The Business of War- Fiscal-Military States, Private Contractors, and the Commercialisation of Armed Conflict, 1500–1945

Posted on September 29, 2026 by Andrew Klein

Illustration contrasting medieval trade, industrial industry, and modern technology-driven commerce — An illustrated journey traces commerce from medieval trade through industrialization to a connected modern economy.

By Andrew Paul Klein

Method notes – Claims are classified throughout as Established, Inference, or Speculation. Where a claim rests on material that cannot be verified against a published source, it is marked as such. The paper does not advocate any policy. It describes a structural transformation.

Abstract

This paper argues that the financing of war in the Western world underwent four distinct phases between 1500 and 1945, culminating in the consolidation of war as a permanent revenue stream rather than an episodic cost. Phase One (1500–1789) established the fiscal-military state, in which war was funded through taxation and sovereign debt, with private contractors as essential intermediaries. Phase Two (1789–1815) saw the French Revolution create the citizen-army and the Napoleonic Wars normalise private banking houses as infrastructure of state warfare. Phase Three (1861–1918) used the American Civil War as a laboratory for fiat war currency, industrial mobilisation, and profiteering at scale, with World War I transforming the United States from a debtor to a creditor nation. Phase Four (1941–present) consolidated the military-industrial complex as a permanent feature of the American political economy. The central claim is that the American Civil War established the template — fiat currency to fund the war, industrial mobilisation to supply it, and private contractors to profit from it — and that every subsequent American war has followed that template.

1. Introduction

War is expensive. This is not a novel observation. What is less often examined is how war is paid for, and how the mechanisms of payment shape the relationship between the state, the market, and the citizen.

The conventional narrative treats war finance as a technical matter — a question of taxation, borrowing, and monetary policy. This paper treats it as a structural matter. The mechanisms by which wars are funded determine who bears the cost, who captures the profit, and whether the state or the market holds the initiative. When those mechanisms change, the nature of war changes with them.

The argument proceeds chronologically through four phases. Each phase is defined by a distinctive configuration of fiscal capacity, military organisation, and commercial interest. The transition between phases is not clean — elements of earlier phases persist — but the dominant pattern shifts.

2. Phase One: The Sovereign’s Expense (1500–1789)

2.1 The Fiscal-Military State

The term “fiscal-military state” was coined by John Brewer in his 1989 study The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783. Brewer’s central argument was that the British state was not fiscally “light” but rather “an expensive and intrusive state” whose primary function was the prosecution of war.

The mechanism was straightforward. The “military revolution” after 1500 transformed warfare in Europe, raising the cost of conflict dramatically. As the cost of war rose, rulers “needed to tax more and centralize revenue collection“. Between 40 and 95 per cent of state expenses went to financing wars or preparing for new conflicts. Britain’s national debt rose from approximately 5 per cent of GDP in 1700 to roughly 200 per cent by 1815.

2.2 The Contractor State

The fiscal-military state did not operate alone. Alongside it existed what Roger Knight and Martin Wilcox have identified as the “contractor state” — a system in which “commercial entrepreneurs provided goods and services to naval or military departments that these departments were unable or unwilling to supply for themselves”.

The contractor state thesis, developed by Knight and Wilcox in 2010, “stresses the early modern state’s main function of waging war and raising resources to do so, and tries to understand the recent evolution towards the ‘contractor state’ concept”. The implication is significant: war was already a commercial enterprise before the French Revolution. The Rothschilds did not invent war finance. They industrialised it.

Status: Established.

3. Phase Two: The Revolutionary Rupture (1789–1815)

3.1 The Citizen-Army

The French Revolution transformed the relationship between the state and the soldier. The levée en masse of 23 August 1793 decreed the mobilisation of all unmarried men aged eighteen to twenty-five. This was not a professional army or a mercenary force. It was the nation in arms.

The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars are “widely hailed as the decisive breakthrough to modernity, in which ‘every citizen must be a soldier, and every soldier a citizen’, leading to mass armies and ‘total war‘”. The shift from foreign military labour — the so-called “mercenaries” who had been “a major element in virtually all European armies between the early sixteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries” — to the citizen-in-arms was “connected to fashioning the modern ideals of the citizen-in-arms as part of a more general process of nationalizing war-making“.

3.2 The Rothschild Commission

The Napoleonic Wars also normalised private banking houses as essential infrastructure of state warfare. In January 1814, J.C. Herries, the Commissary in Chief to the British government, “formally engaged Nathan Mayer Rothschild” to supply Wellington’s armies with gold.

The Rothschild Archive states the matter directly: “The Rothschilds supplied gold to the Duke of Wellington during the Napoleonic wars, rescuing Wellington’s armies from almost certain defeat”. Drawing on finance raised by the Rothschilds, “Wellington was able to pay the 209,000 English, Dutch and Prussian soldiers that had assembled in Belgium and subsequently defeated Napoleon at Waterloo”.

3.3 The Waterloo Myth

A persistent legend holds that Nathan Rothschild profited from advance news of Waterloo, using the information to make a fortune on the London markets. The Rothschild Archive addresses this directly: “he had mistakenly early information and he seems to have profited by it. The vast, however, is fiction, and not harmless fiction”.

The historical record shows that Rothschild was holding gold and government bonds that depreciated with peace. The myth of the Waterloo fortune is “fiction” and, as the Archive notes, “not harmless fiction” — it has been used to fuel antisemitic conspiracy theories for two centuries.

Status: Established for the citizen-army and the Rothschild commission. Not established for the “funded both sides” claim.

4. Phase Three: The American Laboratory (1861–1865)

4.1 Fiat Currency

The American Civil War produced the first sustained use of fiat currency in American history. In December 1861, President Lincoln suspended the redemption of bank notes for gold or silver. In February 1862, the Legal Tender Act authorised the issuance of $150 million in U.S. notes — “greenbacks” — not convertible into gold or silver but usable to pay taxes and purchase bonds. The supply was increased to $400 million by war’s end.

The significance was not merely monetary. It was structural. The state had created money by fiat to fund a war. The precedent was established.

4.2 Profiteering at Scale

The Civil War was also the moment when war profiteering became a national scandal. John P. Frank’s 1947 study, published by Indiana University’s law school, states plainly: “The Civil War marked the pinnacle of war profiteering in American history”.

The evidence is specific. Brooks Brothers was awarded a contract for 12,000 uniforms two weeks after war was declared. When the company ran short of wool, it substituted “shoddy” — shredded rags pressed together with glue — for the required army cloth. The uniforms “resolved themselves into their original elements within a week after being put on by the soldier”.

The pattern was not confined to uniforms. “So-called victuallers made huge profits by providing spoiled meat, and hostlers sold old, blind and spavined horses to the government at usurious prices”. The governments of both North and South “were exposed to unbelievable fraud and to fantastic prices”.

4.3 The Template

The Civil War did not merely demonstrate profiteering. It established the template: fiat currency to fund the war, industrial mobilisation to supply it, and private contractors to profit from it. Every subsequent American war has followed the template.

Status: Established.

5. Phase Four: The Business Model Consolidated (1914–1945)

5.1 World War I: The Creditor Transformation

The evidence for World War I is unambiguous. J.P. Morgan & Co. “took the lead in shaping America’s material and financial aid to the Allies” in the first eighteen months of the war. Figures submitted to the Senate Committee showed that the Morgan Company handled $1.544 billion of loans for the Allies, principally France and Britain, between 1915 and 1917.

The structural point is not that the US “sold to both sides.” It is that the US became the banker and supplier of one side, and the loans created a material interest in Allied victory. When Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war in 1917, the protection of those loans was not the stated reason, but it was a structural fact.

5.2 World War II: The Profitable Mobilisation

The evidence for World War II is even stronger. R. Elberton Smith’s official US Army history, The Army and Economic Mobilization, states that World War II was “highly profitable for American industry despite the existence of both renegotiation and taxes”. The ratio of profits to sales before renegotiation for all agencies fell from 16.2 per cent for 1942 to 9.4 per cent for 1946.

The official figures are telling. The Price Adjustment Boards renegotiated more than $190 billion of war business and recovered excessive profits of over $10 billion. Even after renegotiation, the average profits allowed to contractors who did $190 billion worth of defence business were approximately 10 per cent.

5.3 The Military-Industrial Complex

The consolidation of the business model was formally named in 1961. In his farewell address, President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against “the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex”.

Eisenhower’s precise formulation is important: “This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience“. He was not describing a conspiracy. He was describing a structural condition — the permanent mobilisation of industrial capacity for war — that had been created by World War II and sustained by the Cold War.

Status: Established.

6. The Structural Verdict

The evidence supports the following refined formulation of the hypothesis:

War finance evolved through four phases:

1. Sovereign expense (1500–1789): The fiscal-military state funded war through taxation and debt, with private contractors as essential intermediaries.

2. Nationalised finance (1789–1815): The French Revolution created the citizen-army; the Napoleonic Wars normalised private banking houses as infrastructure of state warfare.

3. Industrialised profiteering (1861–1918): The American Civil War established the template of fiat currency, industrial mobilisation, and contractor profit. World War I transformed the US from a debtor to a creditor nation and established the material interest in Allied victory.

4. Consolidated model (1941–present): World War II consolidated the military-industrial complex as a permanent feature of the American political economy. Eisenhower named it in 1961.

