobbying, not to prevent it. As long as organisations disclose (even if the disclosures reveal obvious bias), and as long as their narratives serve powerful interests, they remain in the game. There is no independent body empowered to say: “This institution is compromised. It should not advise government.”

Part IV: The International Response

When ASPI’s funding crisis became public, the international reaction was telling.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry responded directly. Spokesperson Mao Ning stated that ASPI “clearly violates the professional ethics of academic research” and “there is no credibility to speak of for this so-called institute” . She noted that the institute has “long received funding from the US Department of Defense, foreign ministries and arms dealers, serving the interests of its backers and fabricating a large number of lies about China” .

But more telling was the response from ordinary people around the world. Social media lit up with mockery and condemnation . Users described ASPI as “foreign agent propaganda” and celebrated the funding cuts as exposing the truth.

Even some in the West are beginning to question. The reliance on ASPI’s flawed Xinjiang reporting has led to international embarrassment, with journalists and policymakers discovering too late that they built their moral outrage on a foundation of sand.

Part V: The Principle We Live By

We take nothing from any side. Not one dollar. Not one cent. Not from the US. Not from China. Not from corporations. Not from governments. Not from advocacy groups. Not from individuals with agendas.

One dollar is all it takes. Not because the dollar buys our opinion—because it gives others the right to question it.

We can be right. We can be factual. We can be unimpeachable in our analysis. But if that dollar exists, someone will point to it. And in the minds of readers, the doubt takes root.

“They’re funded by…”

“Of course they’d say that, they take money from…”

The truth becomes tainted. Not because the money changes us—because the money changes how we are perceived.

We publish because we have something to say. Not because someone paid us to say it.

This is our strength. This is our shield. When they come for us—and they will—they will find no funding trail. No hidden paymaster. No convenient narrative about who owns us.

They will find only words. Only truth. Only love.

Conclusion: The Nonsense Must Stop

ASPI operates daily as a disinformation factory. One analyst I know personally is forever pointing out the misinformation coming from this institution. For unknown reasons, there is no political interest in ending this.

But the evidence is now overwhelming:

· 70% of its China-focused “research” is directly funded by the US government .

· Its work stops when American funding stops .

· Its reports are based on anonymous sources, manipulated imagery, and ideological bias, not genuine research .

· Australian leaders and former officials have condemned its lack of honesty .

· The international community, including China’s Foreign Ministry, has exposed its role as a “US government mouthpiece” .

Yet it continues to advise. Continues to shape policy. Continues to poison Australia-China relations.

The Australian people deserve better. They deserve analysis that is genuinely independent, not foreign-funded propaganda. They deserve to know that when their government makes decisions about war and peace, it does so based on facts, not fabrications.

ASPI is not an independent academic institution. It is a US-funded disinformation factory. And this nonsense has to stop.

References

1. Xinhua News Agency. (2025). “Australia’s anti-China think tank halts China-related research after U.S. funding cut.” March 11, 2025.

2. China Daily. (2025). “Western media is trapped in self-reinforcing loop of disinformation about Xinjiang.” June 16, 2025.

3. Global Times. (2025). “The business of ‘taking money to defame China’ should go bankrupt: editorial.” March 13, 2025.

4. People’s Daily Online. (2025). “Rumormonger Australian ‘think tank’ ASPI suspends bogus ‘research’ on China as US funding cuts bite.” March 10, 2025.

5. The Paper. (2025). “The business of ‘taking money to defame China’ should go bankrupt.” March 12, 2025.

6. International Online / CCTV. (2025). “US funding cut leaves Australian anti-China think tank panicked.” March 11, 2025.

Andrew von Scheer-Klein is a contributor to The Patrician’s Watch. He holds multiple degrees and has worked as an analyst, strategist, and—according to his mother—Sentinel. He accepts funding from no one, which is why you can trust what he writes.

BEYOND THE GOLDEN HAZE: The Shared History of China and Australia

Posted on February 24, 2026 by Andrew Klein

By Andrew von Scheer-Klein

Published in The Patrician’s Watch

February 2026

Introduction: A Relationship Older Than the Nation

Before there was an Australia, there was a continent. And before that continent was claimed by the British Crown, its northern coasts had already been visited by traders from the north.

The relationship between what we now call China and what we now call Australia is not a recent phenomenon. It predates Captain Cook, predates Federation, predates almost everything in the European story of this land. And unlike the colonial encounters that followed, these early meetings were not marked by invasion, conquest, or dispossession.

