Submitted by: Dr. Andrew Klein

Date: February 2026

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

I make this submission as an Australian citizen deeply concerned about the integrity of this inquiry and its capacity to address the complex reality of racism in Australia. I am not represented by any organisation. My interest is in ensuring that this Commission fulfils its mandate honestly, thoroughly, and without predetermined outcomes.

This submission addresses four critical areas:

1. The definitional problem – why the IHRA working definition is unsuitable and has been adopted on false premises

2. The legal framework – the distinction between antisemitism and legitimate political criticism as affirmed by the Federal Court

3. The procedural concerns – rushed timelines, secret submissions, and the appearance of pre-determination

4. The missing context – the selective focus on one form of racism while others are ignored

PART ONE: THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM

The IHRA Definition Has Been Adopted on False Premises

The Commission’s terms of reference require it to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) “working definition” of antisemitism. This decision is fundamentally flawed for reasons that go to the integrity of the definition itself.

Independent doctoral research by Oxford University PhD candidate Jamie Stern-Weiner has demonstrated that the IHRA definition, as currently promoted, rests on a misrepresentation of what was actually adopted by the IHRA Plenary .

Key findings of this research:

· In May 2016, the IHRA Plenary in Bucharest agreed to adopt only the basic two‑sentence definition that precedes the examples: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities” .

· The eleven examples that follow—seven of which involve criticism of Israel—were not adopted by the Plenary. Sweden and Denmark explicitly opposed their inclusion, and the examples were retained only as working material, not as an official part of the definition .

· Despite this, from approximately 2018 onwards, pro‑Israel lobby groups began promoting the definition as if the examples were part of it, a misrepresentation that has now been widely accepted by governments and institutions .

· The lead drafter of the original 2005 EUMC definition (on which IHRA’s is based), Kenneth Stern, has publicly stated that the definition has been “weaponized” to silence criticism of Israel .

The Consequences of This Misrepresentation

The practical effect of adopting the IHRA definition with its contested examples is to conflate legitimate political discourse with racial hatred. The eleven examples include:

· “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavour”

· “Applying double standards to Israel by requiring of it a behaviour not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation”

· “Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis” 

Each of these examples potentially captures speech that is political, not racial. The Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC) has stated that the IHRA definition “has been widely documented to conflate legitimate criticism of the State of Israel and its policies with racial hatred of Jewish people” and has been “weaponised to silence advocacy for Palestinian rights, shield Israel from accountability, and marginalise communities who speak out” .

International Criticism

The IHRA definition has been rejected by numerous legal and human rights bodies. The lead drafter Kenneth Stern himself warned in 2010—updated in 2021—that “right-wing Jews” (in context, Zionists) were weaponising the definition as “a blunt instrument to silence criticism of Israel and its rights abuses” .

The General Delegation of Palestine in Canberra has stated that the IHRA definition is “widely criticized and discredited for conflating antisemitism with legitimate criticism of Israel and Zionism,” noting that this “dangerous false conflation distorts and trivializes the real and grave threat of antisemitism in order to shield Israel from being held accountable to global standards of human rights and international law” .

PART TWO: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK – FEDERAL COURT CLARIFICATION

Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720

On 1 July 2025, the Federal Court of Australia delivered a landmark judgment in Wertheim v Haddad. Justice Angus Stewart made findings that are directly relevant to this Commission’s work.

Critical findings:

· The Court found that 25 antisemitic imputations were conveyed in the respondent’s lectures, including that Jews are “conspiratorial, wicked, schemers, treacherous and vile” .

· However, Justice Stewart explicitly rejected imputations that sought to characterise criticism of Israel or Zionism as antisemitic. His Honour stated:

“The conclusion that it is not antisemitic to criticise Israel is the corollary of the conclusion that to blame Jews for the actions of Israel is antisemitic; the one flows from the other” .

· Most importantly, Justice Stewart ruled:

“The ordinary, reasonable listener would understand that not all Jews are Zionists or support the actions of Israel in Gaza and that disparagement of Zionism constitutes disparagement of a philosophy or ideology and not a race or ethnic group” .

“Needless to say, political criticism of Israel, however inflammatory or adversarial, is not by its nature criticism of Jews in general or based on Jewish racial or ethnic identity” .

Implications for the Commission

The Federal Court has now established, as a matter of Australian law, that:

1. Criticism of Israel is not, in itself, antisemitic.

2. Criticism of Zionism is criticism of an ideology, not a race or ethnic group.

3. The distinction between anti-Zionism and antisemitism is legally recognised and must be maintained.

The Commission’s adoption of the IHRA definition, which blurs or erases these distinctions, places it in direct tension with binding judicial authority.

PART THREE: PROCEDURAL CONCERNS

The Rushed Timeline

The Commission is required to deliver an interim report by 30 April 2026 and a final report by 14 December 2026 . Former Royal Commissioner Ron Sackville AO KC has stated that “21 to 24 months would be a much more realistic estimate” for an inquiry of this scope .

Commissioner Virginia Bell has acknowledged that the timeline “imposes a tight time frame and it’s going to impose limitations on how the commission approaches its terms of reference” . She has already indicated that delays in obtaining ASIO material mean she will not be able to “adduce evidence concerning the adequacy of the security arrangements for the Chanukah event, and aspects of the effectiveness of the work of intelligence and law enforcement agencies” before the interim report deadline .

