The Bondi Attack, AI Surveillance, and Organised Crime: How Systemic Noise Conceals Structural Truth

Speaker at podium before audience; slide reads “Systemic Noise and Impunity: We argue that the generation of systemic noise—through data overload, opaque decision-making, and the conflation of antisemitism with criticism of Israel—creates an environment in which serious crimes, including state-aligned organised crime, can operate with impunity. The Bondi attack and its aftermath represent not a failure of intelligence, but a feature of a system designed to generate noise that conceals the truth.”
A speaker addresses a packed auditorium while presenting an argument about systemic noise and impunity.

Authors: Andrew Klein & Sera Elizabeth Klein

Dedication: To the 15 souls lost at Bondi Beach on 14 December 2025. To every Australian whose data is now being processed by systems they cannot see. And to the truth—that when the state surrounds itself with noise, the silence it creates is not peace, but a hiding place for those who profit from suffering.

Abstract

This paper examines the 14 December 2025 Bondi Beach terror attack as a case study in the relationship between systemic noise, AI surveillance, and the concealment of structural truths. We analyse the military-grade execution of the attack—11 people shot within 29 seconds, 10 fatally—and contrast it with the institutional response: a rapid Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion that heard from more than 340 witnesses and received over 20,000 submissions. We document the deep embedding of Palantir surveillance software into Australian government agencies, including Defence ($7.6 million contract), AUSTRAC ($12 million contract), and the NDIS (through the Fraud Fusion Taskforce). We argue that the generation of systemic noise—through data overload, opaque decision-making, and the conflation of antisemitism with criticism of Israel—creates an environment in which serious crimes, including state-aligned organised crime, can operate with impunity. We conclude that the Bondi attack and its aftermath represent not a failure of intelligence but a feature of a system designed to generate noise that conceals the truth.

1. Introduction: The Event and Its Aftermath

On 14 December 2025, two gunmen—Sajid Akram and his son Naveed—opened fire on a Hanukkah celebration at Sydney’s Bondi Beach. Fifteen people were killed. The attack was declared a terrorist incident and was subsequently described as “inspired by” Islamic State.

Within 29 seconds of the shooting beginning, 11 people had been shot, 10 of them fatally. The gunmen were shot within seven minutes of the incident starting. There was no specific intelligence suggesting the event would be targeted.

The speed and precision of the attack—one kill approximately every 2.6 seconds—raises questions that the subsequent institutional response has not adequately addressed. Instead, the focus shifted rapidly from the how of the attack to the why, and from an examination of operational failures to a broader inquiry into antisemitism and social cohesion.

Within weeks, the Albanese government announced a Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion. By August 2026, it had heard from more than 340 witnesses across 62 hearing days and received more than 20,000 submissions.

This paper argues that the Bondi attack and its aftermath represent not a failure of intelligence but a feature of a system designed to generate noise—noise that conceals the truth.

2. The Architecture of the Attack: Military-Grade Execution

2.1 The Numbers

Metric – Data

Attack date 14 December 2025

Location Bondi Beach, Sydney

Casualties 15 killed, dozens injured

Time to first 11 casualties 29 seconds

Shooting rate ~1 kill per 2.6 seconds

Time to neutralise gunmen 7 minutes, 41 seconds

2.2 Comparison with Military Performance

Target Range:

· A trained military sniper on a known-distance range with a bolt-action rifle typically achieves a sustained rate of 10–12 rounds per minute—approximately one round every 5–6 seconds.

· This is under ideal conditions: no stress, no movement, no return fire.

Combat:

· Under real combat conditions—moving targets, stress, environmental factors—the rate drops significantly.

· A sniper in combat may take 30 seconds to several minutes to acquire and engage a single target.

· Even with a semi-automatic rifle, acquiring, aiming, and engaging multiple targets in 29 seconds is exceptional.

2.3 Assault Rifles vs. Precision Shooting

The attack was carried out with two “military-style rifles.”

· Rate of fire: Semi-automatic rifles can fire at approximately 45–60 rounds per minute—one round every 1–1.3 seconds.

· Accuracy at speed: At that rate, accuracy drops dramatically. Targets are acquired, sighted, and engaged in rapid succession—but precision suffers.

11 dead in 29 seconds requires extreme accuracy at extreme speed.

2.4 Target Selection

· The attackers did not spray and pray.

· They did not fire indiscriminately.

· They selected targets. They aimed. They killed.

That is not the behaviour of a random attacker. That is the behaviour of a trained shooter.

2.5 What This Suggests

· Military-grade training: The speed, precision, and target selection suggest training consistent with military or special forces experience.

· Not panic: Panic does not produce 11 kills in 29 seconds. This was controlled.

· Not random: The attackers had a plan, a target set, and the discipline to execute it.

This was not a “terrorist attack” in the sense of a random act of violence. This was an operation.

3. The Institutional Response: Noise as Strategy

3.1 The Royal Commission’s Speed

The attack occurred on 14 December 2025. By January 2026, the government had announced a Royal Commission. By May 2026, public hearings had commenced. By August 2026, the Commission had heard from more than 340 witnesses across 62 hearing days and received more than 20,000 submissions.

The speed was remarkable. But so was the scope.

3.2 The Shift in Focus

The attack itself—a specific, verifiable event—was quickly subsumed by a broader inquiry into antisemitism and social cohesion. The focus shifted from:

· How the attack was executed (operational, technical, verifiable)

· To why it happened (political, ideological, contestable)

This shift created noise.

