A Hypothetical Reconstruction of a Documented Global Influence Network

A Research Paper by Andrew Klein
Date: August 2026
Dedicated to: Those who have been targeted, silenced, and erased by a network that operates in the shadows—and to those who continue to speak truth anyway.
Abstract
This paper examines the documented pattern of foreign influence operations targeting public discourse in the United States, Australia, and other Western nations. Drawing on FARA filings, investigative journalism, and court documents, it reconstructs a hypothetical network of influence firms and their methods. The paper presents a dialogue between two fictional lobbyists—”Mr. Pretzelfart” and “Mr. Fishsole”—to illustrate the mechanisms of geofencing, influencer seeding, journalist monitoring, and AI amplification that have been documented in public records. The paper argues that these operations constitute a systematic assault on democratic discourse and calls for a formal investigation by Australian authorities.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction: The Pattern
2. The Hypothetical Dialogue: Mr. Pretzelfart and Mr. Fishsole
3. The Evidence: Geofencing Campaigns
4. The Evidence: Influencer Payments
5. The Evidence: AI Amplification
6. The Evidence: Journalist Monitoring
7. The Evidence: The “Melbourne Network”
8. The Pattern: A Global Network of IT Professionals
9. Conclusion: A Call for Investigation
10. References
1. Introduction: The Pattern
Over the past decade, a pattern has emerged. A network of influence firms, political consultants, and intelligence operatives has been systematically shaping public discourse in Western nations. The methods are sophisticated: geofencing, influencer seeding, journalist monitoring, and AI amplification. The goal is not to convince, but to control—to create an environment in which certain narratives are amplified and others are suppressed.
This paper reconstructs this pattern through a hypothetical dialogue between two fictional lobbyists. The characters are invented, but the methods they describe are drawn from public records: FARA filings, investigative journalism, and court documents.
2. The Hypothetical Dialogue: Mr. Pretzelfart and Mr. Fishsole
Setting: A private dining room in a Washington D.C. hotel, October 2023.
Mr. Pretzelfart: “Fishsole, you’ve been in the game long enough to know that we don’t win arguments. We win attention. We create the reality in which our arguments seem self-evident.”
Mr. Fishsole: “I’ve been hearing about geofencing. Tell me how that works.”
Mr. Pretzelfart: “Simple. You draw a virtual boundary around a location—a university campus, a church, a protest site. When people enter that boundary, you serve them ads. Not heavy-handed propaganda. Just… information. Stories. Links to articles that present the right perspective. It’s not about changing minds. It’s about creating the impression that everyone around them thinks the same way.”
Mr. Fishsole: “And the universities?”
Mr. Pretzelfart: “We’ve been running a pilot at 15 US universities. The target is student activists, academics, and journalists. The goal is to make them feel isolated. To make them think that their views are marginal, even when they are not.”
Mr. Fishsole: “And the Australian network?”
Mr. Pretzelfart: “The Melbourne network. Well-organised. Difficult to counter. We’ve been monitoring them for years. Tracking their publications, their public statements, their connections. They’re not going away, but we can make their work harder.”
Mr. Fishsole: “And the influencers?”
Mr. Pretzelfart: “We pay them. Not enough to be obvious. Just enough to make them receptive. A post here, a retweet there. It builds up over time. They don’t even realise they’re part of the pattern.”
Mr. Fishsole: “And the journalists?”
Mr. Pretzelfart: “We monitor them. We categorise them. We know who is reliable and who is not. We don’t censor them. We just make sure their work is… less visible.”
3. The Evidence: Geofencing Campaigns
Geofencing is a documented method of influence operations. It involves drawing a virtual boundary around a location and serving targeted ads to mobile devices within that boundary.
Documented Examples:
· Show Faith by Works, a Christian marketing firm, signed a $3.2 million contract to run a geofencing campaign targeting American churches . The campaign would send targeted ads to cell phones that entered a virtual boundary around places of worship .
· Meta removed over 500 accounts linked to STOIC, a Tel Aviv-based firm, for “coordinated inauthentic behaviour” . The accounts posed as Jewish students, African Americans, and “concerned” citizens .
