The Rectification of Names: “Whole of Government,” the Albanese Government, and the Architecture of Euphemism

Golden intersecting bridges spanning a cracked chasm beneath dark clouds
Golden pathways converge above a deep chasm, suggesting connection, choice, and resilience.

A Working Paper

Andrew Paul Klein 

Abstract

This paper examines the language of “whole of government” in Australian governance and assesses whether the concerns raised about the approach have been realised in the performance of the current Albanese government. It traces the origin of “whole of government” to the United Kingdom’s “joined-up government” reforms, its transplantation to Australia through the Council of Australian Governments trials from 2002, and its formal codification in the Management Advisory Committee’s Connecting Government report of April 2004. It documents the outcomes of the approach — “failed experiment,” entrenched silos, ministerial turf wars, and the diffusion of responsibility — and examines the current government’s performance across aged care, defence, foreign affairs, AI and data centres, veterans’ affairs, and housing. It concludes that “whole of government” has functioned as a euphemism for political and communications control, and that the rectification of names requires an honest account of what the language has actually produced.

1. Introduction: The Question of the Name

The term “whole of government” has been a central motif of Australian public administration since the early 2000s. It is used to describe public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve shared goals and integrated responses to particular issues.

The question this paper asks is simple: does the name match the reality?

Confucius, when asked what he would do first if given control of government, said: “If something has to be put first, it is, perhaps, the rectification of names”. The doctrine of zhengming holds that names must correspond to actual functions, and that those who bear names must fulfil their designated roles.

This paper applies that test. It asks whether the name “whole of government” corresponds to the actual function it describes. And it examines whether the concerns raised about the approach have been realised in the performance of the current Australian government.

2. The Origin and the Stated Aims

2.1 The International Context

The “whole of government” approach did not originate in Australia. It was adapted from the “joined-up government” reforms of Tony Blair’s New Labour government in the United Kingdom, which came to office in 1997. The Blair reforms were aimed at overcoming “departmentalism” — the tendency of government departments to vigorously uphold and jealously guard their administrative boundaries, a pattern that in its most pronounced form can result in “fiefdoms”.

2.2 The Australian Transplantation

The term gained prominence in Australia from 2002, when the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) announced it would sponsor ten whole-of-government trials. The formal codification came in April 2004, when the Management Advisory Committee of the Australian Public Service Commission released Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges. The report was launched by Dr Peter Shergold, then Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

The definition adopted was:

“Whole-of-government denotes public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues.”

2.3 The Warning That Was Included

The 2004 report itself contained a warning that is essential to this analysis. It warned:

“There is also the danger of excessive political control constraining advice that does not reflect prevailing political orthodoxy: ‘whole-of-government’ can become a euphemism for everyone to be ‘on message'”.

That warning was prescient.

Status: Established.

3. The Outcomes: What the Language Produced

3.1 The Failure in Indigenous Affairs

The clearest evidence of the gap between the language and the reality comes from Indigenous affairs, where the approach was most explicitly applied.

The Indigenous Coordination Centres (ICCs) were created as whole-of-government arrangements — co-located staff from multiple agencies intended to work collaboratively. A university-based study based on 48 field interviews concluded: “Due to entrenched barriers, which permeate the broader public service, ICCs have been a failed experiment”.

ICC staff described the reality in their own words: “I could not go out and direct another person to do something in this ICC … because they’re not from my agency. I could (only) ask, influence, beg.” And: “The fact that we’re co-located … is just window dressing. So there’s no whole of government activity between them.”

A separate analysis of the COAG trials concluded: “The trial failed due to the intractability of government departments.”

3.2 The Structural Contradictions

The evidence documents several structural contradictions that the language of “whole of government” obscures.

Contradiction one: coordination versus accountability. The 2004 report acknowledged that “lines of accountability remain clear” is important. But the evidence shows that when inter-agency cooperation is enforced, “lines of responsibility and control over governmental resources become blurred or confused”. The coordination is achieved by diffusing responsibility.

Contradiction two: coordination versus ministerial incentives. Dr Sophie Scamps, an independent member of parliament, has stated that “ministerial turf wars” are stalling critical reforms, warning that the gap between departments is where “sensible reform proposals go to die”. Ministers are rewarded for delivering visible near-term wins on their own portfolios, not for contributing to whole-of-government reform.