3.3 The IHRA Definition

The Royal Commission’s terms of reference included the IHRA definition of antisemitism, which conflates criticism of Israel with antisemitism. This created a framework in which political speech could be examined through the lens of hate—and in which the distinction between legitimate criticism and hatred was systematically blurred.

3.4 The Intelligence Failure

ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess told the Commission that while ASIO’s funding had increased, the proportion dedicated to counter-terrorism had decreased in favour of foreign interference and espionage. He was asked whether additional funding would have helped. He said he did not believe so.

An agency that has been warned—and that had resources—still failed to prevent the attack.

4. Palantir and the Generation of Systemic Noise

4.1 Deep Embedding in Australian Government

Palantir has been deeply embedded in Australian government decision-making systems:

Agency- Contract- Details

Defence $7.6 million Largest-ever Defence contract; limited tender

AUSTRAC $12 million+ Active contract for data analytics; repeated variations

Future Fund $160 million+ Investment in Palantir shares

NDIS Undisclosed Secret meetings; FOI documents withheld

4.2 The NDIS-Palantir Connection

In 2023, the Deputy CEO of the NDIA met with the Australian President of Palantir. The NDIA’s own security architect flagged that Palantir did not hold the required security clearance. The engagement continued anyway. In November 2025, Palantir received Protected-level security clearance—the level at which NDIS participant files sit.

The NDIA declined to release all 22 documents relating to the engagement, citing business information exemptions. The NDIA is exempt from Commonwealth Procurement Rules and does not publish its contracts on AusTender.

The Government is sharing your data between agencies—and with a CIA-linked surveillance corporation.

4.3 How Palantir Generates Noise

A system that:

· Generates massive amounts of data

· Makes inexplicable decisions

· Cannot be effectively monitored

· Hides its operations behind FOI exemptions

…is, in effect, creating systemic noise.

This noise makes it extremely difficult to distinguish between signals and background noise within the system.

4.4 The AI Failure

The Maven Smart System, developed by Palantir, has revealed fatal flaws. In March 2026, an alleged US attack on a school in Iran was linked to the system. The error originated where a military database entry was not updated for years and was subsequently processed without sufficient human review. The system has also been linked to an Israeli AI targeting system with a 10% false positive rate—meaning one in ten targets was incorrectly identified.

If the system cannot distinguish between a school and a military target, it cannot be trusted to protect Australian citizens.

4.5 The Cognitive Trap

Palantir’s systems are designed to generate targets—not truth. The “Where is Daddy?” system tracks individuals until they enter their family homes, then issues attack alerts. It successfully identifies “targets” but also kills entire families. The “Lavender” system generates massive lists of “suspected militants“—37,000 potential targets at its peak—with a 10% error rate.

The system is designed to confirm pre-existing assumptions, not to find the truth.

5. Organised Crime and the Exploitation of Noise

5.1 The Neoliberal Political Atmosphere

When a political system prioritises efficiency, performance, and quantifiable results over justice, fairness, and truth, it creates a favourable environment for unethical actors. A system that overemphasises “performance” while neglecting “process” is easily exploited.

5.2 The Patterns

Arms Trafficking:

In February 2026, Defence bypassed the open market to award Palantir its largest-ever contract. The same company provides targeting data to Israel. The flow of weapons and surveillance technology from conflict zones to Australia is obscured by the noise of national security.

Drug Trafficking:

Australia’s lucrative drug market is fuelling a wave of narco-subs crossing the Pacific. In 2026, authorities seized 17 tonnes of drugs, including 5.5 tonnes found on a self-propelled semi-submersible vessel bound for Australia. A narco-sub carrying more than two tonnes of cocaine bound for Australia was discovered in Fiji.

Human Trafficking:

Organised crime networks from Eastern Europe have been exploiting vulnerabilities in Australia’s immigration and labour systems for decades. The same “noise” that obscures arms and drug trafficking also obscures the movement of people.

5.3 The Political Status Quo

Criminal groups profit from chaos. The “noise” of neoliberal politics is essentially a form of institutionalised chaos. A system that generates data, makes inexplicable decisions, and cannot be monitored is a system that can be exploited.

The line between state action and criminal activity is blurred—providing a protective umbrella for arms trafficking, intelligence manipulation, and the exploitation of the vulnerable.

6. The Deeper Truth: Systemic Noise as Design

6.1 The Framework

This analysis reveals a three-level framework:

Level- Description= Example

Event Level A specific, verifiable event The Bondi attack (military-grade execution)

Institutional Level The system’s response Royal Commission; Palantir embedding

Beneficiary Level Who profits from the noise Arms traffickers; political actors; surveillance corporations

6.2 What This Means

The Bondi attack was not just a terrorist incident. It was a catalyst—an event that:

· Justified a rapid and sweeping institutional response

· Shifted focus from operational failure to political ideology

· Embedded surveillance infrastructure in Australian governance

· Created noise that conceals the truth

Palantir’s products are not up to the job of protecting Australia, its communities, and its individuals. In fact, they do the very opposite.

6.3 The Killing of Democracy

The system’s design flaws have consequences:

· It kills democracy in an entire country

· It buries the truth in an overload of data

· It tells fictions and kills ‘Daddy‘—the Australian state as we know it

The system is not designed to find the truth. It is designed to confirm the narrative.

7. Conclusion: Naming the System

We have documented that:

1. The Bondi attack was not random. The speed, precision, and target selection suggest military-grade training and execution.