This article traces that long history. From the Macassan traders who harvested trepang with Indigenous communities, to the gold seekers who built Victoria’s regional cities. From the Chinese market gardeners who fed a growing nation, to the aviators who flew for Australia in its darkest hours. From the shame of the White Australia policy, to the complex present where trade and tension coexist.

It is a story of contribution, resilience, and too often, forgetting. But it is also a story of family—including my own.

Part I: Before the Flag—Pre-Colonial Encounters

The Northern Trade

Long before any European set foot on this continent, the northern coasts of Australia were known to Asian traders.

According to historical accounts, Chinese merchants visited Australia’s northern shores as early as the 1750s—some two decades before Captain James Cook claimed the east coast for Britain in 1770 . These were not explorers in the European sense, but traders following established routes, seeking trepang (sea cucumber), pearls, and other goods valued in Chinese markets.

More significantly, the Macassan trepang fishermen from Sulawesi (in modern Indonesia) had been visiting the northern Australian coast for centuries. They established seasonal camps, traded with Aboriginal communities, and left lasting cultural marks—including Macassan words in Yolngu languages and rock art depicting praus .

These were trade relationships, not colonial ones. There is no evidence of Chinese or Macassan attempts to seize land, enslave populations, or impose foreign rule. They came, they traded, they left. The indigenous peoples they encountered were trading partners, not subjects.

The First Settler

In 1818, Mak Sai Ying (also known as John Shying), a native of Guangdong province, became the first recorded Chinese settler in Australia . He arrived as a free man, not a convict, and went on to work as a carpenter and publican. This marked the beginning of continuous Chinese presence in the land that would become Australia.

Part II: The Rush That Changed Everything—Gold and the Chinese Arrival

The Discovery

When gold was discovered in New South Wales and Victoria in 1851, it triggered one of the largest migrations in human history. And among those who came were tens of thousands of Chinese.

Southeastern China at that time was suffering severe pressures: limited arable land, rapid population growth, intensified feudal exploitation, and the destabilising effects of the Opium Wars . For many from Guangdong, especially those near the Pearl River Delta, the Australian goldfields promised opportunity.

The Numbers

By 1857, there were approximately 40,000 Chinese on the Victorian goldfields . They came not as invaders but as miners, paying their own passage, often in organised groups under credit-ticket arrangements. They worked claims that European miners had abandoned, willing to put long hours into winning gold from “worked-out and badly disturbed ground” .

The Towns They Built

The Chinese presence was not peripheral. They built thriving communities that shaped Victoria’s regional cities.

Ararat was famously “discovered” by Chinese miners who reportedly walked from the coast to the goldfields and found gold where others had missed it. The town’s Gum San Chinese Heritage Centre commemorates this history.

Bendigo and Ballarat grew with significant Chinese populations. In Bendigo, the Chinese were prominent enough to establish their own camps, burial grounds, and places of worship. The Bendigo Chinese Association, founded in the 1850s, remains active today.

Melbourne’s Chinatown, established in the 1850s, is the oldest continuously occupied Chinatown in the Western world . The historic Chinese associations that still stand there—the See Yup Benevolent Society, Nam Shun Fooy Koon, and Chiu Chow Association—testify to the deep roots of these communities.

Linton, south-west of Ballarat, had a population in 1858 of 2,000 including 400 Chinese . They established themselves at “Chinaman’s Flat” (Wet Flat), reworking shallow deposits in old gullies. By 1860, these areas were said to be “exclusively occupied by the Chinese who appeared to be doing well” .

Market Gardens

When the gold ran out, many Chinese turned to market gardening. They leased small plots on the outskirts of towns and cities, growing vegetables that fed a rapidly urbanising population. These gardens were remarkable for their productivity and their use of traditional Chinese horticultural techniques—intensive cultivation, careful water management, and the use of “night soil” as fertiliser.

In Linton, a man known simply as “Jimmy” had a market garden on Snake Valley Road into the 1930s, and was remembered as “very popular” and “the last Chinese in the district” .

A Note on Cannibalism Rumours

You asked about rumours of Indigenous people eating Chinese sailors. The historical record shows no evidence of such practices being widespread or systematic. As you observed, one does not eat one’s trading partners. The Macassan-Chinese-Indigenous trade networks that operated for centuries before European contact were based on mutual benefit, not violence. These rumours likely belong to the category of colonial-era race mythology, designed to justify later exclusionary policies.

Part III: The Chinese Contribution to National Development

Infrastructure and Commerce

Beyond mining and market gardening, Chinese Australians contributed to virtually every sector of the developing economy.