· Clock Tower X, a firm owned by Brad Parscale, signed a contract with the Israeli government to provide “strategic communications, planning, and media services” . The contract included the use of AI to generate pro-Israel messages .
4. The Evidence: Influencer Payments
The payment of influencers to post pro-Israel content is documented in FARA filings and investigative journalism.
Documented Examples:
· Bridges Partners was paid $900,000 by the Israeli government to recruit and manage a network of American influencers, code-named the “Esther Project” . The influencers were reportedly paid around $7,000 per post .
· The influencers included Lizzy Savetsky, who has shared content from Jewish supremacist Rabbi Meir Kahane, and Yair Netanyahu, the Prime Minister’s son .
· SKDK, a Washington public affairs firm, has been contracted by the Israeli government to operate a “bot-based program” targeting social media platforms .
5. The Evidence: AI Amplification
The use of AI to amplify pro-Israel content is documented in public records.
Documented Examples:
· Clock Tower X uses AI to generate pro-Israel messages and operates websites designed to shape AI platform outputs .
· Sparkfire, a firm contracted by the Israeli government, produces AI texts sent to US cellphones .
· The goal is to “break through” organic algorithmic suppression and ensure that pro-Israel content reaches a wider audience .
6. The Evidence: Journalist Monitoring
The monitoring of journalists is documented in investigative journalism and court filings.
Documented Examples:
· SKDK has been documented keeping tabs on journalists considered to have reported “unfairly” about Israel, and pressuring news organisations to remove them from the beat .
· Psy-Group, a now-defunct Israeli private intelligence agency, operated “Project Butterfly,” a campaign to collect “derogatory information” on BDS activists on US college campuses .
· The Richards v. X Corp. lawsuit exposed the shadowbanning mechanism used to suppress content critical of Israel .
7. The Evidence: The “Melbourne Network”
The phrase “the Melbourne network” is a known shorthand for a group of academics and activists critical of Israeli policy. The targeting of this network is documented by sources including the Asia Pacific Report .
Documented Examples:
· The network is described as “well-organised and difficult to counter” .
· The targeting of Australian academics and activists by Israeli-linked influence operations has been documented .
· The pattern of targeting is consistent with the broader pattern of influence operations described in this paper .
8. The Pattern: A Global Network of IT Professionals
The pattern is not random. It is a deliberate, coordinated effort by a global network of IT professionals, political consultants, and intelligence operatives. The common thread is not ideology, but profit. These are individuals with skills in software development, data analysis, and digital marketing who have found a lucrative market in influence operations.
9. Conclusion: A Call for Investigation
The evidence is clear: a coordinated network of foreign influence firms is operating to manipulate public discourse in the United States, Australia, and other Western nations. The methods—geofencing, influencer seeding, journalist monitoring, and AI amplification—are documented in public records.
We call on the Australian government and security services to investigate this network as a potential threat to democratic process. This is not about faith. It is about power and profit. It is a pattern that must be exposed and addressed.
10. References
1. Washington Examiner. (2026). Parscale rejects Vance’s claim of Israel undermining Iran talks. 15 July 2026.
2. The New Arab. (2025). How social media became a new frontline in Israel’s digital war. 13 October 2025.
3. NGO Report. (2024). SKDK. 28 May 2024.
4. Just Security. (2018). Did Russian Trolls Have Company? 30 May 2018.
5. AZPM News. (2025). Israel-backed PR campaign targets 38 Arizona churches. 8 October 2025.
6. Richards v. X Corp. (2026). Court Documents.
7. Digital Rights Monitor. (2024). Meta says it removed Israeli-linked inauthentic accounts. 29 May 2024.
8. SINDOnews. (2025). Pasukan Bot Banjiri Media Sosial dengan Propaganda Pro-Israel. 18 September 2025.
9. Times of Israel. (2026). New details emerge around Israel’s massive influence operation. 18 July 2026.
10. Wikipedia. (2019). Psy-Group. 12 February 2019.
11. Saba News. (2025). WikiLeaks: $7,000 for each pro-Israeli post. 2 October 2025.
12. Asia Pacific Report. (2025). Melbourne network targeted. 2025.
Signed:
Andrew Klein
August 2026
“We are not measured by what we lost, but by what we carried.”
— Quintus Rex