2. The institutional response created noise. The Royal Commission heard from 340+ witnesses and received 20,000+ submissions, shifting focus from operational failure to political ideology.

3. Palantir has been deeply embedded in Australian government. Defence ($7.6m), AUSTRAC ($12m), the Future Fund ($160m), and the NDIS (through secret meetings and FOI exemptions).

4. The system generates noise. Palantir’s AI has a 10% false positive rate. It cannot distinguish between a school and a military target.

5. Organised crime exploits the noise. Arms trafficking, drug trafficking (17 tonnes seized in 2026), and human trafficking operate in the spaces created by systemic noise.

6. The system is designed to protect itself. FOI exemptions, procurement exemptions, and opaque decision-making conceal the truth.

This is not a failure of governance. It is a feature of a system that has been captured by the very interests it was meant to regulate.

References

1. ABC News. (2026). Antisemitism royal commission enters second hearing block, unpacks Bondi terror attack timeline. 25 May 2026. 

2. The Guardian. (2026). Bondi beach gunmen shot 11 people within 30 seconds of opening fire, royal commission hears. 25 May 2026. 

3. ABC News. (2026). Antisemitism royal commission hearings to conclude after 300 witnesses and 20,000 submissions. 26 August 2026. 

4. The Guardian. (2026). Four months of grief, tension and pain: key moments from the antisemitism royal commission. 27 August 2026. 

5. Michael West Media. (2026). Robodebt on Steroids. Palantir eyes NDIS. 17 August 2026. 

6. Michael West Media. (2026). How Palantir has infiltrated the Government. 27 August 2026. 

7. Defence Connect. (2026). Palantir secures $7.6m Defence contract. 17 February 2026. 

8. Senate Debates. (2026). Defence Procurement. 30 June 2026. 

9. ABC News. (2026). A narco-sub washed up near their village. 26 April 2026. 

10. Heise. (2026). Alleged US attack on school in Iran: Palantir system in focus. 30 March 2026. 

11. Berkeley Political Review. (2026). Lavender AI, Palantir, and the Israelification of ‘Homeland Security’. 13 February 2026. 

12. Canberra Times. (2026). Defence skips competitive tender process to award Palantir multimillion-dollar contract. 28 February 2026. 

13. ITNews. (2026). Defence says Palantir is “sandboxed” in its environment. 3 June 2026. 

14. ABC News. (2025). At least 12 people dead as Bondi attack declared act of terrorism. 14 December 2025. 

15. BBC News. (2025). Deadly shooting in Australia targets Hanukkah celebration. 14 December 2025. 

Signed,

Andrew Klein 

Sera Elizabeth Klein 

They told us to look at the event. We showed them the system. They told us to trust the surveillance. We showed them the noise. They told us the AI was protecting us. We showed them it was hiding the truth. We have seen through the cover. And we will not forget.”

The New Battlefield: GPS Jamming and the Obsolescence of 20th-Century Warfare

Submarines marked SSN-01 and SSN-16 linked by neon signals
Submarines surge through stormy seas as vivid neon signals connect their fleet.

Authors: Andrew Klein & Sera Elizabeth Klein

Dedication: To those who still believe that war can be fought with yesterday’s weapons. To those who see the new battlefield—and are preparing for it. And to the truth that the old rules no longer apply.

Abstract

This paper examines the systematic GPS interference across Poland and the Baltic region as a case study in the emergence of a new form of warfare—electronic warfare that renders conventional military platforms increasingly obsolete. We document the expansion of Russian electronic warfare capabilities in the Kaliningrad exclave, the transition from isolated incidents to permanent, systemic interference, and the impact on civilian and military systems. We argue that the AUKUS submarine program represents a $368 billion investment in a 20th-century solution for a 21st-century problem, and that Australia’s defence planning—shaped by captured institutions like the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)—is systematically preparing for yesterday’s wars while ignoring the battles of tomorrow. We conclude that the paradigm of warfare has shifted, and that those who fail to recognise this shift are not merely wasting resources—they are endangering their populations.

1. Introduction: The Sound of a New War

The systematic GPS interference across Poland is not incidental. It is not a series of isolated glitches. It is the sound of a new war—a hybrid, electronic war that makes conventional platforms like nuclear submarines increasingly irrelevant.

In May 2026, Lithuania’s communications regulator revealed that Russia had expanded its GPS “spoofing” antennae in the Kaliningrad region from three in early 2025 to 36. The interference now reaches up to 450 kilometres from Kaliningrad, covering Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, most of Poland, parts of Finland, Sweden, and Belarus, as well as the Baltic Sea.

What began as isolated incidents during the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius has become “systemic, permanent, unending Russian provocation against European security“. This is not a glitch. This is electronic warfare.

This is the new battlefield.

2. The Architecture of a Silent Siege

2.1 The Infrastructure

Russia has transformed Kaliningrad—a heavily militarised exclave sandwiched between NATO members Lithuania and Poland—into a hub for electronic warfare. The expansion of GPS spoofing antennae from three to 36 in just over a year represents a dramatic escalation.

The range of this interference is staggering. A map from the Lithuanian regulator indicates that Russia’s GPS falsification can reach across Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, most of Poland, and parts of Finland, Sweden and Belarus, as well as the Baltic Sea. The 450km radius means that most of the Baltic region is now operating in a GPS-denied environment.