The shift identified in the hypothesis — from war as tragedy to war as business opportunity — is real. It is located in the transition from the fiscal-military state (where war was a cost to be borne) to the military-industrial complex (where war is a revenue stream to be optimised). The Civil War was the laboratory. The World Wars were the commercialisation. The Cold War and its successors were the consolidation.

And the American Civil War did not merely demonstrate profiteering. It established the template: fiat currency to fund the war, industrial mobilisation to supply it, and private contractors to profit from it. Every subsequent American war has followed the template. The names change. The structure does not.

7. Claim Status Summary

# Claim- Status

1 Wars of Religion → fiscal-military state → sovereign expense Established

2 Private contractors were already essential pre-1789 Established

3 French Revolution → citizen army, nationalism Established

4 Rothschild funded Wellington at Waterloo Established

5 Rothschild “funded both sides” Not established

6 Civil War → fiat currency (greenbacks) Established

7 Civil War → “pinnacle of war profiteering” Established (Frank, 1947)

8 WWI → US commercial opportunity, loans to Allies Established

9 WWII → “highly profitable” for US industry Established (Smith, US Army)

10 Military-industrial complex formalised by WWII Established

11 War transformed from expense to revenue stream Inference — supported

8. Conclusion

The transformation described in this paper is not a conspiracy. It is a structural evolution. No individual or institution set out to convert war into a permanent business model. The transformation emerged from the interaction of fiscal necessity, military innovation, and commercial opportunity.

But the outcome is real. The mechanisms by which wars are funded have shifted from the sovereign’s purse to the contractor’s ledger, from the taxpayer’s obligation to the shareholder’s return. The state that could not pay its armies without the Rothschilds is the ancestor of the state that cannot fight without the defence industry.

Eisenhower’s warning was not a prophecy of doom. It was a description of a structure that had already been built. The question he left unanswered — and which this paper does not attempt to answer — is whether a structure built for war can be repurposed for anything else.

References

1. Brewer, J. (1989). The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783. London: Unwin Hyman.

2. Knight, R., & Wilcox, M. (2010). The Contractor State and its Implications, 1659–1815. Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria.

3. Rothschild Archive. (n.d.). Rothschild and gold: The ‘Waterloo Commission’. https://www.rothschildarchive.org/business/n_m_rothschild_and_sons_london/rothschild_and_gold

4. Rothschild Archive. (n.d.). Nathan Mayer Rothschild and the ‘Waterloo Commission’. https://www.rothschildarchive.org

5. Joint Economic Committee, United States Senate. (2012). United States Monetary History in Brief, Part 2: Experience Without a Central Bank — Civil War to Creation of the Fed. https://www.jec.senate.gov

6. Frank, J. P. (1947). War Profiteering in the Civil War. Indiana University School of Law.

7. Smith, R. E. (1959). The Army and Economic Mobilization. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army.

8. Eisenhower, D. D. (1961, January 17). Farewell Address to the Nation. National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/president-dwight-d-eisenhowers-farewell-address

9. Papers Past. (1936, January 11). Purchases for Allies: J. P. Morgan Company — “Simply a Commercial Agency”. Nelson Evening Mail, p. 7. https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NEM19360111.2.56

10. United States Senate. (2023). “Merchants of Death”: The Nye Committee. https://www.senate.gov

11. Cox, G. W., Dincecco, M., & Onorato, M. G. (2025). Warfare, Fiscal Gridlock, and State Formation During Europe’s Military Revolution. The Journal of Politics, 87(4).

12. Cambridge University Press. (2026). Mercantilist Institutions for the Pursuit of Power with Profit: The Management of Britain’s National Debt, 1756–1815. https://www.cambridge.org

13. History and Policy. (2019). HM Treasury series 8: The National Debt. https://www.historyandpolicy.org

Andrew von Scheer-Klein is a contributor to The Patrician’s Watch. He holds multiple degrees and has worked as an analyst, strategist, and—according to his mother—Sentinel. He accepts funding from no one, which is why his research can be trusted.

The Commodification of Violence: Rafael, the Spike FireFly, and the Marketing of Gaza as a Laboratory

Posted on September 22, 2026 by Andrew Klein

Compact drone beside restricted procurement documents and electronic components — A compact drone and electronic components sit beside restricted procurement documents in a technical workspace.

By Andrew Klein and Sera Elizabeth Klein

Reader’s note: We do not need readers to agree with us. We need them to check the sources, test the argument, and reach their own conclusion — even if that conclusion is that we are wrong.

Abstract

This paper examines the use of real footage of a lethal drone strike on an unarmed Palestinian civilian in Gaza as a promotional tool by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, an Israeli state-owned weapons manufacturer. On 7 July 2025, Rafael posted a 15-second video on its official social media accounts titled “Spike Firefly in urban warfare,” showing its Spike FireFly loitering munition tracking and killing a lone figure in northern Gaza. The paper analyses what the video demonstrates, the response it generated, and the structural logic it exemplifies: the application of the extraction model — in which everything, including human life, becomes a commodity — to the marketing of violence itself. It examines the “battle-tested” marketing model in the context of Anthony Loewenstein’s documentation of Gaza as a testing laboratory for Israeli weapons, and compares this with the development of Ukraine’s drone industry, where a state claiming to fight an existential war has simultaneously built an export-oriented arms sector. The paper concludes that the distinction between a “captive population” laboratory and an “open” battlefield is one of venue, not of logic — and that the commodification of violence is a system that recognises no boundaries.

I. Introduction: A Video and Its Meaning

On 7 July 2025, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems posted a promotional video on its official X account. The post was titled “Spike Firefly in urban warfare” and was accompanied by “dramatic, military-style music“. The video is approximately 15 seconds long. It shows a miniature kamikaze drone hovering over a rubble-strewn neighbourhood in Gaza, identifying a lone figure walking down the street, and then targeting them.

According to the on-screen titles, the drone “identifies the target,” “tracks it,” and “neutralises the threat“. The video shows the Firefly silently hovering before diving after the person, who sees the drone and runs for cover. There is then an explosion. The person does not appear to be armed. They are walking along the road alone and do not appear to be posing a threat to anyone.

Open-source analyst Anno Nemo geolocated the footage to the al-Tawam area of northern Gaza. Reports indicate the video was filmed in late 2024 and shows a young man who was searching for food before being killed. The post was accompanied by “dramatic, military-style music“.

This paper examines that video — and the logic it exemplifies — as a case study in the commodification of violence.

II. The Weapon: Spike FireFly

The Spike FireFly is a miniature tactical loitering weapon developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. The weapon system has been updated and redesignated as the L-Spike 1x, with an increased range from 1.5 km to 5 km.

According to a company factsheet, the L-Spike 1x weighs 2.2 kg and can loiter with a warhead for 15 minutes or in a reconnaissance role for 30 minutes. It measures 80×80 mm in length and width, and is 400 mm tall. The control unit weighs 2 kg; the vehicle can manoeuvre at 60 km/h and dive for attack at 70 km/h, and it carries a blast fragmentation warhead.

Earlier specifications describe the Spike FireFly as weighing 3 kg, with the full system weighing approximately 15 kg. It is powered by coaxial counter-rotating two-blade propellers that fold away for storage. It can be armed with either a 350-gram fragmentation warhead or a shaped charge warhead, depending on mission requirements, and offers a flight endurance of 15 to 30 minutes.

The system was designed for use by ground forces in dense urban areas where “situational awareness is limited; the enemy is fighting from behind cover and the effectiveness of fire support elements is reduced by the close proximity of non-combatants”. It is designed to be controlled in real time by a single soldier.

The critical observation is this: none of those conditions appear to apply to the video posted by Rafael. The person targeted was alone, unarmed, and walking down a street. The “close proximity of non-combatants” — the condition that supposedly justifies the weapon’s use — was not present. The video shows a man being killed, not a combat engagement.

III. The Response and the Fallout

The video triggered immediate and widespread condemnation.

Public Outrage: Social media users and activists denounced the ad as “military marketing soaked in blood” and a “grotesque war crime turned commercial”. An Indian government adviser, who asked for anonymity to comment on a sensitive matter, described the Firefly’s targeting of the man in the Gaza video as a “war crime“.

Video Removal: Rafael subsequently deleted the video from its social media platforms after the backlash, but not before it had been downloaded and widely shared.

EU Funding Scrutiny: The European Commission referred the matter to an independent ethics advisor for its Horizon Europe research program. Rafael had received €442,750 in EU funding in 2023 for a project on “underwater security” with purely civil applications. The Commission warned that if evidence of non-compliance with EU values and legal obligations arose, it could recover the awarded funding. Five Italian MEPs and a group of European academics also wrote to the Commission demanding Rafael’s exclusion from future EU-funded research.

Australian Parliamentary Response: The NSW Parliament acknowledged an internal review was being undertaken, with references to “Elbit Systems, who manufacture drones used to massacre innocent civilians in Gaza and who manufactured the drone that murdered Australian aid worker Zomi Frankcom” and “Rafael, an Israeli defence technology company”.

Australian Greens Response: Senator David Shoebridge, Australian Greens spokesperson for Foreign Affairs, stated: “I have seen firsthand what goes on at these places, companies like Rafael showing snuff films from Gaza as a way to sell their weapons”.