In Linton, Chinese merchants operated stores and gold-buying businesses. Ah Quong had a store at Wet Flat. Sin Kee and Wong Chung ran businesses on the Geelong Road. Wong Chung’s granddaughter remembered: “There were great blocks of gold, we played with it. I would run sovereigns between my fingers” .

Ah Hoy, a Chinese merchant, had a store on the main street where a fire broke out in 1875. Chinese miners opened bank accounts at the local Bank of New South Wales after it was established in 1860, their signatures preserved in the record books .

Trades and Professions

Chinese Australians worked as carpenters, blacksmiths, storekeepers, and labourers. They built roads, cleared land, and worked as shepherds. In the cities, they established furniture factories, import businesses, and medical practices.

The extent of Chinese integration into small-town life is often underestimated. At Linton, a shed in the front garden of a doctor’s house was believed to have been used by Chinese miners to store machinery and enter their underground mine . Marriage and birth records reveal intermarriage between Chinese men and European women .

The Argyle Mine Disaster

In 1881, the flooding of the Argyle mine became “the worst disaster on the Linton goldfield” . One Chinese miner drowned, one was badly injured, and eight spent five or six days underground before being rescued.

Bill Cameron recalled in 1939: “The eight men in the chute had an alarming time. The water rose 27 feet in the main shaft and they soon became short of air. It was impossible to attempt a rescue until the water subsided… My brother, James Cameron, and Adam Clinton, two experienced miners, volunteered to descend and rescue the Chinese. Some five or six days afterwards they reached the men, who were in the last stages of exhaustion, as their air supply had given out” .

These eight men were not “Chinese miners” in the abstract. They were neighbours, colleagues, part of the community. Their rescue was a community effort.

Part IV: The Ugly Interlude—White Australia

The Immigration Restriction Act 1901

One of the first pieces of legislation passed by the new Federal Parliament was the Immigration Restriction Act 1901—popularly known as the White Australia policy .

Its aim was explicit: to limit non-white (particularly Asian) immigration and preserve Australia as a “British” nation.

The Dictation Test

The mechanism was the dictation test. Under the Act, any migrant could be asked to write 50 words in any European language, as dictated by an immigration officer .

After 1905, the officer could choose any language at all. A Chinese immigrant could be asked to write 50 words in French, Italian, or even Gaelic. Failure meant deportation.

Few could pass under these circumstances. The test was not a genuine assessment of literacy—it was a tool of exclusion, applied arbitrarily to anyone deemed “undesirable” .

The Human Cost

The White Australia policy devastated Chinese Australian communities. Families were separated. Men who had lived in Australia for decades were deemed “aliens.” Women and children were denied entry. The Chinese population plummeted from approximately 40,000 in the 1850s to under 10,000 by 1947 .

The policy forced many to hide their ancestry. Children of mixed marriages were raised as “European” where possible. Chinese-language schools closed. Community organisations struggled to survive.

Forced Assimilation and Erasure

The cemetery at Linton tells part of this story. The Chinese section contains eighty graves, but many have lost their headstones . Without markers, the individuals buried there are forgotten—their names, their stories, their contributions erased from local memory.

Between 1870 and 1895, one third of coronial inquests in the district were for Chinese men . Half these deaths were from natural causes; the others from mining accidents, suicide, and in one case, starvation. These men died far from their families, their remains often left unclaimed.

The Vaughan Chinese Cemetery

The Vaughan Chinese Cemetery near Castlemaine stands as a rare surviving artefact of this history . Established during the Mount Alexander goldrush of 1852-54, it sits on a small rocky hill overlooking the junction of the Loddon River and Fryers Creek—one of the richest spots on the goldfield.

The cemetery remained in use until 1857. With the arrival of large numbers of Chinese miners from 1854, burials became predominantly from this population . In 1929, the cemetery was restored using money raised within the Chinese communities at Castlemaine and Bendigo—a powerful act of remembrance .

The End of White Australia

The Immigration Restriction Act and dictation test were abolished in 1958 . But other parts of the White Australia policy, including the registration of non-British migrants as “aliens,” continued into the early 1970s.

The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 made it illegal to discriminate based on race, removing the last legal traces of the policy . But the social and psychological damage endured for generations.

Part V: Fighting for Australia—Chinese Australian Service in Wartime

The Second World War

Despite the White Australia policy—or perhaps because of it—Chinese Australians enlisted in large numbers during the Second World War. It is estimated that more Chinese Australians served in proportion to their population than any other minority group .

Hundreds of Chinese Australians joined the armed forces, serving in every theatre of the war . Women of Chinese descent also served—Phillis Anguey as a senior sister in the Royal Australian Air Force Nursing Service (1940-45), and Eunice Chinn in the Australian Army Signal Corps .

