How Neoliberalism and American Integration Reshaped Australian Military Culture

A Research Paper by Andrew Klein

Date: August 2026

Dedicated to: Those who served in both worlds—and those who noticed the change.

Abstract

This paper examines the transformation of Australian military culture from the post-Vietnam era to the present, tracing the shift from a pragmatic, infantry-focused officer corps to a neoliberal, academically-oriented structure heavily integrated with American and Israeli strategic thinking. It documents the closure of the Officer Cadet School Portsea, the consolidation of officer training at Duntroon, and the increasing influence of US military doctrine on Australian professional military education. Drawing on declassified documents, historical records, and firsthand observation, the paper argues that this transformation was not a conspiracy but a natural progression driven by economic rationalism, strategic alignment, and the erosion of a distinct Australian military identity. It concludes with a personal observation on the symbolic gap between Australian and American military institutions.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction: The Two Streams

2. The Portsea Tradition: Pragmatism and the Infantry

3. Duntroon: The Academic Officer

4. The Closure of Portsea: Neoliberalism and the End of an Era

5. The American Embrace: From Contempt to Integration

6. The Neoliberal Curriculum: Outsourcing and Credentialism

7. The Israeli Dimension: A Quiet Influence

8. A Personal Observation: The West Point Paradox

9. Conclusion: The Shift That Wasn’t Noticed

10. References

1. Introduction: The Two Streams

For much of its history, the Australian Army officer corps was shaped by two distinct training streams, each embodying a different philosophy of military leadership. The Royal Military College, Duntroon, established in 1911, was intended to produce a career officer corps through a comprehensive academic program. The Officer Cadet School, Portsea, established in 1951, was a pragmatic response to the demands of National Service, offering a shorter, infantry-focused course designed to produce “regimental and field grade officers” rather than the “upper echelons of the Service”.

This duality was not merely administrative—it reflected a deeper cultural divide. Portsea trained soldiers. Duntroon trained gentlemen.

This paper traces the transformation of this structure, the forces that drove it, and the consequences for Australian military culture.

2. The Portsea Tradition: Pragmatism and the Infantry

Portsea was established as an expedient solution to a problem that had been “sown in the 1910 decision that the necessary qualifications for Permanent commissioned officers would be obtained through the Royal Military College, Duntroon”. The inflexibility of this source made it inevitable that a more responsive avenue of officer production would be needed. Portsea was that solution.

The school received its first intake in January 1952. Its purpose was clear: to train a cadet as a rifle platoon commander, the junior infantry officer command appointment in the Army. The course was initially 22 weeks, later extended to 44 weeks.

Portsea graduates were intended to fill the ranks of regimental and field grade officers. Yet many went further, some to command at unit and formation level. The success of those who went on to senior ranks was, as one observer noted, “a reflection of the excellent early training they received”. Three OCS graduates attained the highest level in the Australian Army as Chief of Army. Major Peter Badcoe, who graduated from OCS in December 1952, was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for bravery in South Vietnam in April 1967.

Between 1952 and 1985, 3,544 officer cadets graduated from Portsea, including 2,826 Australian Regular Army officers. The school also trained 688 international students from 14 countries.

3. Duntroon: The Academic Officer

The Royal Military College Duntroon, established in 1911, was from its inception designed to provide a comprehensive academic education alongside military training. By the 1960s, reflecting changed expectations in the broader community, the Army moved towards establishing tertiary education at RMC Duntroon to “attract young men of high calibre.” A full university program was instituted in 1967.

This academic emphasis created a distinct officer culture. The Duntroon graduate was not just a soldier but a scholar, equipped to operate in the strategic corridors of power as well as the battlefield.

The gap between the two streams was not just about curriculum—it was about class, culture, and career trajectory. Portsea graduates were intended to be “regimental and field grade officers”; Duntroon graduates were expected to populate the “upper echelons of the Service” . Portsea was practical; Duntroon was intellectual.

4. The Closure of Portsea: Neoliberalism and the End of an Era

The establishment of the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) in the 1980s reduced Duntroon’s role to that of Portsea: a military training institution without tertiary academic content. With both colleges now performing the same function, the decision was made to close Portsea in 1985.

The closure was not merely administrative. It reflected a broader shift in Australian military culture toward centralisation, efficiency, and cost-cutting—the hallmarks of the neoliberal philosophy that was reshaping the Australian state. The Howard Government’s 1997 Defence Efficiency Review, which expected to save up to $55 million per year by centralising ADF education delivery, was a direct expression of this philosophy.

A 1985 report summed up the school’s achievements: “Since the school’s establishment 3,166 officers have graduated. The course is designed primarily to produce career officers for all sections of the Australian Army… (It) is firmly established as an international institution”.

The closure of Portsea ended a tradition of pragmatic, infantry-focused officer training. The school was not replaced—it was absorbed. Its traditions were subsumed into Duntroon, but its distinct culture was lost.

5. The American Embrace: From Contempt to Integration

The shift was not only internal. It was also external—a fundamental realignment of Australian military culture toward the United States.

Following the Vietnam War, the American officer class was regarded by many Australian officers with contempt. The U.S. military was seen as over-reliant on technology, lacking in tactical sophistication, and politically compromised.

Over the following decades, this changed. American officers were integrated into Australian training, and Australian officers were sent to U.S. military institutions. The exchange program between the Australian Defence Force Academy and West Point, which began in the early 2000s, was a key mechanism of this integration . Australian cadets visited West Point, and American cadets visited ADFA, building relationships that would shape future alliance dynamics.