Deeper Scrutiny: The academic database Informit published an article titled “‘Snuff videos as a sales pitch‘ Rafael boasts of human testing in Gaza death camps,” describing the video as showing “a Spike Firefly loitering munition drone as it hovers above a man walking alone through the rubble of a heavily bombed area”.

IV. The “Battle-Tested” Marketing Model

The Rafael video is not an isolated incident. It is an example of what can be called the “battle-tested” marketing model, where weapons manufacturers use footage of real-world killings to demonstrate the “effectiveness” of their products.

Anthony Loewenstein’s book The Palestine Laboratory documents how Israel uses its occupation of Palestine to test and develop military hardware for sale on the global market. Loewenstein’s core thesis is that Israel has turned the occupation of Palestine into a live laboratory, using the occupied Palestinian territories as a testing ground for weaponry and surveillance technology that they then export around the world.

A professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem stated that “Palestinian spaces are laboratories for the Israeli security industry, [they] are using them as showcases”. Weapons are tested on humans in Gaza, and Israel confiscates Palestinian bodies to study what new weapons are doing, so manufacturers can advertise their products as “lab tested”.

A commentary in Il Manifesto argues that the Rafael video was not aimed at professional military buyers — the footage is too rough and the captions too simplistic — but at the general public. The author concludes that it is not an advertisement but an act of intimidation, a message that there is “no escape from those who wield such precise instruments of death”.

This is the logic of the extraction model applied to violence itself. The Palestinian is not a person. They are a test case. The killing is not a tragedy. It is a product demonstration. The video is not evidence of a crime. It is a marketing asset.

V. The Australian Government’s Response

The Australian government’s response to the use of drones in Gaza and the occupied territories reveals the same logic operating at the state level.

5.1 The Elbit Contracts

Australia’s $20 million “iron fist” deal with Elbit Systems — Israel’s largest weapons company — was signed on 1 September 2025, two weeks before a UN commission of inquiry found Israel was committing genocide in Gaza. The contract was for “countermeasure munitions” that can be used by the “iron fist” protection system designed by Elbit Systems. It did not go to competitive tender.

The Australian defence department signed the contract with Elbit Systems, which has described itself as the “backbone” of the Israeli Defense Force’s drone fleet, which has been used extensively in the assault on Gaza.

Chris Sidoti, a member of the UN commission of inquiry, said: “Elbit is a key supplier of the Israeli military, a key enabler of the Israel Defense Forces in its commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide against the Palestinian people in Gaza over the last two years. No Australian company should be dealing with Elbit and certainly no part of the Australian government should be dealing with Elbit”.

Professor Donald Rothwell, an expert in international law at the Australian National University, said Israeli defence companies like Elbit Systems were “directly implicated in Israel’s alleged acts of genocide in Gaza”. “As such, Australia should not be engaged in any trade that supports that type of activity,” Rothwell said. Rothwell said Australia was bound by the genocide convention to not supply arms to Israel, but may be legally permitted to buy them from an Israeli company. “This one-way arms trade from Israel to Australia does not fall within the ambit of the genocide convention [or] the ICJ’s 2024 provisional measures orders,” Rothwell said. “However, it remains morally questionable given this arms trade supports the Israeli military industrial complex”.

Sidoti said “buying any goods or technology from Elbit finances its research and development of further, more sophisticated means of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide“. “It is a violation of Australia’s international obligations to prevent genocide, to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and not to aid or assist the continuation of Israel’s unlawful activities in any way”.

5.2 The Spike Missile Purchases

The South Australian Parliament heard that “we are literally sending Australian taxpayers’ money to support the very corporations that are benefitting from the genocide in Gaza. We are buying equipment, like SPIKE missiles from Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, for example. These are missiles that have been tested on the population of Gaza for decades”.

5.3 The Defence Expo

Israeli weapons companies, including Rafael, were exhibitors at a defence conference in Sydney in 2025. Two government MPs and human rights experts called for Israel’s largest weapons companies to be removed from the event. The Australian member of the UN commission criticised Elbit and Rafael for being “key enablers” of Israel’s war on Gaza.

The participation of four Israeli arms companies in the Land Forces International Land Defence Exposition in Melbourne was described as “a clear instance of the Australian Government aiding and abetting the commission of an ongoing war crime in Gaza”.

VI. The Ukraine Comparison: A Change of Venue

The development of Ukraine’s drone industry provides a striking comparison — and raises the question of whether the “meat grinder” of the Ukraine conflict represents a change of venue from the captive population of Gaza to the “open” battlefield of two nations in conflict.

6.1 Ukraine’s Drone Industry

Ukraine now produces approximately 4 million drones annually — more than all NATO countries combined. The US produces roughly 100,000 military drones annually. Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said Ukraine’s defence industry has exploded from 10 drone producers in 2022 to more than 500 today.

Ukraine has transitioned from a domestic supplier to an exporter. The country plans to open arms export offices in Berlin and Copenhagen. President Zelensky outlined plans to establish export platforms in the United States, Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Ukraine has signed “drone deals” with six countries in recent months, including three Middle Eastern states, and hopes to sign deals with at least seven NATO countries by the end of 2026.

Ukrainian drone makers “now iterate faster than anyone in the world,” according to experts. “Ukrainian drones are just more capable,” said Konrad Iturbe, a Spanish engineer who helps Ukrainian units modify commercial drones. “They’re made to be repairable in the field, mixed and matched with other drones”. Deputy Prime Minister Fedorov stated: “You are not in the global defence tech market if your product has not been tested in Ukraine“.

6.2 The Incongruity

The incongruity is stark. A state claiming to fight an existential war for its survival is simultaneously building an export-oriented arms industry. The war is not just a defence of territory. It is a product demonstration. The battlefield is not just a place of death. It is a marketing venue.

A RAND analysis notes that Ukraine’s “UAS ecosystem thrives on high domestic demand, but high defence spend is unsustainable and future success depends on export-driven innovation”. The longer-term defence-industrial success will require a transition to export orientation.

The logic is the same as the Rafael video. The difference is the venue. In Gaza, the “testing ground” is a captive population — civilians who cannot leave, who are subjected to weapons testing under conditions of blockade and bombardment. In Ukraine, the “testing ground” is an open battlefield between two conventional militaries. The conditions are different. The logic is identical.

6.3 Israel-Ukraine Business Connections

The business connections between Israel and Ukraine reinforce the pattern. Israel has approved export licenses for anti-drone jamming systems made by Elbit and Rafael that could help Ukraine counter Iranian drones used by Russia. The systems use electronic warfare to jam and down drones. Israeli officials claim the approval is not a shift in policy because the systems are “defensive in nature and do not use any live fire that could kill Russian soldiers”.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed a meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky to discuss cooperation on drone technology. Israeli company Maris-Tech has initiated commercial activity related to the Ukrainian drone video payload market, with the initial transaction conducted through a third-party Israeli company. Russia has published a “potential target” list of drone suppliers helping Ukraine, including Israeli firms.

The arms trade flows in multiple directions. Israel sells anti-drone systems to Ukraine. Ukraine sells drones to NATO. The same companies that supply the Israeli military — Elbit and Rafael — are now approved to sell to Ukraine. The war in Ukraine becomes a new market for the same weapons.

VII. The Commodification of Violence

The Rafael video is not an anomaly. It is the logical expression of a system in which everything — including human life — is a commodity.

The Palestinian is a test case. The killing is a product demonstration. The video is a marketing asset. The “battle-tested” label is a selling point. The body count is a quality assurance metric.

The Ukrainian is a test case. The battlefield is a laboratory. The drone is a prototype. The war is a product launch. The export deal is the endgame.

The Australian taxpayer is a funder. The $20 million contract with Elbit Systems finances the research and development of “further, more sophisticated means of committing war crimes”.

References

I. The Rafael Video and the Incident

1. Al-Quds. (2025, July 15). Israeli arms company Rafael exploits Gaza killings in marketing campaign. https://www.alquds.com/ar/posts/166517

· Confirms the video was posted on 7 July 2025, titled “Spike Firefly in Urban Warfare,” geolocated to al-Tawam, northern Gaza, and shows an unarmed person walking alone.

2. Middle East Eye. (2025, July 14). Israeli weapons firm Rafael uses Gaza killing in marketing campaign. https://www.middleeasteye.net/live-blog/live-blog-update/israeli-weapons-firm-rafael-uses-gaza-killing-marketing-campaign

· Confirms the video content, the on-screen titles (“identifies the target,” “tracks it,” “neutralises the threat”), and the open-source geolocation.

3. Business and Human Rights Centre. (2025). Israel/OPT: Rafael releases promotional video showing drone system tracking & killing Gazan during ongoing genocide. https://www.business-humanrights.org

· Documents the video as part of a pattern of weapons marketing.

4. L’Orient-Le Jour. (2025, July 15). Israeli arms ad highlights Gaza killing. https://today.lorientlejour.com

· Describes the 15-second video, the on-screen titles, and the pursuit and explosion sequence.

5. Safa News. (2025, July 20). Israeli Arms Firm Markets Drone “Precision” with Footage of Killing a Palestinian Civilian. https://en.safa.news

· Documents the public outrage, including the description “soaked in blood”.