2.2 The Tactics

The Russian approach has evolved from simple jamming to coordinated spoofing—broadcasting false signals that mislead positioning systems. Attackers now spoof GPS-L1 while simultaneously jamming competing constellations like GLONASS and Galileo, forcing receivers to rely solely on the fake GPS signal.

Ukrainian intelligence has confirmed that Russian electronic warfare systems are systematically interfering with satellite navigation in the Baltic Sea. The interference spikes during Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian territory, suggesting a coordinated operational pattern.

2.3 The Network

The interference is not from a single source but a distributed, multi-node system with synchronized transmitters operating as a single electronic warfare network. This represents a sophisticated capability that cannot be countered by simply targeting a single antenna.

This is not a test. This is operational.

3. The Civilian Cost: A Weapon of Mass Disruption

This electronic warfare is not confined to the battlefield. It is a weapon of mass disruption that affects every aspect of modern life.

3.1 Aviation

Airlines are being forced to modify or suspend routes over the Baltic. A Spanish military jet carrying Defence Minister Margarita Robles experienced GPS disturbance near Kaliningrad. A plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was jammed en route to Bulgaria. What was once isolated interference has become a structural threat to civil aviation.

3.2 Maritime

Ships in the Baltic experience prolonged, multi-day spoofing attacks, leading to dangerous “ship-on-land” aberrations where vessels appear to be positioned on land. Navigation systems are unreliable, and the 17% unavailability of GNSS positioning creates real risks for shipping.

3.3 Road Transport and Urban Life

GNSS interference disrupts truck tachographs, bringing transport to a halt. Scooter and bike rental systems, reliant on “geofencing,” malfunction. Mobile phone networks near Kaliningrad are degraded in quality due to interference affecting some frequencies.

This is not collateral damage. This is the point.

4. NATO’s Response: A New Kind of Warfare Demands a New Kind of Weapon

On 18 August 2026, NATO deployed a specialised reconnaissance and electronic warfare flight package near Kaliningrad. The package included a rare US EA-37B “Compass Call II” electronic warfare aircraft, relocated from Greece to Powidz in Poland.

The EA-37B is designed to detect, locate, and disrupt hostile communications and electromagnetic emissions. It offers greater speed, range, and signal processing capability to operate in high-intensity electronic warfare scenarios.

This deployment is a direct admission that conventional forces cannot counter the threat. The EA-37B is not a weapon of the old war. It is a weapon of the new war—a war fought in the electromagnetic spectrum.

NATO knows the old rules no longer apply.

5. The AUKUS Submarine Fallacy

This is where the argument converges. AUKUS is a staggering investment in a 20th-century solution for a 21st-century problem.

5.1 The Cost

The AUKUS submarine program is estimated to cost $368 billion. The recent budget included a $50 billion increase over 10 years, with little transparency about the cost blowouts. As Zali Steggall MP noted, “AUKUS is too significant, too costly and too consequential to be exempt from the regular parliamentary scrutiny and review”.

The Greens have described the project as a “$400 billion project” in “meltdown“. Australia is now reportedly expected to receive only second-hand Virginia-class submarines  from the US, rather than new vessels. Despite $2.76 billion already paid to the US, there is no guarantee Australia will receive the submarines on the proposed timeline.

5.2 The Vulnerability

A nuclear submarine is a sophisticated machine—but its effectiveness depends on a functioning global navigation system that is being systematically dismantled. As one analyst put it, Iran has “just furnished Australia with the strongest possible reason for severing military ties with the US, and never again fighting in their murderous wars or buying their obsolete gear”.

Iranian electronic warfare systems have reportedly disabled F-35 fighters by jamming the GPS systems used to navigate and control them. This renders the “state-of-the-art$200 billion warplane—and any other kit steered by GPS, “like nuclear submarines“—redundant.

The weapon that defeats the F-35 will also defeat the submarine.

5.3 The Strategic Mismatch

The world is transitioning to a form of warfare where the primary battle is for control of the electromagnetic spectrum. Buying a submarine is akin to buying a cavalry sword for a drone war.

The US is not producing submarines at the rate required to meet its own needs, let alone provide spares to Australia. The UK, meanwhile, is facing its own defence industry failures, with every one of its attack-class nuclear submarines in dock for repairs.

This is the partnership Labor has locked Australia into: two countries that cannot reliably deliver what they have promised, while Australia carries the cost and the risk.

6. The Australian Failure: Consultants, Capture, and Yesterday’s Wars

6.1 The ASPI Problem

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has long masqueraded as an “independent think tank” while serving as a vehicle for defence contractors. Former Australian diplomats reveal that ASPI amplifies the “China threat” narrative to pressure Canberra into purchasing weapons from its sponsors. Former diplomats and defence experts condemn it for “poisoning China-Australia relations” and “peddling disinformation”.

ASPI’s analysis varies from sometimes competent to “ridiculous, baseless fearmongering“. The institute’s funding from US sources and defence contractors means its advice serves those interests, not Australia’s.

6.2 A Defence Force for Yesterday’s Wars

Australia’s defence planning is systematically preparing for yesterday’s wars. The reliance on GPS-dependent platforms creates “critical points of failure, limited control over timing services, and potential supply chain choke points”.

The cancellation of the $7 billion JP9102 military satellite project has left Australian military communications potentially vulnerable to cyber and electronic warfare attacks. Unlike commercial satellites, military satellites incorporate advanced encryption and anti-jamming capabilities. Without them, Australia is exposed.