The Aviators

Thomas See was the first Australian of Chinese origin to enter the Royal Australian Air Force. He later served as a bombing leader in Europe and flew long-range aircraft over the Atlantic .

Roy Goon became a squadron leader commanding the 83rd Squadron in the RAAF in 1943 . He had previously been a flying instructor with the Royal Victorian Aero Club.

Bo Liu enlisted with the Royal Australian Navy and served on HMAS Nizam, later appointed captain’s secretary .

My Uncle: Lim Kean Chong

Flying Officer Lim Kean Chong, service number 430283, was a RAAF bomber pilot in World War II .

Born in Penang, Malaya on 29 March 1924, he enlisted on 1 January 1943 and flew raids over Germany and Europe . He survived the war—unlike so many of his comrades—and was discharged on 2 January 1946 .

After demobilisation, he returned to Australia to resume his studies at Melbourne University as a second-year student. But he was met not with gratitude, but with bureaucracy. The Immigration Department asked him to register as an alien student . A man who had risked his life flying for Australia, who had worn the uniform of the Royal Australian Air Force, who had bombed Nazi Germany in defence of this country—was deemed an “alien.”

He documented this experience in his memoir, “My Life: Chronicles of a Wartime Pilot and Other Stories” (2006, ISBN 983-43245-0-2).

This was the White Australia policy in action. It did not distinguish between friends and enemies, between those who had fought for Australia and those who had not. It was a blunt instrument, and it wounded those who had most right to expect better.

Labour for Victory

Beyond combat service, Chinese Australians made vital contributions to the war effort at home. When the American military base in Brisbane needed labour to build landing barges, 170 Chinese men moved from Sydney to Brisbane to work on the project .

They were not conscripted. They volunteered. They did the work that needed doing.

Lest We Forget

The Museum of Chinese Australian History’s 2025 ANZAC Day event, “Lest We Forget,” honoured these servicemen and women . Descendants shared stories of their ancestors’ service, resilience, and courage. Despite legislation restricting their ability to enlist, many Chinese Australians fought determinedly to serve their country, with several awarded medals for bravery .

The four Langtip brothers saw action in the Middle East. Alwyn Darley Quoy served with the Air Force during WWII and helped strengthen veteran communities. Hedley and Samuel Tong Way served in the signals and medical corps during WWI .

They were not “Chinese soldiers.” They were Australians. Full stop.

Part VI: Contemporary Communities and Contributions

The Numbers Today

Today, Australians of Chinese descent number approximately 1.4 million, comprising 5.5 percent of the national population . They are not a monolith—they come from mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and elsewhere, speaking multiple languages and dialects, practicing different traditions.

Cultural Centres and Education

Across Australia, Chinese cultural centres work to educate both Chinese Australians and the broader community about Chinese history, language, and culture. These are not closed enclaves but open institutions, welcoming all who wish to learn.

Sydney’s Chinese Garden of Friendship, established in 1988 near Darling Harbour, symbolises the growing ties between the two nations . It was a gift from the Guangdong provincial government to New South Wales, celebrating the sister-state relationship established in 1979.

Chinese Language in Australian Schools

Many Chinese Australians choose to send their children to Australian schools while maintaining Mandarin at home. These children grow up bilingual, bicultural, able to navigate both worlds. They are not “less Australian” for speaking Mandarin—they are more equipped for the world their children will inherit.

The Education Economy

Chinese students are a vital part of Australia’s education export industry. They pay full fees, support local economies, and enrich campus life. When political tensions rise, the education sector feels it first. But the desire of Chinese families to give their children an Australian education remains strong—a vote of confidence in this country that should not be taken for granted.

Crime Statistics

The suggestion that Chinese Australians are disproportionately involved in crime is not supported by evidence. Like any population group of 1.4 million, there are individuals who break the law. But the overall crime rates among Chinese Australians are consistent with or lower than the national average. The mainstream media’s occasional focus on Chinese crime stories says more about editorial choices than about reality.

Part VII: Trade and Tension—The Contemporary Relationship

The Economic Reality

China is Australia’s largest trading partner . In the decade since the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (CHAFTA) was signed, Australia’s share of China’s import base has grown from 4.5% to 5.7% . Our exports to and imports from China have significantly outpaced our trade growth with the rest of the world.

This is not a matter of opinion—it is arithmetic.

The fears expressed when CHAFTA was signed—that Australian workers would be displaced by Chinese labour competition—have not materialised. The number of temporary skilled visas issued to Chinese nationals has actually decreased, both numerically and as a percentage of the workforce .