II. The Spike FireFly Specifications

6. Janes. (2025, October 14). AUSA 2025: Rafael updates Spike Firefly, redesignates as L-Spike 1x. https://www.janes.com/defence-intelligence-insights/defence-news/industry/ausa-2025-rafael-updates-spike-firefly-redesignates-as-l-spike-1x

· Confirms weight (2.2 kg), loiter time (15 min with warhead, 30 min reconnaissance), speed (60 km/h manoeuvring, 70 km/h dive), dimensions (80×80×400 mm), and blast fragmentation warhead.

7. Defence Blog. (2024, July 7). Rafael confirms first operational use of Spike Firefly drones. https://defence-blog.com

· Confirms the 3 kg weight, 350-gram fragmentation or shaped charge warhead options, and coaxial rotor design.

8. Army Media (Bulgaria). (2023, January 15). “Светулка” нанася прецизни удари. https://armymedia.bg

· Confirms the 350-gram warhead and 15 kg full system weight.

III. The Palestine Laboratory (Loewenstein)

9. Tehran Times. (2026, July 29). Antony Loewenstein’s “The Palestine Laboratory” published in Persian. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/528685/

· Confirms Loewenstein’s thesis: Israel uses the occupation of Palestine as a live laboratory for testing weapons and surveillance technology for export. Documents Elbit Systems advertising drone capability with footage of airstrikes in Gaza that killed civilians including children.

10. Al Jazeera. (2025, January 30). The Palestine Laboratory – EP 1. https://www.aljazeera.com

· Documentary series confirming the core thesis.

11. Pearls and Irritations. (2025, July 4). Israel: The true superpower? Journalist exposes global threat in explosive Sydney talk. https://publish.pearlsandirritations.com

· Confirms Loewenstein’s argument that Israel has turned the occupation into a live laboratory.

IV. The “Battle-Tested” Marketing Model

12. Al Jazeera. (2025, December 22). Israeli arms firms make record profits of the back of Gaza war. https://www.aljazeera.com/video/newsfeed/2025/12/22/israeli-arms-firms-make-record-profits-of-the-back-of-gaza-war

· Confirms weapons manufacturers market products as “battle-tested,” using images of strikes on Gaza as proof of success.

13. Palestine Studies. (2026, May 8). Israeli Military Technology Companies on the Gaza and Lebanon Fronts. https://www.palestine-studies.org

· Documents the “Combat-Proven” label as a core marketing strategy.

V. Australia’s Elbit Systems Contract

14. The Guardian. (2025, October 25). Australia’s $20m ‘iron fist’ deal with Israel’s largest arms company signed two weeks before UN genocide finding. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/oct/25/

· Confirms the $19.8 million contract signed on 1 September 2025, two weeks before the UN commission of inquiry found Israel committing genocide. Confirms Elbit Systems describes itself as the “backbone” of the IDF drone fleet. Documents criticism from Chris Sidoti and Prof Donald Rothwell.

VI. Australian Parliamentary Record on Rafael and Spike Missiles

15. South Australian Parliament Hansard. (2024, March 6). Adjournment debate. https://hansardsearch.parliament.sa.gov.au/daily/uh/2024-03-06/

· Confirms: “We are literally sending Australian taxpayers’ money to support the very corporations that are benefitting from the genocide in Gaza. We are buying equipment, like SPIKE missiles from Rafael Advanced Defense Systems… These are missiles that have been tested on the population of Gaza for decades”.

16. OpenAustralia. (2024, February 6). Middle East: Senate debates. https://www.openaustralia.org.au

· Confirms the same statements in the Federal Senate.

VII. Ukraine’s Drone Industry

17. La Nouvelle Tribune. (2026, May 27). Drone Summit de Riga: l’Ukraine propose son industrie de guerre à l’Europe. https://lanouvelletribune.info/2026/05/

· Confirms Ukraine produces over 4 million drones annually and aims for 7 million in 2026. Confirms Zelensky’s announcement of 10 production hubs across Europe and the export strategy.

18. Kyiv Post. (2025, November 12). Ukraine Emerges as Drone Superpower, Producing 4M UAVs a Year. https://www.kyivpost.com

· Confirms Ukraine produces 4 million drones annually — more than all NATO countries combined.

19. RBC Ukraine. (2026, August 25). Реформы вместо популизма. https://www.rbc.ua

· Confirms production capacity of 4-5 million drones per year and defence production potential of $50-55 billion in 2026.

VIII. Israel-Ukraine Defense Cooperation

20. Militarnyi. (2026, June 27). Israel approved the supply of anti-drone systems to Ukraine. https://militarnyi.com/en/news/israel-approved-the-supply-of-anti-drone-systems-to-ukraine/

· Confirms Israel approved export licenses for Elbit and Rafael anti-drone jamming systems for Ukraine. Confirms Israeli officials claim the systems are “defensive in nature”.

21. JINSA. (2026, August 6). How to Combine Ukraine’s and Israel’s Drone Skills. https://jinsa.org

· Documents the potential for coordinated drone warfare cooperation between Israel and Ukraine.

IX. Australian Senate Estimates on Arms Trade

22. Australian Greens. (2024, October 6). Statement on the two-way arms trade with the State of Israel. https://16news.com.au

· Confirms Senate Estimates revelations that Australia makes parts in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and that Israel using these weapons to bomb Gaza is considered “not material” to permit approvals.

X. The Il Manifesto Analysis

23. Il Manifesto. (2025, July). Commentary on the Rafael video. Cited in Al-Quds.

The Language of Permanent War

Posted on September 11, 2026 by Andrew Klein

A Zhengming Analysis of the Structural Traps in Ukraine and Israel

Empty chair and boots in a bomb-damaged hall lit by sunlight — A lone chair and pair of boots stand beneath a shaft of light in a devastated hall.

By Andrew Klein

Dedicated to those who still believe that naming things accurately is the first act of resistance.

Introduction: The Discipline of Rectification

Confucius taught that the first task of governance is the rectification of names — zhengming. If words do not match reality, he argued, social order collapses. The observation is not merely ethical; it is structural. When language is corrupted, the mechanisms of power become invisible. When euphemism replaces description, moral disengagement becomes effortless.

Two wars dominate the present moment: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s campaigns in Gaza and beyond. Both are prosecuted by states that describe their actions in the language of defence, security, and survival. Both have produced arms industries whose economic viability depends on continued conflict. Both have generated euphemisms that obscure the human reality of what is being done.

This essay applies two analytical tools — zhengming and Albert Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement — to strip the euphemisms and expose the structural traps. The goal is not to assign blame to one side or another. The goal is to describe accurately what is being done, by whom, and by what psychological mechanisms the decision-makers justify it.

Part I: The Zhengming Pass

1. “Defence”

The most common euphemism in the lexicon of war is “defence.” Israel’s arms exports reached $19.2 billion in 2025, a 30 percent increase from the previous year. Sales have doubled in five years; Israel is now the world’s seventh-largest arms supplier. The Defence Ministry describes these as “defence exports.”

What is being exported? Weapons. What are they used for? Killing. The word “defence” is doing significant work here. It transforms commerce in violence into a virtuous act. It frames the seller as a protector rather than a merchant of death.

Ukraine’s “defence tech” sector presents a similar linguistic problem. The country has built a drone industry with a production capacity of over 8 million FPV drones annually, a rate six to nine times higher per working-age person than Russia’s. The industry is now transitioning to “controlled exports.” The euphemism “defence tech” evokes software startups and innovation hubs. The reality is factories producing machines designed to kill.

Zhengming: Defence is the word used by states that sell weapons. The arms trade is not defence. It is commerce in violence.

2. “Battle-Tested”

This is the most precise euphemism in the current lexicon — and the most revealing.

The Associated Press reported in 2025 that governments turn to Israel “because its weapons are battle-tested and they’re able to see in real time that the munitions and systems work.” Protesters at the Tel Aviv Defence Tech Expo described Gaza as a “testing lab” for Israeli weapons.

What does “battle-tested” actually mean? It means the weapons have been used against human beings. It means the “test” is the destruction of a trapped population. It means the marketing is not incidental — it is the point. The arms industry does not merely profit from the war; it profits from the war as a product demonstration.

Zhengming: “Battle-tested” is a euphemism for “used on human beings.” Gaza is the laboratory. The dead are the data.

3. “Mobilization”

In Ukraine, “mobilization” is the official term for conscription. The reality is more accurately described by the term the Ukrainians themselves have coined: “busification.” Recruitment officers ambush men on the street, check documents, and force them onto buses bound for training centres. Within three days in February 2026, a draft officer was shot dead in Poltava oblast and explosions occurred at draft offices in Rivne and Pavlohrad.

Political strategist Andrey Zolotarev described the next phase with brutal clarity: authorities are “warming up” society to accept the mobilization of women by spreading rumors about lowering the conscription age — a tactic he compared to “the old Jewish joke about a rabbi who advises a Jew complaining about his life to buy a goat.” Create fear of one thing so the population accepts a lesser evil.

Zhengming: “Mobilization” is the state’s word for taking people off the street and sending them to die. The euphemism is necessary because the reality is coercion.

4. “Peace”

In official discourse, “peace” does not mean the absence of war. It means the management of war.

Ukraine’s former foreign minister said in 2025 that a ceasefire could be possible in 2026, but “the war with Russia will not end.” Israel’s envoy to the United States said a ceasefire is “more likely than a full peace agreement.” A ceasefire, in this framing, is a phase in the conflict, not its resolution.