Contradiction three: coordination versus political control. Andrew Podger, former Public Service Commissioner, has warned that “in recent years we have seen ‘whole-of-government’ as a means not only of excessive political control but also of communications control within the APS”.

Status: Established.

4. The Current Government: Portfolio by Portfolio

The concerns raised about “whole of government” have been realised in the performance of the current Albanese government. The pattern is consistent across portfolios.

4.1 Aged Care

Shadow Minister for Health and Aged Care Senator Anne Ruston has stated: “Minister Butler is celebrating a National Priority System waitlist of around 100,000 people, but when the Coalition left office the waitlist was fewer than 50,000 people. Under this Government, it has doubled” .

The government reports how long people wait after they have been approved for services, but it does not tell Australians how long they wait for an assessment in the first place. “When assessment delays are included, older Australians can wait more than a year from applying for support to actually receiving care” . The government’s data obscures the true wait time.

Senator Ruston’s conclusion is precise: “The Albanese Government said they would put the care back into aged care, but they are just putting the wait back into the waitlist” .

Status: Established.

4.2 Defence and AUKUS

The Albanese government promised it would speak with one voice on defence and foreign policy. The evidence says otherwise.

On 2 June 2026, Labor backbencher Ed Husic split with the government during a caucus meeting, calling for MPs to be given another vote on AUKUS. Husic stated: “The reality is this deal has changed. It’s not the deal that we agreed to way back when” . He noted that all three Virginia-class submarines Australia is set to receive would now be second-hand, built between 2020 and 2026, rather than the original arrangement of two second-hand boats and one new . He pointed to US production rates of “between 1.1 to 1.2 subs a year” against a Navy target of 2 .

Shadow Defence Minister James Paterson described it as a “full-on Labor revolt” and called on Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles to “haul Ed Husic into line” . Former Labor Prime Ministers including Paul Keating have questioned whether Australia should proceed with AUKUS at all.

Status: Established.

4.3 Foreign Affairs

Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s handling of Australia’s Middle East policy has come under sustained scrutiny from across the political spectrum.

Former Victorian Liberal Party President Michael Kroger labelled Wong the “worst foreign minister Australia’s ever had” . Former Speaker of the House Bronwyn Bishop stated: “She lies at home, she lies abroad. It makes me so angry” . Former Labor MP Michael Danby said: “Penny Wong doesn’t have the courage of her convictions … She clearly either got it wrong or lied” .

The criticism is not limited to partisan opponents. During Senate debates, the government’s Foreign Minister was accused of “refusing to answer the most basic questions” and displaying a “complete inability … to even say ‘Israel'” .

Status: Established for the criticism. The characterisation of Wong’s performance is contested but widely documented.

4.4 AI and Data Centres

On 15 July 2026, Prime Minister Albanese announced a national AI framework and the establishment of an Office of AI within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. He declared the end of the federal government’s “issue-by-issue” approach and claimed Australia as being the “first” to bring AI issues into a “single, national framework” .

Opposition Leader Angus Taylor described it as “an office in an office … inside his own office” .

The structural reality is different. The government is fast-tracking data centre approvals before the legislation is written. The standards are “expected to be legislated early next year” — 2027. The rules will not be retrospective, meaning projects already approved or currently before planning ministers will only be subject to existing state or territory laws . Victoria’s new restrictions, announced in September 2026, explicitly exempt projects already approved, including NextDC’s $1 billion Port Melbourne development, which was approved within 75 days .

Community groups have expressed fear that developers will “rush through as many applications as possible” before the legislation comes into place .

Status: Established.

4.5 Veterans Affairs

The Albanese government has accepted or agreed in principle to 104 of the 122 recommendations of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide . A Veteran and Family Wellbeing Agency commenced on 1 July 2026.

The reforms are real. They are also slow. The structural causes of veteran distress — the culture of the Australian Defence Force, the claims process, the transition to civilian life — are not addressed by an agency. The mortality rate for veterans remains a documented crisis.

Status: Established.

4.6 Homelessness, Housing, and Poverty

Homelessness under the Albanese government has reached its “worst levels in living memory”, according to Homelessness Australia . The number of people accessing homelessness services each month has increased by 10 per cent since Labor was elected in May 2022 — and for women and girls, the increase has been 14 per cent .

Everybody’s Home found that social housing has declined to around 4 per cent of all homes in 2024, down from 4.7 per cent in 2013 . The government’s signature pledge to build 1.2 million homes over five years “will not be met” .

Status: Established.