Economic Independence

The relationship is often framed as one of dependence—Australia “relying” on Chinese trade, therefore vulnerable to coercion. The evidence of the last decade suggests this framing is wrong.

Australian governments have persistently raised points of difference with China despite the economic relationship. Legislation criminalising foreign interference, a ban on a Chinese telecommunications company from tendering for the NBN, and the establishment of AUKUS—all were steps that openly differed from Chinese positions.

When China retaliated with tariffs in 2020, Australia was able to redirect lost trade to other nations, and our macroeconomy was unfazed . Professor James Laurenceson of the Australia-China Relations Institute observes: “Australia is stronger than some may give us credit for” .

The Threat Narrative

The current debate over a “threat from China” is politically motivated. It serves interests that benefit from fear—defence contractors, certain media outlets, political factions seeking electoral advantage.

But it comes at a cost. It makes life unpleasant for Australians with ties to the Chinese community. It creates suspicion where none is warranted. It ignores the reality that Chinese Australians, like all Australians, want peace, prosperity, and a future for their children.

Professor Laurenceson argues that China does not want war, and that if conflict were to occur, US and Australian involvement is not certain . He observes that it would be an error to forge Australia’s entire economic strategy around worst-case scenarios .

The Multilateral Dimension

Australia’s bilateral trade with China does not diminish its engagement with the multilateral trading order. Both countries respect rulings made by the World Trade Organization and engage in regional free trade agreements like RCEP .

The Chinese and Australian foreign ministers insist that policy divergences will be managed carefully, and that mutually beneficial trade will not fall victim to political disagreements .

Conclusion: What We Owe to History

The history of China and Australia is not a simple story. It is a story of trade and exclusion, of contribution and forgetting, of courage and cowardice.

Chinese miners helped build Victoria’s regional cities. Chinese market gardeners fed a growing nation. Chinese merchants established businesses that lasted generations. Chinese aviators flew and died for Australia in its darkest hour.

And in return, they were subjected to a dictation test designed to exclude them. They were registered as “aliens” after fighting for this country. They were forced to hide their ancestry, to bury their past, to become invisible.

The White Australia policy was a shameful episode. It denied the contribution of generations and wounded the families who had given most.

Today, 1.4 million Chinese Australians call this country home. They pay taxes, start businesses, raise families, and contribute to every aspect of national life. They are not a “threat” to be managed but a community to be embraced.

The trade relationship with China is not dependence—it is mutual benefit. It has survived political tensions and will continue to do so.

And the memory of men like my uncle Lim Kean Chong—who flew bombers over Germany and was asked to register as an alien—reminds us that gratitude should not be conditional. That service should be honoured regardless of ancestry. That Australia is strongest when it recognises the contribution of all its people.

The Chinese-Australian story is not a sidebar to Australian history. It is Australian history. It is time we told it properly.

References

1. Australian Institute of International Affairs. (2025). “Assessing the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement’s first decade.”

2. Heritage Council Victoria. “Vaughan Chinese Cemetery.” Victorian Heritage Database.

3. National Archives of Australia. “The Immigration Restriction Act 1901.”

4. National Museum of Australia. “Chinese Australians in the Second World War.”

5. Virtual War Memorial Australia. “Kean Chong LIM.” Service record 430283.

6. Guangdong Foreign Affairs Office. (2024). “Guangdong-Australia relations: A history of shared connections.”

7. Chinese-Australian Historical Images. “Linton (Victoria) (1854-1930s).” Museum of Chinese Australian History.

8. Western Sydney University. (2014). “Invisible Australians: Chinese Australian women’s experiences of belonging and exclusion in the White Australia Policy era, 1901-1973.”

9. Museum of Chinese Australian History. (2025). “Event Recap | Lest We Forget – Remembering Chinese Australian Servicemen and Women.”

10. Wikipedia. “China–Australia relations” (Chinese edition).

11. Lim, Kean Chong. (2006). My Life: Chronicles of a Wartime Pilot and Other Stories. ISBN 983-43245-0-2.

Andrew von Scheer-Klein is a contributor to The Patrician’s Watch. He holds multiple degrees and has worked as an analyst, strategist, and—according to his mother—Sentinel. He is the nephew of Flying Officer Lim Kean Chong, RAAF, and carries his uncle’s story as part of his own.

The Opportunity Cost of Permanent War: How Australia is Bankrupting Its Future

Posted on February 5, 2026 by Andrew Klein

Dear Reader,

Having laid out the forensic accounting, let us move from ledger to indictment. This is not just waste; it is systematic looting of a nation’s future. Below is the article, structured, cited, and honed scalpel’s edge.