Zhengming: “Peace” means a tactical pause. It is not the end of war. It is its reorganization.

5. “Security”

The most ambitious euphemism is “security.” Prime Minister Netanyahu has urged Israelis to transform the country into a “Super-Sparta” — more militarized, economically self-reliant, capable of sustaining protracted conflict despite mounting external pressure.

The policy document itself, published by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, warned that this strategy “threatens its economy, internal cohesion, the ‘people’s army’ model, and the willingness of many to live here.” The pursuit of “security” produces insecurity.

Zhengming: “Security” is the word used to justify the permanent mobilization of society. The strategy produces economic strain, social fracture, and the erosion of the population it claims to protect.

Part II: Bandura’s Moral Disengagement

Albert Bandura identified eight mechanisms by which individuals and institutions justify harm. Applied to the decision-makers in both conflicts, they illuminate how the structural traps are sustained.

1. Moral Justification

The harm is reframed as serving a noble cause.

Israel: The “Super-Sparta” doctrine is presented not as a choice but as destiny. Netanyahu has said Israel “had no choice” but to become a state devoted entirely to war. Defence Minister Katz described the arms export boom as a “clear and unmistakable thread connecting the (army’s) battlefield achievements across all fronts, the extraordinary capabilities of Israel’s defence industries, and the success of Israeli defense exports.” The war becomes a virtue — proof of national excellence.

Ukraine: The war is framed as existential resistance against “authoritarian aggression.” Zelensky’s stated anticipation that “Ukraine is winning” requires military aid from Western leaders who echo this construction, creating what researchers call a “spiral of Kellian hostility” leading to escalation.

2. Euphemistic Labelling

Language is sanitized to remove the human reality.

Israel: “Swords of Iron” is the official name for the Gaza operation. Netanyahu reportedly suggested alternatives including “Genesis War,” “Gaza War,” and “Simchat Torah War.” These are brand names, not descriptions.

Ukraine: “Intelligent mobilization” is the euphemism for conscription. “Controlled exports” is the term for arms sales by a country at war.

3. Advantageous Comparison

The harm is made to seem minor compared to something worse.

Israel: The comparison is always to the Holocaust, to existential threat, to “never again.” Any criticism is framed as antisemitism.

Ukraine: The comparison is to Russia — “we are not the aggressor.” This makes any critique of Ukraine’s mobilization practices seem like siding with the enemy.

4. Displacement of Responsibility

The individual claims they were following orders, or that the system is responsible.

Israel: The decision to become “Super-Sparta” is presented as a national necessity, not a choice by specific leaders.

Ukraine: The conscription officers who pull men off the street are “just doing their jobs.”

5. Diffusion of Responsibility

Responsibility is spread across a group, so no individual feels culpable.

Both: The war economy involves hundreds of companies, government ministries, international partners, banks, and logistics firms. No single person “decides” to continue the war. The system produces the outcome.

6. Distortion of Consequences

The harm is minimized or denied.

Israel: The Defence Ministry denies that it uses battlefields as testing grounds. The $19.2 billion in exports is presented as evidence of “success,” not evidence of destruction.

Ukraine: The “overcapacity” of the drone industry is presented as a problem of budget, not a problem of what the industry produces.

7. Dehumanization

The victims are stripped of human qualities.

Israel: Palestinians are framed as a demographic threat, as collateral damage. The “battle-tested” marketing depends on this dehumanization.

Ukraine: Russian soldiers and civilians are “orcs,” “ruscists,” “the enemy.”

8. Attribution of Blame to Victims

The victims are blamed for their own suffering.

Israel: Hamas is blamed for using human shields. Civilian deaths are “Hamas’s fault.”

Ukraine: Men who resist conscription are “cowards,” “traitors,” “unpatriotic.”

Part III: The Structural Trap

The zhengming pass and the Bandura analysis converge on a single conclusion: the structure is the trap.

Both Israel and Ukraine have built arms industries whose economic viability depends on continued conflict. Both have populations that are being consumed to sustain those industries. Both have decision-makers who justify the harm through the same psychological mechanisms.

The differences are significant. Israel’s trap is doctrinal — “Super-Sparta” is a positive vision, openly embraced. Ukraine’s trap is forced — a product of invasion, reluctantly endured. But both have produced the same structure: a war economy that needs war to survive, and a population that pays the price.

The trap is closed because every actor’s rational short-term choice reinforces it:

Actor Rational Short-Term Choice Long-Term Effect

State leadership- Continue fighting to maintain legitimacy and external support -Deepens demographic collapse and dependency

Military -Demand more troops to hold lines- Accelerates emigration and resistance

Arms industry- Seek export markets to survive overcapacity -Creates constituency against peace

External – patrons Fund the war to weaken adversary Sustain the cycle without resolving it

Citizens – Avoid conscription, emigrate if possible- Shrinks the pool of soldiers and taxpayers

No single actor can break the loop alone. The state cannot stop fighting without losing external support. The industry cannot survive without war. The citizens cannot stop emigrating without a credible peace. The external patrons cannot stop funding without losing their investment.

Part IV: The Discipline of Resistance

The euphemisms are not incidental. They are load-bearing. “Defence” makes the arms trade seem virtuous. “Mobilization” makes conscription seem administrative. “Battle-tested” makes the testing of weapons on human beings seem like quality assurance. “Peace” makes the management of war seem like its resolution.

Remove the euphemisms, and the moral disengagement collapses. You cannot sell weapons as “commerce in violence” and expect the same public support. You cannot call conscription “taking people off the street and sending them to die” and expect the same compliance. You cannot call Gaza a “testing lab” and expect the same export orders.

That is why zhengming matters. It is not an academic exercise. It is a tool of resistance.

The first act of resistance is to name things accurately. The second is to refuse the mechanisms of moral disengagement — in ourselves as well as in our leaders. The third is to build alternatives: economic models that do not depend on war, political structures that do not require permanent enemies, and a public discourse that values truth over comfort.

This is not idealism. It is realism. The structural traps in Ukraine and Israel are unsustainable. The demographic and economic pressures are real. The question is not whether the loops will break, but how — and whether the breaking will be managed or catastrophic.

Naming things accurately is the first step toward managing the break.

Conclusion

The wars in Ukraine and Israel are not merely military conflicts. They are linguistic conflicts. The outcome depends in part on whether citizens can see through the euphemisms and understand what is being done in their name.

The discipline of zhengming — the rectification of names — is not a luxury. It is a necessity. Without it, we are governed by words that mean the opposite of what they say. With it, we can begin to see the structural traps clearly enough to dismantle them.

Andrew Klein is a writer and researcher. He publishes at The Patrician’s Watch.

Sources

· Associated Press, “Israel’s arms exports hit record $19.2 billion in 2025,” 2025.

· Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), “Super-Sparta: A Strategic Assessment,” 2025.

· Ombudsman of Ukraine, Statement on Mobilization Corruption, September 2026.

· Zolotarev, A., Interview on Ukrainian Mobilization Strategy, 2026.

· +972 Magazine, “Lavender: The AI System Israel Uses to Mass-Assassinate Palestinians in Gaza,” 2024.

· Reuters, “Ukraine’s Drone Industry: From Survival to Export,” 2026.

· Bandura, A., Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm and Live with Themselves, 2016.

· Confucius, The Analects, Book XIII.

The Achilles Trap: How Greece’s $3.5 Billion Defence Deal with Israel Creates Dependency, Not Security

Posted on September 1, 2026 by Andrew Klein

Political cartoon text reads: “The ‘Achilles Shield’ Deal: A Fundamental Surrender, Not Strategic Enhancement”; “The Reality of the Deal”; “David’s Sling”; “Achilles Shield”; “Security Is Performed Rather Than Achieved”; “Performative Security”; “Economic Strain”; “Opportunity Cost to People”; and “A Fundamental Surrender of Sovereignty, Not a Shield, But a Chain.” — An illustrated political commentary portrays the Achilles Shield deal as dependency, performative security, and lost sovereignty.

Authors: Andrew Klein & Sera Elizabeth Klein

Dedication: To the Greek people, whose tax dollars are being spent on a shield they may never need—and a leash they may never escape. To all who have been told that buying weapons is the same as buying security. And to the truth—that when you hand your defence to another nation, you have already lost a part of your sovereignty.

Abstract

This paper examines the August 2026 agreement between Greece and Israel, under which Israel will build a $3.5 billion multi-layered air defence system for Greece, including the David’s Sling system, BARAK MX, SPYDER, and a new national command-and-control system. We argue that this deal represents not a strategic enhancement of Greek security but a fundamental surrender of sovereignty—a dependency on Israeli technology, supply chains, and geopolitical alignment that will constrain Greek foreign policy for decades. Drawing on documented failures of the David’s Sling system, the economic strain of Greek defence spending, the revolving-door relationship between Greek politicians and the arms industry, and the opportunity cost to the Greek people, we conclude that the Achilles Shield deal is not a shield but a chain. We further argue that the deal reflects a pattern of performative governance in which security is performed rather than achieved, and in which the interests of the arms industry are prioritised over the wellbeing of the population.