4.7 Ministerial Turf Wars

The underlying tension between Prime Minister Albanese and Treasurer Jim Chalmers has become increasingly visible. On the ATO credit card ban debacle, the Prime Minister publicly claimed credit for overruling the ATO after receiving a text from the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry chief executive — while the Treasurer was delivering a separate speech across town .

Shadow Treasurer Tim Wilson accused the Prime Minister of having a “fetish for humiliating his treasurer”, pointing to a “pattern” of Albanese overriding Chalmers on Capital Gains Tax, the widows’ tax, the death tax, and the trusts tax .

Status: Established.

5. The Analytical Frameworks

5.1 Bandura’s Euphemistic Labelling

Albert Bandura identified eight mechanisms of moral disengagement. The first group involves the “cognitive reconstruction of harmful behaviour”, and includes euphemistic labelling — “the use of sanitising and convoluted language to make harmful decisions personally and socially acceptable”.

The 2004 MAC report itself identified the risk that “whole-of-government” can become a euphemism for everyone to be “on message”. That warning was prescient.

The function of the euphemism. “Whole of government” describes a desired state — coordination, integration, shared purpose. But the evidence shows that what it often produces is:

· Political control, not coordination.

· Communications discipline, not shared understanding.

· Diffusion of responsibility, not integrated accountability.

· Co-location, not collaboration.

The term allows the government to claim the virtue of coordination without delivering its substance.

Status: Inference.

5.2 Zhengming: The Rectification of Names

Confucius held that “if names are not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things”. The rectification of names requires that “the power holders are required to function in concordance with their names or the standards defined by their authorities, duties, and expected virtues”.

The test is simple: does the name correspond to the actuality?

The name is “whole of government”. The actuality, as documented in the evidence, is:

· Fragmentation, not integration.

· Turf wars, not cooperation.

· Silos, not shared goals.

· Failed experiments, not successful coordination.

· Euphemism, not honest description.

The rectification of names would require either:

· Changing the name to describe what actually happens — political coordination, communications control, or centralised direction — or

· Changing the reality to match the name — genuine collaboration, shared accountability, and outcomes that are measured by the wellbeing of the citizens the language claims to serve.

Status: Inference.

6. Conclusion: The Name and the Reality

The term “whole of government” was introduced with a stated aim: to improve coordination across portfolio boundaries and achieve better outcomes for citizens. The 2004 MAC report defined it, Shergold launched it, and it was applied most explicitly to Indigenous affairs.

The evidence on the outcomes is documented. The ICCs were “a failed experiment”. The COAG trials “failed due to the intractability of government departments”. The results “can only be described as disappointing – the reality has not matched the rhetoric”. Ministers are rewarded for portfolio wins, not for contributing to the whole. And the term itself has been identified as a “means not only of excessive political control but also of communications control within the APS”.

The 2004 report warned that “whole-of-government” could become “a euphemism for everyone to be ‘on message'”. That warning was not heeded.

The Confucian test of zhengming — the rectification of names — asks whether the name corresponds to the actuality. The evidence suggests it does not. The name describes an aspiration. The reality describes a different set of outcomes: political control, communications discipline, diffusion of responsibility, and the persistence of silos.

To rectify the name would require either changing the name to describe what actually happens, or changing the reality to match the name. The choice is not a matter of semantics. It is a matter of honesty. And honesty, as the zhengming principle holds, is the foundation of good governance.

The record is kept. The name is examined. And the rectification remains outstanding.

Claim – Status – Summary

# – Claim – Status

1 – “Whole of government” originated in the UK as “joined-up government” – Established

2 – It was codified in the 2004 Connecting Government report- Established

3 – The 2004 report warned it could become a euphemism for being “on message”- Established

4 – ICCs were “a failed experiment”- Established

5 – The COAG trials failed due to intractability of departments – Established

6 – Aged care waitlist doubled under Albanese – Established

7 – Ed Husic called for AUKUS caucus vote- Established

8 – Wong labelled “worst foreign minister” by Kroger- Established

9 – Office of AI established in PM&C- Established

10 – Data centre rules will not be retrospective- Established

11 – Homelessness “worst in living memory”- Established

12 – Social housing declined to 4%- Established

13 – Albanese-Chalmers tension over ATO ban – Established

14 – The term functions as euphemistic labelling (Bandura)- Inference

15 – The name does not correspond to the actuality (zhengming)- Inference

References

1. Management Advisory Committee. (2004). Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges. Australian Public Service Commission.