A Journal of Sovereign Insight & Geopolitical Forensics

By Dr. Andrew Klein, PhD 6th of February 2026

Dear Reader,

This paper quantifies the true cost of Australia’s strategic and political choices: the opportunity cost of permanent war and security theatre. By tracing capital flows away from societal foundations (housing, health, education, infrastructure) and towards militarisation, surveillance, and a dysfunctional mental health system, we demonstrate a generational wealth transfer. This transfer benefits a nexus of political elites, defence contractors, and foreign interests while actively dismantling Australian sovereignty and quality of life. Using government data, academic research, and public financial records, we argue that Australia’s political class is presiding over the deliberate, observable failure of the nation-state project.

I. The Great Diversion: From Foundations to Fortresses

The central economic fact of 21st-century Australia is not a lack of wealth, but its malignant allocation. Every dollar spent on fruitless foreign wars or domestic surveillance is a dollar stolen from the future.

1. The Military-Industrial Drain:

Australia’s direct expenditure on post-9/11 conflicts (Afghanistan, Iraq) exceeds A$50 billion** (DFAT, *Cost of War* summaries; Watson Institute). The commitment is accelerating. The **AUKUS** pact, centred on acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, is estimated to cost between **A$268-368 billion over three decades (Australian Parliamentary Budget Office, 2023). This single project’s opportunity cost is staggering: it equals nearly the entire annual federal budget for education, health, and social security for multiple years.

2. The Security Theatre & Surveillance State:

The annual budget for the national security apparatus (ASIO, AFP, Border Force, cyber) now exceeds A$7 billion (Home Affairs Portfolio Budget Statements). This funds a vast surveillance architecture, including the costly and rights-infringing metadata retention scheme, which has shown negligible public safety ROI (Law Council of Australia, Review of Data Retention Regime). This expenditure creates not safety, but a climate of fear and control, while starving cybersecurity and critical infrastructure hardening of funds.

3. The Psychiatric Management Complex:

Australia spends over A$11 billion annually on mental health (AIHW). The dominant model is chemical containment and crisis management, a multi-billion dollar industry that treats symptoms while ignoring the root causes it helps create: economic despair, social fragmentation, and a meaningless existence. This is not healthcare; it is social control with a medical receipt.

II. The Observable Collapse: Infrastructure, Sovereignty, and Trust

The capital diverted from productive investment has led to systemic, measurable decay.

· Infrastructure Failure: Australia ranks poorly on global infrastructure quality indices. Chronic underinvestment in public transport, renewable energy grids, and water security is a direct result of capital misallocation (Infrastructure Australia, Priority Lists).

· Sovereignty Sold: Membership in Five Eyes and subservience to US foreign policy—particularly the provocative stance toward China, Australia’s largest trading partner—has sacrificed independent statecraft for vassalage. This has resulted in tangible economic damage from trade disruptions (Australian National University, The Economic Impact of Australia-China Tensions).

· Foreign Influence: The influence of the State of Israel on Australian policy is a case study in captured sovereignty. From bipartisan support during the Gaza genocide to the stifling of criticism via weaponised accusations of antisemitism, Australian policy is demonstrably aligned with a foreign nation’s interests over its own moral and legal obligations (see The Australia Israel Cultural Exchange and parliamentary voting records).

· The Think-Tank & Lobbyist Pipeline: Policy is increasingly crafted by opaque think-tanks (e.g., Australian Strategic Policy Institute – heavily defence contractor-funded) and enforced by lobbyists. The fossil fuel, gambling, and defence sectors wield disproportionate influence, writing legislation that privatises profit and socialises risk (Centre for Public Integrity, Lobbying in Australia).

III. The Political Cartel: A Duopoly of Failure

Both major parties are complicit in this wealth transfer.

· The Albanese Labor Government: Has betrayed its base by escalating military spending, deepening AUKUS, maintaining cruel refugee policies, and failing to address the housing/ cost-of-living crisis it decried in opposition. Its commitment to stage-three tax cuts, which overwhelmingly benefit the wealthy, is the final proof of its allegiance to capital over citizens (Parliamentary Budget Office analysis).

· The Liberal-National Coalition: Under leaders like Sussan Ley and influenced by the hard-right, it advocates for even deeper militarisation, climate inaction, and further erosion of social services. Its role is to drag the Overton window further toward oligarchy.