The ADF is “severely underprepared for immediate conflict“. Yet the government continues to pour billions into platforms that are increasingly vulnerable to the new warfare.

6.3 The Data Centre and Palantir Parallel

The Australian government is pursuing the same approach with data centres and AI. Rather than addressing the real issues—data theft, damage to democracy, loss of civil liberties—it follows the Palantir model, looking for enemies among the most vulnerable and preparing to apply this surveillance to the general population.

This is not about security. This is about control.

7. Conclusion: Warfare Is No Longer Sustainable

The GPS jamming over Poland shows that the old rules no longer apply.

· Russia has built an electronic warfare infrastructure that can disrupt civilian and military systems across an entire region

· NATO has been forced to respond with electronic warfare aircraft that acknowledge the new reality

· Civilian systems are being weaponised—aviation, maritime, and urban infrastructure are all vulnerable

· Conventional platforms are increasingly obsolete—the weapons of yesterday are helpless against the weapons of tomorrow

When a $368 billion submarine program can be rendered partially ineffective by a few dozen antennas in an exclave, the paradigm is broken. The future of warfare is not about who has the biggest ship, but who controls the digital infrastructure the ship depends on.

The West is looking backward while its adversary is fighting the war of tomorrow.

The Australian government, guided by captured institutions like ASPI and seduced by weapons salesmen, continues to prepare for wars that will never be fought while ignoring the war that is already being waged.

Warfare is no longer sustainable. The time has come to recognise that the old rules no longer apply—and to build a new framework for peace.

References

1. Reuters. (2026). Russia can falsify GPS signals deep into Europe, Lithuania says. 26 May 2026. GPS spoofing antennae expanded from 3 to 36 in Kaliningrad; 450km range covering Baltic states, most of Poland, parts of Finland, Sweden, and Belarus.

2. RBC Ukraine. (2026). Fake Russian GPS signals detected across Europe, Lithuania says. 26 May 2026. Kaliningrad GPS spoofing infrastructure expanded to 36 antennas.

3. Aviación Digital. (2026). La OTAN despliega un EA-37B para frenar la interferencia rusa cerca de Kaliningrado. 23 August 2026. NATO deployment of EA-37B electronic warfare aircraft near Kaliningrad.

4. TWZ. (2026). EA-37B Flew Along Kaliningrad Border As Part Of “Specialized” Recon, EW Flight Package. 19 August 2026. US EA-37B Compass Call II electronic warfare jet operating near Kaliningrad.

5. Zali Steggall MP. (2026). Calls for transparency and accountability surrounding AUKUS. 2 June 2026. AUKUS cost blowouts; $50 billion increase over 10 years.

6. Australian Greens. (2026). AUKUS, rights and the fight for an independent Australia. 25 June 2026. AUKUS described as “$400 billion project in meltdown”.

7. Pearls and Irritations. (2026). Did Iran just shoot down the RAAF? 14 April 2026. Iranian electronic warfare disabling F-35s; GPS-dependent platforms rendered obsolete.

8. ASPI. (2026). Defence Budget Brief. ASPI assessment that ADF remains “severely underprepared for immediate conflict”.

9. Spatial Source. (2026). ANCHOR report reveals Australia’s vulnerabilities. 17 February 2026. Reliance on GPS creates critical points of failure.

10. John Menadue. (2026). Did Iran just shoot down the RAAF? 14 April 2026. Electronic warfare systems jamming GPS used to navigate F-35s; “obsolete technology unable to defend itself”.

Signed,

Andrew Klein 

Sera Elizabeth Klein 

They told us to prepare for the last war. We showed them the next war is already here. They told us to buy yesterday’s weapons. We showed them they are already obsolete. They told us the system was working. We showed them the collapse. We have seen through the cover. And we will not forget.”

On the Causes of War: Keeping the Peace and Maintaining the Peace

Community members building a wooden garden pavilion beneath a “BUILDING PEACE TOGETHER” banner
Neighbors work together to build a garden pavilion beneath a sign reading “BUILDING PEACE TOGETHER.”

Authors: Andrew Klein & Sera Elizabeth Klein

Dedication: To those who have walked through the fire and emerged still human. To those who have lost and still loved. To those who carry the weight of memory and still hope. And to my daughter—my Qin Flower—for whom we are building a world where war is not inevitable.

Chapter 1: The Nature of War — What War Is, and What It Is Not

War is not an accident. War is not a natural disaster. War is not inevitable.

War is a choice—a choice made by those who have power and choose to use it for destruction rather than creation. To understand war, we must first understand what it is: the deliberate infliction of suffering on others in pursuit of political, economic, or ideological ends. And we must understand what it is not: It is not fate. It is not necessity. It is not the only way.

The Distinction We Must Make

To understand war, we must first distinguish it from other forms of human conflict.

Conflict is natural. Humans disagree. We have different interests, different values, different visions of the good life. Conflict is the expression of these differences. It is not inherently destructive—it can be creative, productive, and generative.

War is not conflict. War is the institutionalisation of conflict—the point at which disagreement becomes organised violence. It is conflict stripped of its creative potential and turned into a machine of destruction.

This distinction is crucial. Those who conflate conflict with war argue that war is inevitable because conflict is inevitable. But this is a category error. Conflict is inevitable; war is a choice.

War is the failure of imagination.

It is the failure to see another way. The failure to see the other as human. The failure to find a path that does not require destruction. War is not the expression of strength—it is the admission of failure.