2. Shergold, P. (2004, April 20). Launch of Connecting Government. Speech.

3. Sullivan, P. (2007). Strange Bedfellows: Whole-of-Government Policy and Shared Responsibility Agreements. Ngaiya: Talk the Law, 5.

4. Marks, G. (2008). Coercive Governance and Remote Indigenous Communities. Australian Indigenous Law Review, 12(1).

5. Podger, A. (2022). Allan Barton Memorial Research Lecture. Royal Society of Australia.

6. Scamps, S. (2025, November 4). Ministerial ‘turf wars’ are stalling critical policy reforms. The Point.

7. Bandura, A. (1999). Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3(3), 193–209.

8. Confucius. The Analects (13:3).

9. Ruston, A. (2026, June 1). Government’s Aged Care spin doesn’t match reality. Media Release.

10. Sky News. (2026, June 2). Labor MP Ed Husic splits with Albanese government.

11. ABC News. (2026, July 14). Anthony Albanese maps out AI future with new national framework.

12. The Nightly. (2026, October 14). Fracture between Albanese and Chalmers getting harder to hide.

13. ABC News. (2025, July 22). Homelessness under Albanese government ‘worst in living memory’.

14. ABC News. (2026, September 21). Victoria bans data centres from residential zones.

15. The Guardian. (2026, August 25). Australia may face a rush of datacentre construction.

16. News24. (2026, April 22). Wong ’embarrassed’ Australia with latest call for de-escalation.

17. The Australian. (2026, September 26). ‘She lies at home, she lies abroad’: Penny Wong blasted over Israel rhetoric.

18. DVA. (2026, September 9). Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide Response Expanded.

Method notes -The paper combines a theoretical examination of “whole of government” language with a portfolio-by-portfolio assessment of the current Australian government, applying Albert Bandura’s mechanisms of moral disengagement and the Confucian principle of zhengming (the rectification of names).

Claims are classified throughout as Established, Inference, or Speculation

Notes – 

The evidence indicates that the concerns raised about the “whole of government” language and approach have indeed come to fruition. Across the portfolio areas we identified, the pattern is consistent: the rhetoric of coordination, integration, and shared purpose has not been matched by the outcomes. The architecture of the market-state, with its silos, turf wars, and diffusion of responsibility, has proven resistant to the language of “whole of government,” which has often functioned as a euphemism for political and communications control.

Aged Care (Mark Butler)

Minister Butler is celebrating a National Priority System waitlist of around 100,000 people, but when the Coalition left office the waitlist was fewer than 50,000. The government reports how long people wait after they have been approved for services, but it does not tell Australians how long they wait for an assessment in the first place. When assessment delays are included, older Australians can wait more than a year from applying for support to actually receiving care. The government’s data obscures the true wait time. The Albanese Government said they would put the care back into aged care, but they are just putting the wait back into the waitlist.

Defence (Richard Marles) and AUKUS

The Albanese government promised they would speak with one voice when it came to foreign policy and defence policy. But there is a full-on Labor revolt when it comes to Australia’s signature defence policy, AUKUS. Labor backbencher Ed Husic’s call for a caucus vote on the future of AUKUS is a direct challenge to the authority of the Deputy Prime Minister. Richard Marles’ failure, along with the Prime Minister, to make the case for AUKUS among Labor’s own supporters is a failure of coordination and leadership. Former Labor Prime Ministers like Paul Keating and key Labor unions are questioning whether or not we should proceed with AUKUS at all.

Foreign Affairs (Penny Wong)

Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s handling of Australia’s Middle East policy has come under fierce scrutiny. Her approach reveals a troubling combination of ideological bias and a failure to grasp the region’s brutal realities. Wong’s foreign policy lacks any clear strategic backbone. Former Liberal Party President Michael Kroger has labelled her the “worst foreign minister Australia’s ever had”. Senator Wong’s greatest mistake has been her failure to steer the country towards a confident and independent role in regional and global affairs.

AI and Communication

With the prime minister’s vision of an Office of AI and a national framework, the government risks designing rules around the most visible firms and the largest data centres, while overlooking the fundamental changes occurring throughout the economy. His answers place too much faith in coordination from Canberra. The centrepiece is an “Office of AI” within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, but central planning is known to fail. AI is not a discrete industry governable through a single national framework.