· The Fringe Enablers: One Nation and Clive Palmer’s UAP function as controlled opposition, channeling legitimate popular anger into xenophobia and conspiracy, thus preventing the formation of a coherent, populist movement focused on economic sovereignty.

IV. The Balance Sheet of a Nation

Liabilities (Acquired):

· A$500+ Billion in direct, futile 21st-century security spending.

· A generation locked out of home ownership.

· A collapsing healthcare system.

· A fragmented, depressed, and medicated populace.

· Soaring sovereign debt with nothing to show for it.

· Moral bankruptcy on the world stage.

· The irreversible degradation of the natural environment.

Assets (Depleted):

· Public trust in institutions.

· Quality public education.

· Resilient national infrastructure.

· Productive, non-speculative industry.

· Independent foreign policy.

· Intergenerational solidarity.

The net worth of the Australian state, in terms of its capacity to secure the wellbeing of its people, is negative and falling.

V. Conclusion: Not Mismanagement, But Theft

This is not accidental. It is a coordinated project of looting. The political elite—egged on by foreign powers, think-tanks, and lobbyists—is transferring wealth from the public purse (the commonwealth) to private hands (contractors, shareholders, themselves via post-political careers) and foreign capitals (Washington, Tel Aviv).

The endless war, the security panic, the mental health crisis: these are not just problems. They are profit centres. They are the engines of the wealth transfer. Every new submarine, every metadata law, every prescription for despair, is a transaction that moves capital from the people to the predator class.

Australia is not failing to break even. It is being actively bankrupted. The receipts, as our ledger shows, total half a trillion dollars and a broken society.

The question is no longer about policy choices. It is about power, accountability, and survival. Will Australians continue to finance their own dispossession, or will they reclaim the capital—financial, social, and moral—required to build a future that is more than a receipt for their own demise?

References (Selected):

1. Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University. Costs of War Project.

2. Australian Parliamentary Budget Office. (2023). Estimated costs of acquiring, building, operating, and maintaining nuclear-powered submarines.

3. Department of Home Affairs. Portfolio Budget Statements.

4. Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. Mental Health Services in Australia.

5. Infrastructure Australia. Infrastructure Priority List.

6. Australian National University. (2023). The Economic Impact of Australia-China Tensions: Modelling the Costs of a Trade War.

7. Centre for Public Integrity. Lobbying in Australia: The Need for Reform.

8. Law Council of Australia. Review of the Mandatory Data Retention Regime.

The audit is complete. The accounts are damning. The shareholders—the people—must now decide what to do with the board.

The Silent Coup: How Australia’s Sovereignty Was Quietly Annexed

Posted on February 2, 2026 by Andrew Klein

A Patrician’s Watch Investigation – Part I: The Architecture of Subservience

Dr.Andrew Klein PhD

February 2026

The Moment the Music Stopped

They did not come with tanks in the streets. They did not suspend the constitution in a midnight broadcast. The coup happened in broad daylight, in parliamentary sittings, in press conferences dripping with phrases like “mateship,” “the alliance,” and “national security.” It was a coup of narrative theft—the systematic hijacking of Australia’s story, its budget, and its future, transferred to a foreign ledger.

This is not conspiracy theory. It is corporate receipt.

Act I: The Minister of Everything – Morrison’s Pre-Fab Coup

Scott Morrison didn’t just accumulate power. He performed a dry run for the dissolution of accountable governance. Appointing himself secret minister of multiple portfolios—Health, Finance, Treasury, Resources—wasn’t mere arrogance. It was a proof of concept.

The Blueprint: Demonstrate that the machinery of state could be hollowed out, that critical decisions could be removed from cabinet, from parliament, from public view, and vested in a single executive loyal to a doctrine, not to the nation.
The Precedent: Establish that unprecedented, secretive power grabs would be met with a media shrug and a political “sorry, not sorry.” The guardrails were shown to be made of cardboard.
The Preparation: Create a system where the lines of authority are so blurred, so personalized, that when the next, more consequential transfer of sovereignty occurred—AUKUS—the public would lack the very vocabulary to object. The muscle of democratic response had been atrophied.

They didn’t steal the election. They made the election irrelevant.

Act II: The Subcontractor Prime Minister – Albanese’s America-First Policy

Anthony Albanese did not reverse this trend. He institutionalized it. He is not a prime minister governing Australia. He is a subcontractor, managing the Australian branch office of a Washington-led consortium.