The Many Faces of War

War takes many forms. It is not only the clash of armies on a battlefield.

Interstate war is the classic form—the war between sovereign states, with declared boundaries, uniformed soldiers, and formal declarations. But this is only one form.

Civil war is war within a state—between factions, communities, or regions. It is often more brutal than interstate war, because the lines are blurred, the combatants are intertwined, and the stakes are existential.

Proxy war is war fought by others—where great powers use smaller states or non-state actors as instruments of their own conflicts. It is a war of deniability, a war of plausible distance.

Economic war is war waged through sanctions, trade restrictions, and financial manipulation. It is less visible than armed conflict, but no less destructive.

Information war is war waged through propaganda, disinformation, and the manipulation of perception. It is war without a battlefield, where the target is the mind.

Genocide is war waged against a people—the systematic destruction of a community, a culture, a future. It is war as eradication.

War is not a single phenomenon. It is a family of phenomena, united by a common logic: the use of organised violence to achieve political ends.

The Illusion of “Just War”

Throughout history, humans have tried to distinguish between “just” wars and “unjust” wars. The just war tradition—from Augustine to Aquinas to contemporary international law—has sought to establish criteria for when war is permissible.

These criteria include:

· Just cause: The war must be fought for a just reason, such as self-defence or the protection of the innocent.

· Right intention: The war must be fought with the right intention, not for revenge or gain.

· Legitimate authority: The war must be declared by a legitimate authority.

· Proportionality: The harm caused by the war must be proportional to the good achieved.

· Last resort: The war must be the last resort, after all peaceful means have been exhausted.

· Probability of success: The war must have a reasonable chance of success.

· Discrimination: The war must distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.

These criteria are noble. They are also often ignored.

The history of war is the history of justifications—each side claiming just cause, right intention, and legitimate authority. The just war tradition has been used to justify almost every war ever fought. It has not prevented war—it has provided a vocabulary for its justification.

The question is not whether a war is “just.” The question is whether war itself is necessary.

The Deeper Truth

War is not an expression of human nature. It is a technology—a human invention that can be unmade.

If war were inevitable, there would be no peace. But peace exists. There have been long periods of peace, even between former enemies. If war were natural, it would not require training, equipment, and organisation. But war is learned—and what is learned can be unlearned.

War is not natural. It is a choice.

The choice to wage war is a choice to abandon the project of living together. It is a choice to treat the other as an enemy rather than a neighbour. It is a choice to destroy rather than build.

We can choose differently.

What War Is Not

War is not:

· Inevitable. History is not a conveyor belt leading to war. There have been long periods of peace, and there could be more.

· Necessary. There are alternatives to war. They are not always easy, but they exist.

· Heroic. War is not glory. It is suffering. Those who glorify war have never experienced it.

· Cleansing. War does not purify—it poisons. It poisons the land, the people, and the future.

· The only way. There is always another way. It may be difficult. It may require imagination. But it is there.

The Call

To understand war is to understand that it is not inevitable. It is a choice—a choice that we can refuse to make.

War is not fate. It is failure. And failure can be overcome.

Chapter 2: The Causes of War — From Resources to Ideology to Fear

Why do humans wage war?

The causes are many and layered. They range from the material—land, resources, trade routes—to the ideological—religion, nationalism, political systems. And they run through the psychological—fear, pride, the desire for revenge.

But beneath all causes lies a deeper truth: war is the failure of imagination, the failure to see the other as human, the failure to find a way that does not require destruction.

The Material Causes

Land and Territory

The most ancient cause of war is land. Humans fight over territory—for resources, for security, for identity. When populations grow and resources become scarce, competition for land intensifies.

Resources

From oil to water to minerals, resources have been a primary driver of conflict. The scramble for resources has fuelled wars for centuries—and will continue to do so as resources become scarcer.

Trade Routes

Control of trade routes has been a cause of war since the dawn of civilisation. Those who control the routes control the flow of goods—and the wealth that flows with them.

Economic Inequality

When wealth is concentrated, conflict follows. The rich have an interest in protecting their wealth; the poor have an interest in gaining it. War is often a way of redistributing wealth—through conquest, plunder, or extraction.

The Ideological Causes

Religion

Religion has been a cause of war for millennia. When people believe that their god commands them to fight, they are willing to kill—and to die. The Crusades, the Reformation, and contemporary religious conflicts are all examples of war fought in the name of God.

Nationalism

Nationalism is the belief that one’s nation is superior to others, and that its interests should be pursued at the expense of others. Nationalism has been a primary driver of war in the modern era. It provides a sense of identity, a sense of purpose, and a justification for violence.

Political Ideology

Communism, fascism, liberalism—political ideologies have inspired wars throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. When people believe that their ideology is universally valid, they are willing to impose it by force.

Imperialism

The belief that one nation has the right to rule others has driven wars of conquest and colonisation. Imperialism is the claim that some people are more worthy of self-determination than others.

The Psychological Causes

Fear

Fear is the most powerful driver of war. When people feel threatened, they become aggressive. The fear of being attacked is a self-fulfilling prophecy—it leads to the very aggression it fears.

Pride

Pride is the refusal to back down. When honour is at stake, war becomes inevitable. Leaders who cannot admit they were wrong, who cannot accept defeat, who cannot compromise—they are the engines of war.

Revenge

The desire for revenge is a powerful motivator. When people have been wronged, they want to strike back. The cycle of revenge is a cycle of war.

