By Andrew Klein 

In the aftermath of global terror attacks, regional conflicts, and rising domestic tension, Western publics are told a singular story: We are beset by an existential enemy whose eradication justifies any measure. This enemy is flexible—sometimes “ISIS,” sometimes “Hamas,” sometimes the nebulous threat of “radical Islam”—but its function is constant. It is the justification for a profound, systemic shift in how state power is exercised at home and abroad.

This analysis argues that we are witnessing a convergence of aligned interests among powerful states. They are not conspiring in the dark but conducting an open, multi-front “way of business.” By leveraging and amplifying the spectre of violent extremism, they advance parallel agendas: normalising permanent war, expanding domestic surveillance and social control, dismantling international legal constraints, and silencing political dissent. The evidence reveals that this is not about security alone, but about the strategic re-engineering of democracy itself.

Pillar One: The Business of Cognitive Warfare

Governments are transforming the information space into a formal battlefield, institutionalising narrative control under the banner of national security.

The Tactical Playbook: Foreign Interference as a Pretext

Official government reports detail sophisticated,state-sponsored information warfare targeting Western democracies. Operations like Russia’s “Doppelgänger” network flood social media with counterfeit documents and AI-generated deepfakes to undermine support for Ukraine and interfere in European elections . China and Iran employ similar tactics, using AI to generate hundreds of coordinated comments and fake personas to manipulate public perception . Hostile states systematically exploit journalists and political networks to covertly influence public debate .

This foreign threat is real and documented. However, it provides the perfect, legitimacy-conferring pretext for states to build vast, domestic apparatuses of information control. A report from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) argues that the UK’s fragmented response to disinformation is a critical vulnerability, and calls for the creation of a “National Disinformation Agency” with a mandate to operationalise intelligence and coordinate a “whole-of-society” response . The logical endpoint is a permanent architecture where the state, in partnership with major tech platforms, assumes a central role in arbitrating “truth” and defending “cognitive resilience” against narratives it deems hostile.

The Boomerang Effect: When Counter-Narratives Fuel Extremism

This state-led narrative management is not only expansionist but can be counterproductive.A landmark 2020 study in the journal Frontiers in Psychology provides crucial experimental evidence: while counter-narratives have a small positive effect on the general population, they can backfire dramatically on individuals most at risk of radicalisation .

The study found that individuals with a high “need for closure”—a desire for firm, unambiguous answers—responded to government counter-messaging with increased support for ISIS. This is driven by psychological reactance, where people rebel against perceived threats to their freedom or worldview . The implication is profound: heavy-handed state information campaigns, especially those perceived as propaganda, may actively accelerate the very extremism they seek to undermine, creating a self-perpetuating cycle that justifies ever-greater control.

Pillar Two: The Permanent Security State & the Erosion of Law

The “war on terror” framework, endlessly renewed, is being used to suspend normal legal and humanitarian standards, creating spaces of exception where power operates without restraint.

From Battlefield to Camp: The Blueprint of Indefinite Control

The treatment of populations deemed suspect offers a clear model.Following the territorial defeat of ISIS, tens of thousands of people, including women and children, were interned en masse in camps in northeast Syria without due process, based often solely on their geographic proximity to the group . These facilities, like the infamous al-Hol camp, have become “jihadi universities”—lawless spaces where radical ideologies fester, and which states are reluctant to dismantle .

This model is not an anomaly; it is a potential blueprint. A report from the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism draws direct parallels to Gaza, where the scale of destruction and displacement could lead to similar long-term “humanitarian camps” administered under a security pretext . Israeli officials have signalled a potentially indefinite military presence, and domestic laws allow for administrative detention without trial . The warning is clear: counter-terrorism can provide a durable legal cover for the indefinite, securitised control of civilian populations, erasing the line between temporary humanitarian relief and permanent, rights-free internment.

Weaponising the “Terrorist” Label to Criminalise Dissent

The label of “extremist” or “terrorist sympathiser” is increasingly detached from violence and applied to political opponents. This is not conspiracy; it is emerging policy.

· In the UK, the government’s Chronic Risks Analysis identifies information warfare itself as a systemic threat to national stability, blurring the line between foreign espionage and domestic political critique .

· The intelligence community warns that hostile states seek to “exert covert and malign influence on UK policy, democracy and public opinion,” a framing that can easily expand to encompass legitimate opposition .