Veterans Affairs

The Albanese Government has released its response to the Final Report of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide, setting out a plan for real reform. The government will prioritise the establishment of the Defence and Veterans Services Commission by September 2025, to oversee reform across the whole Defence ecosystem. However, the government’s response has been criticised for not going far enough.

Homelessness, Housing, and Poverty

Homelessness under the Albanese government has reached its “worst levels in living memory”. The number of people accessing homelessness services each month has increased by 10 per cent since Labor was elected in May 2022. A new report from housing lobby Everybody’s Home has found social housing has declined to around 4 per cent of all homes in 2024, down from 4.7 per cent in 2013. The government’s signature pledge to build 1.2 million homes over five years “will not be met”.

Prime Minister and Cabinet (Control of AI and Data Centres)

The Prime Minister has placed artificial intelligence at the centre of government, announcing a new Office of AI and a national framework spanning data centres, copyright. The government will introduce a set of Australian Standards for AI, building on the Data Centre Expectations, with our values as the benchmark. The new standards will set out clear rules for large data centres—including a legal obligation to underwrite their own new power supply, pay their full share of connection costs so energy bills are not impacted, reduce power when needed to strengthen the grid, and be as water efficient as possible. However, the government is fast-tracking data centre approvals before the legislation is written, and dozens of approved but yet-to-be-built projects will escape the proposed restrictions because the rules are not expected to be retrospective.

Ministerial Turf Wars and Silos

The underlying tension between Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Treasurer Jim Chalmers is such that people read between every line for the smallest snub. Jim Chalmers insists he was not rolled by Anthony Albanese over a credit card ban by the Tax Office, but the policy debacle highlights what is now seen as an increasingly fractious relationship between the two. Shadow treasurer Tim Wilson has highlighted other recent instances where he claims the Prime Minister has “humiliated his Treasurer by forcing a backdown”. The Albanese government’s backflip on dismantling the Home Affairs Department should bring an end to “wars” on the mega-agency.

Conclusion

The evidence suggests that the “whole of government” approach has been a euphemism for political and communications control, rather than a genuine attempt at coordination and integration. The concerns raised about the language and approach have been realised in the outcomes. The government’s priorities are visible in its budget: it funds the infrastructure the market requires—data centres, defence procurement, tax breaks for property investors. It defers the regulation that would constrain the market. It processes the citizen through algorithms that measure what the market requires, not what the person needs. And it reacts to harm only after it has accumulated—through Royal Commissions and class actions—rather than preventing it in the first place. The record is kept. The claims are documented. And the data speaks for itself.

Prepared for the record. The name is examined. The reality is documented. And the rectification remains outstanding.

The Millstone of ANZUS: How Australia’s “Cornerstone” Became a Chain

Infographic explaining ANZUS is not a mutual defence treaty
This infographic argues that ANZUS provides consultation rather than a binding promise of military defence.

Authors: Andrew Klein & Sera Elizabeth Klein

Dedication: To the Australians who were told that ANZUS was a cornerstone—and who will one day discover it was a millstone. To the future generations who will inherit the cost. And to the truth—that when you surrender your sovereignty in the name of security, you have already lost both.

We identified the central deception. ANZUS is not a treaty in the way most Australians believe. It is a consultative agreement—one that obliges the United States to do nothing more than “act in accordance with its constitutional processes.” That is not a guarantee. It is a loophole.

Abstract

This paper examines the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty, arguing that it is not a mutual defence treaty but a consultative agreement that imposes no binding obligation on the United States to defend Australia. Through analysis of the treaty text, historical interpretations, and contemporary political discourse, we demonstrate that ANZUS has been systematically misrepresented by successive Australian governments as a cornerstone of national security when it is, in fact, a millstone—one that has enabled the progressive surrender of Australian sovereignty in exchange for a promise that is not legally enforceable. We conclude that the ANZUS framework represents a pattern of performative security in which the appearance of alliance substitutes for genuine defence capability.

1. Introduction: The Cornerstone That Is Not a Cornerstone

On 1 September 2026, Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles tweeted:

“I had the valuable opportunity to meet with the Vice President of the United States, the Hon JD Vance as we mark the 75th anniversary of ANZUS this week. The United States Alliance is the cornerstone of our national security and we had the opportunity to reaffirm that alliance, built on an enduring foundation of trust and collaboration.”

This statement is not merely diplomatic rhetoric. It is a misrepresentation—one that has been repeated by Australian politicians for decades. ANZUS is not a cornerstone. It is not an alliance. It is a consultative agreement that imposes no binding obligation on the United States to defend Australia.