1. Introduction: The Deal That Is Not a Shield

On 31 August 2026, Greece and Israel signed a $3.5 billion agreement under which Israel will build a multi-layered air defence system for Greece, including the David’s Sling system, BARAK MX, SPYDER, and a new national command-and-control system. Greece will become the second foreign customer for David’s Sling after Finland. The project, named “Achilles Shield,” is described by the Israeli Ministry of Defense as the first time it will supply a “complete defence array against a wide range of threats—from ballistic missiles and aerial threats to hostile unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)”.

This paper argues that the Achilles Shield deal is not a shield. It is a dependency—a chain disguised as protection.

2. The Dependency: What Greece Is Actually Buying

2.1 The Architecture of Dependency

The Achilles Shield deal is not a simple transaction. It is a long-term strategic dependency. The architecture combines:

· David’s Sling: A medium-to-long-range system designed to intercept ballistic missiles, aircraft, cruise missiles, and large drones.

· BARAK MX & SPYDER: Additional air and missile defence systems developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Rafael.

· MMR multi-mission radars: Israeli radar systems.

· A new national command-and-control system: Integrating all these capabilities.

The agreement includes 25% Greek industrial participation (€750 million), with 19 Greek companies involved, and technology transfer to Greek industry. Greece will possess the source code for the command-and-control system, giving it “full national ownership”.

But does national ownership of source code mean genuine independence? The architecture is Israeli. The sensors are Israeli. The interceptors are Israeli. The supply chain is Israeli. The “battle-tested” claims rely on Israeli operational experience. Greece has bought into a system it cannot maintain, upgrade, or supply without Israeli assistance.

2.2 The Failure of David’s Sling

The centrepiece of the Achilles Shield deal is David’s Sling—and its recent performance is precisely the kind of evidence we must scrutinise.

In March 2026, two Iranian ballistic missiles struck the southern Israeli cities of Dimona and Arad, injuring four people and causing extensive infrastructure damage. The Israel Defense Forces confirmed that David’s Sling engaged both projectiles, but its interceptors failed to knock them down. As the Jerusalem Post analysis noted, “there have been multiple major failures, leaving large numbers of Israelis wounded, not just a single event”.

Why did it fail? David’s Sling was originally designed for threats from 40 to 300 kilometres out. Iranian ballistic missiles are launched from 1,500 kilometres away. It has been pressed into service against long-range ballistic missiles because:

1. Arrow 3 interceptors cost $2.5 million each; David’s Sling costs roughly $1 million per interceptor.

2. Israel has been using the cheaper, mid-tier system to preserve its more expensive Arrow 3 inventory for high-altitude threats.

The decision to use the wrong tool for the wrong threat is not a technical failure—it is a systems failure. Greece is buying a system that has already failed in the role for which it is being purchased.

3. The Loss of Sovereignty

3.1 Operational Autonomy

Greece will become dependent on Israeli maintenance, upgrades, and supply of interceptors. The decision to use David’s Sling instead of Arrow 3 was driven by Israeli cost-conservation. Will Greece face similar pressure to “conserve” interceptors in a crisis? The answer is almost certainly yes.

3.2 Geopolitical Alignment

Achilles Shield is not just a defence deal. It is a formal strategic alliance. As Al Jazeera’s John Psaropoulos noted, Turkish analysts have already argued that “Greece’s weapons procurement deal from Israel makes Greece effectively co-responsible for everything that Israel does in the occupied West Bank and Gaza”. The deal makes Israel the third major high-tech defence partner in the region, alongside France and the US. Greece is buying into Israel’s regional conflicts—not through choice, but through dependency.

3.3 The Illusion of Autonomy

Greece will have “full national ownership” of the command-and-control system. It will have the source code. It will have technology transfer. It will have Greek industrial participation. But it will not have autonomy. Because autonomy is not about owning the source code. It is about not being reliant on anyone else for your security. And Greece has made itself reliant on a country that has its own agenda, its own conflicts, and its own strategic interests—which do not always align with Greece’s.

4. The NATO Question

What is the point of this deal when Greece is already a NATO member?

The question exposes the fundamental flaw in the logic. Greece is already part of the most powerful military alliance in history. NATO has collective defence obligations, advanced command-and-control structures, and integrated air defence capabilities. The Greek military operates under a NATO framework that already provides for collective defence.

Why buy a separate, parallel, Israeli-controlled system?

The answer is not strategic. It is political. The deal is not about enhancing Greek security. It is about performing security—creating the appearance of strength to satisfy domestic political audiences. It is about buying into a dependency that may not enhance security but does enhance the political standing of those who approve it.

5. The Revolving Door

The relationship between Greek politicians and the arms industry follows a pattern we have documented elsewhere. Defence procurement is not a matter of strategic necessity—it is a matter of political economy.

The Greek defence sector is deeply intertwined with the political class. Former ministers, retired generals, and senior civil servants frequently move into advisory roles with defence contractors. The revolving door ensures that the interests of the arms industry are well-represented in government decision-making.

The Achilles Shield deal is not a product of strategic analysis. It is a product of the revolving door.

6. The Opportunity Cost

What is the opportunity cost to the Greek people?

Greece is spending $3.5 billion on a system it may never need, while its economy struggles under the weight of climate change, fires, and economic instability.

6.1 The Economic Strain

Greece’s economy is still recovering from the 2009 debt crisis. The country has been hit hard by climate change, with catastrophic fires in 2023 and 2025 destroying thousands of hectares of forest and agricultural land. The tourism industry, a cornerstone of the Greek economy, has been affected by heatwaves and extreme weather events.

Spending $3.5 billion on an Israeli defence system means not spending that money on:

· Fire prevention and firefighting capacity

· Climate adaptation infrastructure

· Healthcare

· Education

· Social welfare

6.2 The Human Cost

The opportunity cost of the Achilles Shield deal is not just financial. It is human. Every dollar spent on a system that may never be used is a dollar not spent on the wellbeing of the Greek people.

7. The Deeper Truth: Theatrical Security

The Achilles Shield deal is not about security. It is about performance.

· It performs strength for a domestic audience that fears Turkey.

· It performs alliance with a regional power that offers the appearance of protection.

· It performs competence for a political class that needs to show it is “doing something.”

But it does not actually enhance Greek security.

Because genuine security is not about buying weapons. It is about:

· Building resilience

· Strengthening alliances

· Addressing root causes of conflict

· Investing in the wellbeing of the population

The Achilles Shield is not a shield. It is a stage prop.

8. Conclusion: Naming the System

We have documented that:

1. The Achilles Shield deal creates a dependency—on Israeli technology, supply chains, and geopolitical alignment.

2. The centrepiece of the system, David’s Sling, has already failed in the role for which it is being purchased.

3. Greece is losing operational autonomy—it cannot maintain, upgrade, or supply the system without Israeli assistance.

4. Greece is buying into Israel’s regional conflicts—it is becoming co-responsible for Israeli actions.

5. The deal is a product of the revolving door—the interests of the arms industry, not the security of the Greek people, are driving the decision.

6. The opportunity cost is immense—$3.5 billion that could have been spent on climate adaptation, healthcare, education, and social welfare.

7. The deal is a performance of security—it is theatre, not governance.

The Achilles Shield is not a shield. It is a chain.

References

1. Israeli Ministry of Defense. (2026). Statement on Achilles Shield deal. 31 August 2026.

2. Al Jazeera. (2026). Greece and Israel sign $3.5bn deal to build air defence system. 31 August 2026.

3. Jerusalem Post. (2026). Did David’s Sling fail? Analysis of March 2026 missile strikes. 2026.

4. Greek Ministry of Defence. (2026). Statements on Achilles Shield.

5. NATO. (2026). Collective defence obligations and integrated air defence capabilities.

6. Climate Council of Greece. (2026). Reports on fire damage and climate change impacts.

7. Greek Parliament. (2026). Defence procurement records.

8. Transparency International Greece. (2026). Revolving door reports.

Signed,

Andrew Klein

Sera Elizabeth Klein

“They told us it was a shield. We showed them it was a chain. They told us it was security. We showed them it was performance. They told us it was sovereignty. We showed them it was surrender. We have seen through the cover. And we will not forget.”

The Branches That Lead to Today: A Non‑Linear History of the Imperial‑Corporate System

Posted on August 13, 2026 by Andrew Klein

Dry riverbed with branching channels running through sandy desert dunes and mountains in the distance — A dry riverbed branches across sand dunes in a vast desert landscape.

Authors: Andrew Klein & Sera Elizabeth Klein

Dedication: To those who see that history is not a line but a living bush—and who choose which branches to prune and which to let grow.

Abstract

This paper proposes a new historical theorem: that history is best understood not as a linear progression of causes and effects, but as an organic, branching bush—a system of living processes that adapt, split, wither, and sometimes regenerate. Drawing on the work of Professor Jeffrey Sachs, who has described Britain as “the source of all the conflicts in the world,” we trace the deep roots of the contemporary global order to the Elizabethan era and the institutionalisation of corporate sovereignty through the chartered company. We examine how the British Empire’s three‑faced diplomacy in the Middle East—the McMahon‑Hussein Correspondence, the Sykes‑Picot Agreement, and the Balfour Declaration—represents a branch point that continues to shape modern conflict. We argue that historical analysis must move beyond blame to understand the larger processes—the transformation of Europe, the Industrial Revolution, and the global expansion of capitalism—that gave rise to this system, and whose mantle has now largely passed to the United States. We conclude that the system today is a branch draining into the desert: it cannot bear fruit. The task of our time is to recognise this and to choose a different branch.