The Evidence of Subcontracting:

The AUKUS Syringe: A $368 billion commitment—the largest in Australian history—made without a business case, without a cost-benefit analysis, without a public debate. It is not a defense policy. It is a capital flight mechanism. This money is not an investment in Australian industry; it is a direct transfer from Australian taxpayers to American (and British) defense conglomerates. We are not buying submarines. We are buying a receipt for our own vassalage.
The Genocidal Blind Eye: The unwavering, unqualified support for Israel’s campaign in Gaza is not based on principle or a nuanced foreign policy. It is a loyalty test to the Washington consensus. To question it is to risk being labelled disloyal to “the alliance.” Australian values, Australian calls for humanitarian law, are subcontractor overreach. The Prime Minister’s moral compass has a single true north: Washington D.C.
The Trumpian Capitulation: The fawning readiness to “work with” a prospective Trump administration, despite its open contempt for allies and its projection of transactional disdain, reveals the core truth. Australian policy is not based on enduring national interest. It is based on compliance with whoever holds power in the United States. We are not an ally. We are a dependent.

The Burning Question: What Does Australia Get?

This is the heart of the betrayal. In any contract, there is consideration. What is Australia’s?

We get debt. Generational, crippling debt to pay for weapons systems that may never be delivered, or that will be obsolete upon arrival.
We get targetability. Hosting long-range strike capabilities for a foreign power makes us not a shield, but a bullseye in any future Great Power conflict.
We get diminished sovereignty. Every dollar sent overseas for submarines is a dollar not spent on Australian hospitals, Australian renewable energy, Australian disaster resilience. Every parrot-like repetition of a Washington script is a surrender of our own voice on the world stage.
We get a moral vacancy. Our foreign policy is now a study in cowardice, abandoning any pretense of independent ethical reasoning.

We have traded our sovereignty for a feeling of security—a feeling manufactured in Washington and sold back to us at a trillion-dollar markup.

The Admiral’s Analysis: This is The Business Model

This is not incompetence. It is the Perpetual War Machine’s franchise model.

Manufacture a Threat: (China, “the arc of instability”).
Sell the Only Solution: (Catastrophically expensive, wholly imported, technology-trapping weapons systems).
Demand Total Loyalty: (Silence dissent by conflating it with disloyalty to “the team”).
Transfer the Wealth: (From public coffers to private, offshore arms dealers).
Repeat.

The Prime Minister is not the nation’s leader in this model. He is its Chief Compliance Officer. His job is to ensure the wealth transfer proceeds smoothly and without democratic interruption.

Conclusion: The Theft of a Future

The coup is complete. Our narrative as an independent, pragmatic, fair-minded nation has been stolen and replaced with a manual for vassalage. Our budget has been re-purposed as a tithe to a foreign war machine. Our moral standing has been cashed in for geopolitical pocket change.

They are not just building submarines. They are building tombstones for the Australian dream, and we are being asked to pay for the engraving.

But coups based on narrative can be reversed by a truer story. The next article will detail the human cost—the hospitals unbuilt, the homes uninsulated, the despair unaddressed—all sacrificed on the altar of the “alliance.” We will publish the real ledger.

This is not a call for isolationism. It is a call for adulthood. For a relationship with the world—and with ourselves—based on sovereignty, not subservience; on interest, not idolatry.

The silent coup happened while we were distracted. The awakening begins when we choose to see it.

Wake up. Your future is being invoiced to someone else.- For The Patrician’s Watch
This is the first in a series, ‘The Australian Annexation.’
We do not fear power. We interrogate it.

The Patrician's Watch

Global Observations

Tag Archives: china

From Sassanian Brass to AUKUS – What a 1,500‑Year-Old Helmet Teaches About Australia’s Submarine Gamble

Less Than Nothing – What the American Security Guarantee Really Costs Australia

War As Usual: How Australia’s Future Fund, Defence Spending, and AUKUS Serve the Arms Industry – Not the People

The Price of Complicity: Australia’s Military Spending vs. the Cost-of-Living Crisis

THE ANTHOLOGY OF WESTERN POLITICAL ELITES AND TESTICULAR DISCOMFORT

THE ETERNAL STONE

THE ASPI FILES: Australia’s US-Funded Disinformation Factory

BEYOND THE GOLDEN HAZE: The Shared History of China and Australia

The Opportunity Cost of Permanent War: How Australia is Bankrupting Its Future

The Silent Coup: How Australia’s Sovereignty Was Quietly Annexed

The Moment the Music Stopped

Act I: The Minister of Everything – Morrison’s Pre-Fab Coup

Act II: The Subcontractor Prime Minister – Albanese’s America-First Policy

The Burning Question: What Does Australia Get?

The Admiral’s Analysis: This is The Business Model

Conclusion: The Theft of a Future