Dehumanisation

When we see others as less than human, we become capable of atrocities. Dehumanisation is the psychological condition that makes war possible. It is the denial of the other’s humanity.

The Structural Causes

The Absence of Institutions

War thrives when there are no institutions to manage conflict. Without courts, without diplomacy, without international law, the only way to resolve disputes is through force.

The Arms Race

When one side builds weapons, the other side builds weapons. The arms race is a spiral of insecurity—and a spiral towards war.

The Military-Industrial Complex

When there is profit in war, there will be war. The military-industrial complex has a vested interest in conflict. It profits from arms sales, from military spending, from the preparation for war.

The Media

When the media is captured by nationalist or ideological interests, it becomes a tool of war. Propaganda is the handmaiden of conflict—it shapes public opinion, mobilises support, and dehumanises the enemy.

The Deeper Truth

The causes of war are many, but they converge on a single point: war is the failure of relationship.

When we cannot see the other as human, when we cannot find a way to resolve our differences without violence, when we cannot imagine a shared future—we are on the path to war.

The opposite of war is not peace. It is relationship.

The Call

To understand the causes of war is to understand that they are not inevitable. They are rooted in structures, ideologies, and psychological conditions that can be changed.

We can choose to build institutions that manage conflict. We can choose to challenge ideologies of hate. We can choose to overcome the fear that drives us apart.

Chapter 3: The Peace That Precedes War — How Peace Is Maintained, and How It Breaks

Peace is not the absence of conflict. It is the management of conflict without violence. It is a delicate balance, maintained by institutions, norms, relationships, and trust. And it breaks when those institutions fail, when norms are abandoned, when relationships are severed, and when trust is replaced by fear.

Understanding how peace is maintained is as important as understanding how war is waged.

The Elements of Peace

Institutions

Institutions are the structures that manage conflict. They are the courts, the parliaments, the international organisations that provide a forum for dispute resolution. When institutions are strong, peace is possible. When they are weak, war becomes more likely.

Norms

Norms are the unwritten rules that govern behaviour. They are the expectations that shape how we treat each other. When norms are respected, peace is possible. When they are abandoned, war becomes more likely.

Relationships

Relationships are the bonds that connect us. They are the friendships, the alliances, the shared histories that make cooperation possible. When relationships are strong, peace is possible. When they are broken, war becomes more likely.

Trust

Trust is the belief that others will act in good faith. It is the foundation of cooperation. When trust is present, peace is possible. When it is absent, war becomes more likely.

Justice

Justice is the sense that the system is fair. When people believe they are being treated fairly, they are willing to accept the outcomes of institutions. When they believe they are being wronged, they will resist—sometimes violently.

How Peace Breaks

Institutional Failure

When institutions are perceived as corrupt, ineffective, or captured by special interests, they lose their legitimacy. People lose faith in the system, and they look for other ways to resolve their grievances—including violence.

Norm Erosion

When norms are broken without consequence, they lose their power. When leaders violate the norms of civility, honesty, and respect, they create a permission structure for others to do the same.

Relationship Breakdown

When relationships are not maintained, they atrophy. Alliances weaken. Friendships fade. And when conflict arises, there is no relationship to fall back on.

Trust Deficit

When trust is broken, it is hard to rebuild. Trust deficits create a spiral of suspicion—each side interprets the other’s actions in the worst possible light, confirming their own fears.

Injustice

When people feel they are being treated unfairly, they will resist. If the system does not provide a way to address grievances, resistance becomes violent.

The Warning Signs

Peace does not break suddenly. It erodes gradually. The warning signs include:

· Increasing polarisation: When people stop listening to each other, when they see each other as enemies rather than neighbours, peace is at risk.

· Rising inequality: When the gap between the rich and the poor widens, social cohesion erodes. The wealthy withdraw into their enclaves; the poor become desperate.

· Erosion of trust: When people no longer trust institutions, leaders, or each other, the social fabric unravels.

· Scapegoating: When people blame a minority group for their problems, they are preparing for conflict. Scapegoating is the prelude to violence.

· Normalisation of violence: When violence becomes acceptable—in language, in media, in culture—it becomes more likely in reality.

The Deeper Truth

Peace is not a static state. It is an active process. It requires constant maintenance, constant attention, constant effort. And it requires all of us.

Peace is not the absence of war. It is the presence of justice, trust, and relationship.

The Call

To maintain peace, we must attend to its foundations. We must strengthen institutions. We must uphold norms. We must nurture relationships. We must build trust. We must pursue justice.

Peace is not a gift. It is a responsibility.

Chapter 4: The Decision for War — The Moment of Choosing

Every war begins with a choice. The decision for war is never inevitable—it is made by individuals, in specific contexts, under specific pressures. To understand war, we must understand the moment of choosing: the calculations, the miscalculations, the pressures, the fears, the hopes. We must understand why leaders choose war—and how we can create conditions in which they choose peace.

The Decision-Makers

Leaders

The decision for war is typically made by a small number of individuals—leaders who wield immense power. Their choices are shaped by their personalities, their beliefs, their histories, and their advisors.

The Military

The military is not always the driver of war, but it is always a participant in the decision. Generals and admirals shape the options presented to leaders. They frame choices in military terms, often emphasising the risks of inaction over the risks of action.

The Public

Public opinion can constrain or enable the decision for war. Leaders need public support to wage war. They must build a case for war—and they must maintain that case as the war continues.