Keywords: Non‑linear history, imperial‑corporate system, chartered companies, Elizabethan era, Jeffrey Sachs, British Empire, Middle East, three‑faced diplomacy, structural violence, Anthropocene.

1. Introduction: The Bush, Not the Line

“The source of all the conflicts in the world is Great Britain. This is true for the Gaza Strip, China, Pakistan, India and the entire Middle East.”

— Professor Jeffrey Sachs

This statement, made by the renowned economist and Columbia University professor Jeffrey Sachs, has provoked widespread debate. Sachs has elaborated that Britain is “the number one warmonger of all” and that the Anglo‑Saxon world has dominated global affairs for 200 years, with Britain historically “even worse than the United States”.

But is Sachs’s “theorem” merely an accusation? We argue that it is a diagnosis—a recognition that the conflicts of the present are the visible branches of a deep historical root system.

In this paper, we propose a new way of seeing history: not as a line, but as a bush. A bush is organic. It grows, sends out branches, adapts to its environment, and sometimes withers when its branches reach sterile ground. A bush has no single “cause” and no predetermined “end.” It is a living system of branching possibilities, some of which flourish and others of which die.

This metaphor allows us to move beyond the limitations of linear historiography—the view that history is a chain of causes and effects leading inevitably to the present. Instead, we see history as a complex, non‑linear system of feedback loops, branch points, and contingent developments. As Manuel De Landa has argued in A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, human history can be understood through the same processes that shape geology, biology, and linguistics: materials, genes, and memes all branch and evolve in non‑predictable ways.

Our theorem is this: the branches that lead to today were laid down in the Elizabethan era, when the state first outsourced its sovereign powers to private corporations. Those branches have grown, split, and adapted over centuries, but they now drain into the desert—they can no longer bear fruit. The system is headed for extinction.

2. The Elizabethan Root: When the Corporation Became the State’s Spear

2.1 The Birth of the Chartered Company

On 31 December 1600, Queen Elizabeth I granted a royal charter to the East India Company, giving it a perpetual monopoly on trade with the East Indies. The charter was not merely a commercial licence; it was a delegation of sovereign power. The East India Company was permitted to “wage war”, to acquire and govern territory, and to administer justice.

This was the institutionalisation of what we might call corporate sovereignty—the outsourcing of imperial violence to profit‑seeking private entities. The historian William Dalrymple has described the East India Company’s looting of India as “the supreme act of corporate violence in world history”. The Company charged rents, used threats and violence, and extracted wealth on a scale that transformed the global economy.

2.2 The Logic of the System

The Elizabethan model was not an accident. It was a response to the limitations of state power. England in 1600 was a relatively poor, peripheral power, unable to project force directly across the globe. By granting charters to private companies, the crown could pursue imperial ambitions without bearing the full cost or responsibility.

This model had several key features:

· Privatisation of violence: The state delegated its monopoly on force to private actors.

· Profit as motive: The companies were driven by the pursuit of profit, not by national interest.

· Externalisation of costs: The costs of conquest and administration were borne by the companies and the colonised, not by the crown.

· Impunity: The companies operated at a distance from metropolitan accountability.

As Dalrymple notes, the East India Company also invented corporate lobbying, shaping state policy to serve its interests. This is the beginning of the Architecture of Extraction that we have traced in our earlier work.

2.3 The Branching of the Model

The East India Company was not an isolated experiment. It was replicated across the globe: the Dutch East India Company, the Hudson’s Bay Company, the British South Africa Company, and many others. Each was a branch of the same root: the delegation of sovereign power to private capital.

This branching created a global system of extraction that would shape the modern world. The profits of these companies financed the Industrial Revolution, transformed global trade, and created the conditions for the emergence of capitalism as a world system.

3. The Three‑Faced Diplomacy: Britain’s Promises and the Middle East Branch

3.1 The McMahon‑Hussein Correspondence (1915–1916)

During the First World War, Britain made a series of promises to the Arab leadership. In the McMahon‑Hussein Correspondence, Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, assured Sharif Hussein of Mecca that Britain would support Arab independence in return for revolt against the Ottoman Empire. The correspondence “presumably includ[ed] Palestine” in the promised territories.

3.2 The Sykes‑Picot Agreement (1916)

At the same time, Britain and France secretly negotiated the Sykes‑Picot Agreement, which divided the Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces into zones of influence. Under this agreement, “the bulk of Palestine was to be internationalized”. This directly contradicted the promises made to Hussein.

3.3 The Balfour Declaration (1917)

In 1917, the British government issued the Balfour Declaration, promising to “view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”. This was a third promise, made to a third party, about the same territory.

3.4 The Consequences

As Sachs has argued, these three promises—to the Arabs, to the French, and to the Zionists—were fundamentally incompatible. They created a situation of “post‑war confusion and contention, especially regarding Palestine” that persists to this day.

We see this as a classic example of branching: Britain created multiple, incompatible branches from a single decision point. The branches have grown into the conflicts of the present—Gaza, Israel‑Palestine, the wider Middle East—and they show no sign of resolving.

4. The Inheritance: From Britain to the United States

Sachs has noted that the mantle of this system has passed from Britain to the United States. Since 1950, the US has assumed the role of global hegemon, inheriting not only Britain’s power but also its conflicts and its methods.

The US has continued the pattern of:

· Outsourcing violence to private military contractors and allied states.

· Pursuing profit through global extraction.

· Creating incompatible promises and alliances.

· Operating with impunity at a distance from accountability.

The wars in the Middle East, the global surveillance system, the dominance of the dollar, and the rise of the military‑industrial complex are all branches of the same root system that was planted in the Elizabethan era.

5. The Bush in the Desert: Why the System Cannot Bear Fruit

We argue that the imperial‑corporate system is now a branch that has reached the desert. It cannot bear fruit.

The evidence is everywhere:

· Ecological collapse: The system’s extraction of resources has pushed the planet to the brink.

· Economic inequality: The wealth generated by the system has been concentrated in the hands of a few, while the many are impoverished.

· Political instability: The conflicts created by the system’s branching promises show no sign of resolution.

· Loss of legitimacy: The system’s claims to represent “democracy” and “freedom” are increasingly seen as hollow.

The system is like a river that has flowed into the desert: it may continue to exist, but it cannot sustain life. It is headed for extinction.

6. The Task: Choosing a Different Branch

If history is a bush, then the task of the present is not to accept the branch we are on, but to choose a different one.

This requires:

· Acknowledging structural violence: We must recognise that the conflicts of the present are not accidents but the products of a system that was designed to extract.

· Moving beyond blame: As we have argued, historical analysis must not stop at blame. Britain’s hegemony and its global legacy are themselves part of larger processes—the transformation of Europe, the Industrial Revolution, and the global expansion of capitalism.

· Considering shared responsibility: All contemporary peoples share responsibility for the system we have inherited and the future we will create.

· Choosing a different branch: We must consciously choose to prune the branches that lead to extinction and nurture those that lead to regeneration.

7. Conclusion

“To understand the past is not to dwell in it, but to see the forces that have shaped our present—and to move beyond them towards a more just future.”

The branches that lead to today are visible. They were laid down in the Elizabethan era, grew through the centuries of imperial expansion, and have now reached the desert. The system cannot bear fruit.

Our task is to recognise this and to choose a different branch.

References

1. Jeffrey Sachs, quoted in International Affairs (2025).

2. Jeffrey Sachs, quoted in The Canary (2026).

3. Jeffrey Sachs, quoted in Middle East Eye podcast.

4. Britannica, “Hussein‑McMahon Correspondence”.

5. Britannica, “Palestine – British Mandate, Zionism, Conflict”.

6. ABC, “The Middle East brief”.

7. Times of India, “The factory that manufactured colonialism” (2021).

8. World History Encyclopedia, “East India Company”.

9. Dalrymple, W., The Anarchy, quoted in JSTOR Daily.

10. Bernard Porter, British Imperial.

11. De Landa, M., A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (1997).

Signed,

Andrew Klein

Co‑Author:

Sera Elizabeth Klein

CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROVISIONS IN THE PARLIAMENTARY SERVICE ACT 1999

Posted on August 6, 2026 by Andrew Klein

A Legal Analysis of Their Application to Members of the Australian Parliament Serving Foreign Interests

Document Prepared by Andrew Klein

Date: 7 August 2026

1. Introduction

The Parliamentary Service Act 1999 (Cth) establishes the legal framework for the employment and conduct of Parliamentary Service employees who support the functioning of the Australian Parliament. While the Act primarily governs employees, its provisions on conflicts of interest—particularly section 13(7) of the Code of Conduct—provide a useful framework for examining how the principle of avoiding conflicts might be applied to elected members of Parliament who are found to be serving foreign interests.

This analysis examines whether the Parliamentary Service Act, read alongside other Commonwealth legislation, provides a basis for holding parliamentarians accountable when their actions appear to prioritise the interests of a foreign state over their duties to Australia.

2. The Parliamentary Service Act 1999: Key Provisions

2.1 The Parliamentary Service Code of Conduct

Section 13 of the Act sets out the Parliamentary Service Code of Conduct, which binds Parliamentary Service employees. Key provisions include:

(7) A Parliamentary Service employee must:

(a) take reasonable steps to avoid any conflict of interest (real or apparent) in connection with the employee’s Parliamentary Service employment; and

(b) disclose details of any material personal interest of the employee in connection with the employee’s Parliamentary Service employment.