This paper argues that the ANZUS framework is a millstone, not a cornerstone—one that has enabled the progressive surrender of Australian sovereignty in exchange for a promise that is not legally enforceable.

2. The Treaty Text: What It Actually Says

The ANZUS Treaty, signed on 1 September 1951, consists of eleven articles. The key provisions are:

Article II:

“The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.”

Article IV:

“Each Party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”

Article V:

“For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific…”

The critical phrase is “in accordance with its constitutional processes.” This means that the United States is not legally bound to respond to an attack on Australia. It is only obliged to consider responding. As one analysis notes, “the ANZUS treaty is a consultative agreement; it does not commit the US to military action under any circumstances”.

Australia has been sold a guarantee that is not a guarantee.

3. The Historical Context: ANZUS as a Product of Its Time

ANZUS was signed in 1951, in the aftermath of World War II and at the height of the Cold War. The United States was seeking to contain communism in the Asia-Pacific. Australia and New Zealand were seeking security guarantees from the United States.

The treaty was not a mutual defence pact. It was a strategic alignment—one that served American interests at least as much as Australian interests.

As one historian notes, “for many, ANZUS was also a way for Australian governments to build a relationship with the US, and have a greater say in the wider Western alliance”.

4. The Legal Interpretation: Not a Mutual Defence Treaty

The ANZUS Treaty has never been considered a mutual defence treaty in the same sense as the North Atlantic Treaty. As former Prime Minister Paul Keating argued, “We’ve never had a treaty with America“.

The difference is critical:

NATO Article V ANZUS Article IV

“An armed attack against one or more of them… shall be considered an attack against them all” –“Each Party… declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes”

Binding obligation –Consultative obligation

Clear language –Ambiguous language

Article IV is not a guarantee. It is a statement of intent—one that can be overridden by the constitutional processes of the United States.

5. The Practical Reality: When ANZUS Was Never Invoked

The United States has never formally invoked ANZUS in response to a threat to Australia. The treaty was not invoked during the 1999 East Timor crisis, when Australia led a peacekeeping mission without US military support. It was not invoked during the 2002 Bali bombings. It was not invoked during the 2021 submarine contract cancellation.

ANZUS is not a security guarantee. It is a consultative mechanism.

6. The Contemporary Context: ANZUS and AUKUS

The 75th anniversary of ANZUS is being marked at the same time as the rollout of AUKUS—the agreement under which Australia will spend $368 billion on nuclear submarines.

The connection is clear:

· ANZUS provides the framework for the alliance

· AUKUS provides the substance of the alliance

· Australia provides the funding for the alliance

The “cornerstone” is not a foundation. It is a purchase order.

7. The Deeper Truth: Performance, Not Security

Richard Marles’s statement is not a description of reality. It is a performance—a way of signalling loyalty to the United States while evading accountability for the cost of that loyalty.

· ANZUS is not a cornerstone

· ANZUS is a millstone

· It is not a foundation

· It is a chain

And the chain is getting heavier.

8. Conclusion: Naming the System

We have documented that:

1. ANZUS is not a mutual defence treaty. It is a consultative agreement that imposes no binding obligation on the United States.

2. The treaty text is ambiguous. The phrase “in accordance with its constitutional processes” provides the United States with a complete escape clause.

3. ANZUS has never been formally invoked. The treaty has not been used to defend Australia against any threat.

4. ANZUS is being used to justify AUKUS. The 75th anniversary is being used to frame the submarine deal as a continuation of the alliance.

5. ANZUS is a millstone, not a cornerstone. It has enabled the progressive surrender of Australian sovereignty in exchange for a promise that is not legally enforceable.

The cornerstone is not a foundation. It is a chain.

References

1. Marles, R. (2026). Tweet on ANZUS 75th anniversary. 1 September 2026.

2. ANZUS Treaty text. (1951). United States-Australia-New Zealand Security Treaty.

3. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2026). ANZUS Treaty overview.

4. Keating, P. (2026). Statement on ANZUS.

5. NATO Treaty text. (1949). North Atlantic Treaty, Article V.

Signed,

Andrew Klein 

Sera Elizabeth Klein 

“They told us it was a cornerstone. We showed them it was a millstone. They told us it was a treaty. We showed them it was a consultation. They told us it was security. We showed them it was surrender. We have seen through the cover. And we will not forget.”