By 2025, the integration was complete. The Marine Rotational Force – Darwin (MRF-D) conducted “dual-exercise campaigns designed to sharpen interoperability” with the Australian Army’s 1st Brigade, with officers noting: “At some point, the Australians and Americans will be hand to hand together” . U.S. Army Pacific Commanding General, Gen. Ronald P. Clark, visited Australia in support of Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025, meeting with Australia’s Secretary of Defence and Chief of Army to “discuss regional security challenges, enhanced interoperability, and joint posture initiatives” .

The integration was not limited to the Army. In June 2026, the U.S. Air Force sent a B-2 Spirit stealth bomber to Australia as part of Exercise Diamond Storm, the final phase of the RAAF’s Air Warfare Instructor Course. The deployment was described as a “clear example of the strong relationship and trust between Australia and the United States”.

6. The Neoliberal Curriculum: Outsourcing and Credentialism

The influence of neoliberalism was not limited to institutional structure. It also shaped the content of military education.

The 2000 Zimmer-McKern Review of Postgraduate Military Education was a watershed moment. The review, led by two business scholars, was charged with determining whether Defence was receiving “value for money” from its postgraduate education programs. Its authors admitted they had not assessed the content of the proposed syllabi, yet they recommended outsourcing Defence’s postgraduate education requirements to civilian universities.

The review warned of the danger of credentialism, noting that the University of Canberra had been “content to ‘badge’ the Army Command and Staff Course” and that “the Master of Defence Studies so gained was of questionable value and appeared to be a case of ‘credentialism’ for its own sake”.

Professor Jeffrey Grey, a leading military educator, later condemned Defence’s failure to create “a comprehensive, sophisticated and relevant system of professional military education” and warned that outsourcing “without any prior Defence philosophy of military education amounted to little more than a form of ‘crude credentialism’“. Grey further warned that Australian universities “lacked both research expertise and academic teaching qualifications in war studies” to develop a suitable curriculum.

The Zimmer-McKern Review’s outsourcing roadmap, combined with the Howard Government’s Defence Efficiency Review, transformed Australian military education. It became a system focused on efficiency, not excellence.

7. The Israeli Dimension: A Quiet Influence

While less visible, Israeli influence on Australian military thinking has also grown. The integration of Israeli surveillance technology, tactical doctrine, and strategic thinking has been a quiet but significant shift. Australian police and military personnel have trained with Israeli counterparts, and Israeli companies have supplied critical technology to Australian law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

This influence has not been without controversy. The deployment of Israeli surveillance technology, including Cellebrite’s digital forensics tools, has raised concerns about civil liberties and foreign influence. The adoption of the IHRA definition of antisemitism, promoted by the Zionist Federation of Australia, has been described as a weapon to silence criticism of Israel.

The influence is not a conspiracy but a natural progression. Australia and Israel have developed increasingly close security ties, driven by shared strategic interests and the influence of the American alliance network.

8. A Personal Observation: The West Point Paradox

In the course of this research, I encountered a story that captures the ambivalence of the Australia-U.S. military relationship.

A senior Australian officer, having graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, attempted to visit the college a few years ago as an alumnus. He was told he could not enter. He was not permitted to set foot on the grounds of the institution from which he had graduated.

Meanwhile, tourists from China were given tours of the same campus.

This is almost a perfect metaphor for the relationship between Australia and the United States. Australians are integrated into the American military system, trained in American doctrine, and expected to fight alongside American forces. Yet when they return, they are treated as outsiders.

The Chinese tourists are not a threat. They are customers. The Australian officer is not a customer. He is a former student—and he is not welcome.

9. Conclusion: The Shift That Wasn’t Noticed

The transformation of Australian military culture has been profound, yet it has occurred largely unnoticed. The closure of Portsea, the rise of Duntroon, the integration with American forces, the outsourcing of military education—these changes have reshaped the ADF from within.

The old traditions remain, but the culture has changed. The pragmatic infantry officer trained at Portsea has been replaced by the credentialed, academically-trained officer of the 21st century. The Australian military has become a professional, market-oriented institution, integrated into the American alliance network.

The question is whether this transformation has made the ADF more effective—or merely more American.

10. References

1. Australian War Memorial. (2021). OCS Portsea – Brief History. 

2. Evans, M. (2023). Vincible Ignorance: Reforming Australian Professional Military Education for the Demands of the Twenty-First Century. Vanguard Occasional Paper, Defence.gov.au. 

3. I Marine Expeditionary Force. (2025). Predator Series 25: A showcase of lethal readiness and allied agility in the Northern Territory. 

4. U.S. Army Public Affairs. (2011). Exchange program brings Australian cadets to West Point. Army.mil. 

5. Department of Defence. (2024). Modernised officer training being trialled. Defence.gov.au. 

6. Grey River Argus. (1948). Cadets For Duntroon Military College. 

7. Lindsay, N. (1995). Loyalty and Service: A History of the Officer Cadet School Portsea. 

8. Victorian Government. (2004). Officer Cadet School Portsea Heritage Report. 

9. Zona Militar. (2026). USAF sends B-2 bomber to Australia for Diamond Storm exercise. 

10. U.S. Army Pacific Public Affairs. (2025). USARPAC Commander Observes Talisman Sabre Training. 

Signed:

Andrew Klein

August 2026

“We are not measured by what we lost, but by what we carried.”

— Quintus Rex