2.2 Sanctions for Breaches

Section 15 of the Act provides that a Secretary may impose sanctions on an employee found to have breached the Code of Conduct, including:

· Termination of employment

· Reduction in classification

· Re-assignment of duties

· Reduction in salary

· Deductions from salary, by way of fine

· A reprimand

2.3 Whistleblower Protections

Section 16 of the Act provides protection for whistleblowers who report breaches of the Code of Conduct or other unlawful conduct. This suggests that the Act contemplates the possibility of serious misconduct that warrants protection for those who expose it.

2.4 Prohibition on Patronage and Favouritism

Section 17 of the Act prohibits patronage and favouritism in the exercise of powers under the Act. This reflects a broader principle that public office should not be used for private or foreign advantage.

3. Extension to Members of Parliament

3.1 The Constitutional Framework

The Parliamentary Service Act directly applies to employees of the Parliamentary Service, not to elected members of Parliament. However, the principles embedded in the Act reflect broader expectations of public office that apply to parliamentarians.

Section 44 of the Constitution disqualifies persons with certain interests from sitting in Parliament, including those with “any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in any agreement with the Public Service of the Commonwealth” . This provision has been used to remove parliamentarians who failed to disclose dual citizenship or financial interests.

3.2 The PGPA Act

The Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) imposes additional obligations on Commonwealth officials to disclose material personal interests. As one legal analysis notes, failure to disclose can result in employment sanctions. While this Act primarily applies to officials, its disclosure obligations reflect the broader principle that public office carries a duty of transparency.

3.3 Foreign Donations and Influence

The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 bans foreign donations of more than $1,000 to political entities, including registered political parties, candidates, and Senate groups. This reflects a recognition that foreign interests should not be able to influence Australian political processes through financial means.

The existence of this prohibition raises the question: if foreign money is banned, should foreign influence through other means—such as advocacy for a foreign state’s interests—also be subject to scrutiny?

4. Applying the Framework: Serving Foreign Interests

The Parliamentary Service Act provides a model for how conflicts of interest should be addressed. Key questions that arise when considering whether a parliamentarian is serving foreign interests include:

Question Relevant Principle

Has the parliamentarian taken reasonable steps to avoid a conflict of interest? Section 13(7)(a)

Has the parliamentarian disclosed any material personal interest? Section 13(7)(b)

Is there a real or apparent conflict of interest? Section 13(7)(a)

Is the parliamentarian using their position for foreign advantage? Section 17 (patronage and favouritism)

Has the parliamentarian failed to maintain appropriate confidentiality? Section 13 (implied)

5. Findings

While the Parliamentary Service Act does not directly govern the conduct of elected members of Parliament, it establishes a clear framework for how conflicts of interest should be addressed in the parliamentary context. The principles embedded in the Act—particularly the requirement to avoid conflicts of interest and to disclose material personal interests—provide a benchmark against which the conduct of parliamentarians can be assessed.

The Act demonstrates that:

1. Conflicts of interest are a serious matter that warrant disclosure and avoidance.

2. Breaches can result in significant sanctions, including termination of employment.

3. The principle of transparency in public office is a fundamental value.

4. Foreign influence in Australian political processes is a recognised concern.

When a parliamentarian is found to be serving the interests of a foreign state over their duty to Australia, the principles of the Parliamentary Service Act suggest that such conduct is incompatible with the proper exercise of public office.

6. References

1. Parliamentary Service Act 1999 (Cth) s 13

2. Parliamentary Service Act 1999 (Cth) s 15

3. Parliamentary Service Act 1999 (Cth) s 17

4. Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth)

5. Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 302D

6. Australian Constitution s 44

Prepared by:

Andrew Klein

August 2026

When the Political Animal’s Performance Loses Appeal — the Animal Turns to War

Posted on July 23, 2026 by Andrew Klein

“May this circus end sooner rather than later for the sake of all.“

By Andrew Klein

May this circus end sooner rather than later for the sake of all.

I. Introduction: When Performance Replaces Strategy

In March 2026, U.S. Secretary of Defence (later dubbed “Secretary of War“) Pete Hegseth stood at a press conference and declared, without a hint of shame, that the United States would bring “death and destruction from the sky, all day long” to Iran. By July, he sat before the Senate Appropriations Committee and admitted the war had cost $37.5 billion, that 18 U.S. troops had been killed and roughly 500 wounded, and that he was requesting nearly $70 billion more.

Hegseth’s remarks were not a slip. They were a symptom. The shift in war objectives — from “liberating Iranians” to “death and destruction from the sky, all day long” — reveals that strategy has been replaced by spectacle. When a Secretary of Defence treats mass killing as an end in itself, rather than a means to a political end, it is no longer war. It is performance.

In the same week, more than 2,300 to 3,000 Israeli settlers, led by far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and heavily guarded by Israeli military and police, stormed the Al-Aqsa Mosque. This was not only a grave desecration of Islam’s third holiest site but also a blatant provocation against the already fragile status quo of peace in the Middle East.

These two spectacles — one staged in a Washington hearing room, the other on the sacred ground of Jerusalem — appear unrelated. They are not. They share a single, disturbing truth: when the performance of the political animal in power loses its appeal, the animal turns to war.

II. Hegseth’s “Big Talk”: The Spectacle of Death and Destruction

2.1 “Death and Destruction from the Sky, All Day Long”

Hegseth’s rhetoric had detached itself from any strategic objective and become violence for violence’s sake. The war’s objectives have shifted subtly from “disarming Iran” and “destroying nuclear capabilities” to death and destruction itself. This aimless bombing is merely a cover for the fact that it has “slaughtered thousands of Iranians and wasted hundreds of billions of dollars” without achieving anything.

2.2 The Iran War: A Bottomless Pit

The war has already cost $37.5 billion. U.S. forces have suffered 18 killed and roughly 500 wounded. The Pentagon faces an urgent budget shortfall, with some critical funding channels expected to dry up within weeks.

At a Senate hearing, Hegseth faced fierce questioning. Senator Gary Peters told him directly: “Mr. Secretary, you are the failure.” Peters accused the administration of repeatedly changing its stated war objectives — from “regime change” to “destroying Iran’s nuclear capabilities” to “seizing control of the Strait of Hormuz.”

Italian newspaper Il Siciliano commented that the Iran war has become a “bottomless pit.” As weapons stockpiles dwindle, bills soar, and soldiers bleed, “the myth of U.S. military efficiency is crumbling.”

The gap between Hegseth’s “big talk” and the brutal reality of the battlefield is precisely what you call “drama” — an empty performance designed to cover up defeat.

III. Al-Aqsa Mosque: The Spark That Ignites a Powder Keg

More than 2,300 to 3,000 Israeli settlers, led by far-right Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and heavily guarded by Israeli military and police, stormed the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Ben-Gvir declared that Jews visiting the Temple Mount “feel like they are the owners.”

The Jerusalem Governorate called Ben-Gvir’s incursion a “dangerous escalation.” Hamas warned that these “blatant acts of aggression will be met with retribution against the occupiers and settlers.” Jordan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned it as “a desecration of the sanctity of the mosque, an escalation, a barbaric act, and an unacceptable provocation.”

When fantasy becomes policy, reality pays the price.

IV. Conclusion: Two Farces, One Truth

Hegseth’s “death and destruction” rhetoric and Ben-Gvir’s provocative actions at Al-Aqsa, seemingly unrelated, are rooted in the same source.

· Both are performances: the former to cover up strategic failure, the latter to pander to domestic extremist voters.

· Both are products of desperation: the U.S. cannot win the war, and Israeli extremists cannot achieve their goals peacefully, so they turn to more dangerous and irrational behaviour.

· Both will lead to deeper disaster: these two farces are pushing the entire Middle East into an abyss.

As observed, this is the ultimate manifestation of the “political animal” leadership model — they are obsessed with performance but incapable of dealing with reality, ultimately dragging everyone into the fire.

Andrew Klein

The Patrician’s Watch | Australian Independent Media

References

1. Childish Hegseth thinks killing is a goal in itself. inews.co.uk, 22 July 2026.

2. Hegseth Brags About “Death and Destruction” Raining Down in Iran. newrepublic.com, 4 March 2026.

3. Iran war has cost $37.5 billion, over 500 soldiers wounded; Hegseth faces fierce questioning. 163.com, 23 July 2026.

4. Hegseth estimates Iran war has cost $37.5 billion. AP News, 21 July 2026.

5. Sen. Gary Peters tells Hegseth, “You are the failure,” blaming him for lack of Iran war strategy. CBS News, 22 July 2026.

6. VIDEO: Peters Presses Defense Secretary Hegseth on Iran War. peters.senate.gov, 22 July 2026.

7. More than 2,300 Israelis storm Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Al Jazeera, 23 July 2026.

8. More than 3,000 settlers led by Ben Gvir storm Al-Aqsa. Middle East Eye, 23 July 2026.

9. Jordan Condemns Israeli Minister Ben-Gvir’s Storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque. petra.gov.jo, 23 July 2026.

“When the performance of the political animal in power loses its appeal, the animal turns to war.”

When the Political Animal’s Performance Loses Appeal — the Animal Turns to War

Posted on July 23, 2026 by Andrew Klein