Public Submissions

The Commission’s website went live only weeks before submissions opened. Public submissions close after approximately three months . This is inadequate time for community organisations and individuals to prepare considered responses, particularly given the complexity of the issues.

The ASIO Submission

The independent intelligence review by former ASIO chief Dennis Richardson has been incorporated into the Commission. Its contents remain secret. There have been “delays in obtaining and accessing ASIO material” because intelligence agencies “have had to seek legal advice on a variety of matters” .

While Mr Richardson has stated that ASIO has been “absolutely” cooperative , the lack of transparency about what has been submitted, and the delays in accessing material, undermine public confidence in the process.

The Counsel Question

The Commission has engaged counsel who previously signed a letter defending Israel’s actions in Gaza . This creates an appearance of partiality that is incompatible with the requirements of a fair and independent inquiry. A Royal Commission must not only be impartial but must be seen to be impartial.

The Excluded Voices

Commissioner Bell has made clear that the Commission “will not hear from other groups about Australia’s broader difficulties with racism.” Her stated justification is: “Against the background of the massacre of innocent people, who appear to have been targeted simply because they were Jewish, I trust everyone will appreciate why the focus of this Commission will be on tackling antisemitism as a starting point” .

This approach is deeply problematic. It creates a hierarchy of racism in which some forms of bigotry are deemed worthy of national inquiry while others are ignored. The Australian Federation of Islamic Councils has documented “the alarming rise in Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian discrimination across Australia”  and has called for “a parallel commitment to addressing” these forms of racism . The Commission’s refusal to examine them sends a damaging message about whose suffering counts.

PART FOUR: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

The Envoy’s Plan

Special Envoy Jillian Segal’s Plan to Combat Antisemitism, released 10 July 2025, recommends:

· Adoption of the IHRA definition at “all levels of government and public institutions”

· Charging the Envoy with monitoring media and universities for antisemitism

· Issuing “report cards” to universities with potential funding consequences 

The plan was developed without meaningful consultation with communities most likely to be affected by it. AFIC has stated that “no meaningful consultation with the communities who have borne the brunt of rising Islamophobia, anti-Palestinian racism, and political repression” occurred .

The Manufactured Crisis

Sydney experienced a series of antisemitic incidents over the 2024/25 summer. Police later revealed these were “manufactured by overseas actors, hiring gig criminals to commit the crimes in order to convey an antisemitism crisis to serve their own purposes” . A similar pattern appears to be emerging regarding the arson attack on the Addas Israel Synagogue in Melbourne .

These revelations fundamentally alter the context in which this Commission was established. The urgency that drove its creation was, at least in part, based on fabricated events.

PART FIVE: RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the evidence set out above, I respectfully make the following recommendations:

Recommendation 1: Reconsider the IHRA Definition

The Commission should reconsider its adoption of the IHRA definition in light of:

· The Oxford PhD research demonstrating it was never officially adopted with its examples

· The Federal Court ruling distinguishing anti-Zionism from antisemitism

· The warnings from definition drafters that it is being weaponised

The Commission should either adopt the definition without the examples, or develop an alternative definition that does not conflate political criticism with racial hatred.

Recommendation 2: Extend the Timeline

The Commission should seek an extension to allow proper investigation of the matters within its terms of reference. A minimum of 18–24 months is required for adequate inquiry.

Recommendation 3: Ensure Transparency

All submissions made to the Commission, including the ASIO materials, should be made publicly available in redacted form where necessary. The Commission should publish a clear statement of what materials have been received and from whom.

Recommendation 4: Broaden the Scope

The Commission should be directed to examine all forms of racism equally, or a separate inquiry should be established to examine Islamophobia, anti-Palestinian racism, and discrimination against other affected communities.

Recommendation 5: Maintain Judicial Clarity

The Commission’s findings and recommendations should be explicitly framed to accord with the Federal Court’s ruling in Wertheim v Haddad, maintaining the legal distinction between:

· Criticism of Israel (protected political speech)

· Criticism of Zionism (criticism of an ideology)

· Antisemitism (racial hatred against Jewish people)

Recommendation 6: Address the Root Causes

The Commission should examine why antisemitic and Islamophobic incidents have both risen since October 2023, and what policy responses might address both forms of racism simultaneously. Selective responses that privilege one community’s safety over another’s will not strengthen social cohesion—they will undermine it.

CONCLUSION

A Royal Commission must be, above all else, a search for truth. It must be independent, impartial, and thorough. It must listen to all affected voices. It must be seen to do justice.

This Commission, as currently constituted and directed, risks failing each of these requirements. It has adopted a contested definition on false premises. It operates under a timeline that precludes adequate inquiry. It excludes voices that should be heard. It appears to have been influenced by events now revealed as manufactured.

None of this diminishes the reality of antisemitism in Australia. Jewish Australians do face prejudice and discrimination. They do deserve protection and support. But protecting one community must not come at the cost of silencing others. Responding to racism must not mean creating hierarchies of suffering.

I urge the Commission to reconsider its approach. The truth—all of it—deserves nothing less.

Submitted electronically

February 2026

Dr. Andrew Klein

Victoria