· In Australia, the push to embed the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism into law is a prime example. Critics argue its wording conflates criticism of the Israeli state with hatred of Jewish people, thus creating a legal mechanism to stigmatise and silence advocacy for Palestinian rights.

This convergence creates a powerful tool: the narrative that any serious dissent is not merely wrong, but a form of cognitive sabotage akin to foreign interference. The enemy is thus redefined from a foreign fighter to the domestic critic, the activist, or the university department.

Pillar Three: The Aligned Interests & the Flexible Enemy

A key feature of this new order is the strategic alignment of interests between states that are otherwise geopolitical rivals. They benefit from a shared, flexible narrative of threat.

The Narrative of the “Useful Enemy”

A recurring disinformation narrative,often propagated by pro-Kremlin outlets, claims that ISIS never attacks Israel and implies a covert alliance . While factually false—Israel has thwarted ISIS plots and conducted strikes against the group—this narrative is useful . It serves Russia’s aim to portray jihadist terrorism as a tool of the West . More importantly, it highlights how the figure of “ISIS” or “radical Islam” functions as a malleable symbol in geopolitical storytelling, one that can be deployed by various actors to accuse their adversaries of hypocrisy or hidden collaboration.

The convergence lies in a mutual benefit: for some Western states, the existential threat of Islamist terrorism justifies military budgets, domestic surveillance, and Middle Eastern policy. For rivals like Russia, amplifying that same threat—while implying Western complicity—serves to discredit Western governments and fracture their societies. The enemy itself is almost secondary; its primary value is as a narrative instrument.

The Economic Engine of Endless Conflict

Underpinning this system is an economic reality. As analysis suggests, when a state like the U.S. finds itself unable to compete on purely economic terms (e.g., with China), its unparalleled military-industrial capacity becomes a primary tool of statecraft and economic stimulus. Perpetual conflict, or the credible threat of it, sustains this engine. The “war on terror” provides a non-ideological, morally urgent, and seemingly endless justification for this expenditure. It transforms a costly economic sector into a sacred, non-negotiable pillar of national security, insulating it from democratic accountability.

Conclusion: The New Democratic Mask

This is not a conspiracy of a secret cabal, but the logical outcome of a system adapting to maintain its power. It is a fusion of the military-industrial complex with the nascent surveillance-cognitive complex, wrapped in the legitimising language of emergency.

The genius of this “way of business” is its deniability. Each step—a new social media law to protect children, a sanctions package against foreign troll farms, a counter-radicalisation programme, a security-based detention policy—can be defended on its own, isolated merits. Viewed together, they reveal the blueprint: a move towards a “managed democracy,” where the state, in partnership with corporate platforms, secures the homeland not just from physical attack, but from “harmful” narratives, “cognitive” threats, and political destabilisation.

The enemy—whether ISIS, Hamas, or “disinformation”—is essential. It is the eternal justification. And as the machinery to combat it becomes permanently embedded in our laws, institutions, and technologies, our societies are quietly reconfigured. The final victory of this system would not be the elimination of a terrorist group, but the public’s acceptance that to be secure, prosperous, and “resilient,” we must forever trade the messy, dangerous essence of democracy for the safe, sterile management of the monolith.

References and Further Reading

1. UK Government. (2025). New UK action against foreign information warfare. Details state-sanctioned entities like Rybar LLC and the “Storm-1516” network, illustrating the tactics of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) .

2. Bélanger, J. J., et al. (2020). Do Counter-Narratives Reduce Support for ISIS? Yes, but… Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 1059. Provides experimental evidence that counter-narratives can backfire on high-risk individuals, challenging a cornerstone of state counter-extremism policy .

3. Dixon, W. (2025). Why the UK Now Needs a National Disinformation Agency. RUSI Commentary. Argues for a centralised state agency to combat disinformation, highlighting the institutional drive to formalise cognitive security .

4. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT). (2025). After ISIS: Insights into Post-war Gaza Humanitarian Camps. Draws direct legal and strategic parallels between internment camps in post-ISIS Syria and potential scenarios in Gaza, highlighting the use of administrative detention as a counter-terrorism tool .

5. EUvsDisinfo. (2024). DISINFO: ISIS never attacks Israel, nor the other way round. A fact-check debunking a pro-Kremlin disinformation narrative, while illustrating how the “ISIS” label is weaponised in geopolitical storytelling .

6. UK Defence Journal. (2025). Hostile states exploit UK journalists and social media. Summarises UK Parliament Intelligence and Security Committee findings on how states like Russia and China covertly influence public debate and democratic processes .