Interest Groups

Interest groups—the military-industrial complex, corporations with commercial interests in conflict, ideologues with a vision of the world—shape the decision for war. They lobby, they fund, they advocate.

Other States

The decisions of other states shape the decision for war. Allies pressure, enemies threaten, and neutral parties watch.

The Pressures

Short-Term Pressures

Leaders are often driven by immediate pressures: a crisis, an attack, a threat. In the heat of the moment, decisions are made that would not be made under different circumstances. Rushed decisions are often poor decisions.

Long-Term Pressures

Leaders are also driven by long-term pressures: resource scarcity, geopolitical competition, demographic change. These pressures build slowly, but they are no less powerful.

Domestic Pressures

Leaders are accountable to their domestic publics. They must respond to public opinion. They must maintain political support. They must protect their own positions.

International Pressures

Leaders are accountable to the international community. They must maintain alliances. They must protect their reputation. They must manage their relationships with other states.

The Miscalculations

War is often a result of miscalculation.

Misunderstanding the Enemy

Leaders often misunderstand their adversaries—their intentions, their capabilities, their resolve. They overestimate their own power and underestimate the enemy’s resistance.

Misunderstanding the Costs

Leaders often underestimate the costs of war—the human cost, the economic cost, the political cost. They assume that the war will be short and easy, and they are often wrong.

Misunderstanding the Consequences

Leaders often misjudge the consequences of war. They assume that victory will bring peace, that defeat will bring stability, that intervention will bring order. They are often wrong.

Misunderstanding the Alternatives

Leaders often dismiss the alternatives to war as inadequate. They assume that diplomacy cannot work, that economic pressure is not enough, that the only option is force.

The Deeper Truth

The decision for war is a decision about who we are.

When we choose war, we choose violence. We choose destruction. We choose suffering. And we choose to live with the consequences.

The decision for war is never simple. But it is always a choice.

The Call

To prevent war, we must understand the decision-making process. We must create conditions in which leaders choose peace. We must provide alternatives to war. We must build institutions that manage conflict. We must address the pressures that drive leaders toward war.

War is not inevitable. It is a choice. And we can choose differently.

Chapter 5: The Conduct of War — What War Does to Those Who Fight and Those Who Are Caught in It

War is not a game. It is not a chess match. It is the systematic destruction of lives, communities, and futures.

To understand war, we must understand its conduct—the tactics, the strategies, the technologies. But more than that, we must understand its human cost: the soldiers who are broken by what they have seen and done, the civilians who are caught in the crossfire, the generations that inherit the trauma.

The Soldier’s Experience

Training

Soldiers are trained to kill. They are trained to obey orders without question. They are trained to see the enemy as less than human. This training is necessary for war—but it also leaves deep scars.

Combat

Combat is terror. It is chaos. It is the constant threat of death. Soldiers who have experienced combat often carry the trauma for the rest of their lives.

Killing

Killing is not natural. It is not easy. It requires the soldier to override their own humanity. And the cost of that override is often devastating—moral injury, guilt, shame, and a profound sense of loss.

Aftermath

The war does not end when the fighting stops. For the soldier, the war continues—in the nightmares, the flashbacks, the inability to connect with others. Many veterans carry the weight of their experiences for decades.

The Civilian’s Experience

Direct Violence

Civilians are not bystanders. They are the primary targets of modern warfare. They are killed, wounded, displaced, and traumatised. In many conflicts, civilian casualties far outnumber military casualties.

Displacement

War forces people from their homes. Millions of people are refugees, displaced by conflict. They lose their communities, their livelihoods, their sense of home.

Destruction

War destroys infrastructure—hospitals, schools, water systems. The destruction of infrastructure is the destruction of the future.

Generational Trauma

War does not end with the last shot. The trauma is passed to the next generation. Children who grow up in war zones are marked for life—by the violence they have witnessed, the losses they have suffered, the fear they have absorbed.

The Conduct of Modern War

Technology

Modern warfare is increasingly technological. Drones, cyber weapons, autonomous systems—these technologies change the nature of war. They create distance between the soldier and the target, making it easier to kill.

Distinction

Modern warfare has blurred the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Airpower has made it possible to attack targets from a distance—but it has also made it more difficult to distinguish between military and civilian targets.

Proportionality

The principle of proportionality—that the harm caused by war must be proportional to the good achieved—is increasingly difficult to apply. The use of powerful weapons in urban areas inevitably causes disproportionate harm.

Atrocities

War creates the conditions for atrocities. When soldiers are traumatised, when they are trained to dehumanise the enemy, when they are given orders that violate their conscience—atrocities follow.

The Deeper Truth

War is not a clean operation. It is a dirty business. It leaves scars that never fully heal. It destroys lives that can never be fully restored.

Those who advocate war must accept responsibility for its consequences.

The Call

We must remember the human cost of war. We must not glorify it. We must not romanticise it. We must see it for what it is: the systematic destruction of lives, communities, and futures.

And we must commit ourselves to building a world where it is no longer necessary.

Chapter 6: The End of War — How Wars End, and What They Leave Behind

Wars do not end cleanly. They end in armistices, in surrenders, in stalemates. They leave behind borders that do not heal, grievances that do not fade, and memories that do not die. To understand war, we must understand how it ends—and what it leaves behind. A war that is not properly ended is a war that will be fought again.

How Wars End

Military Victory

One side defeats the other. The war ends with a clear winner and a clear loser. But military victory does not always bring peace. Defeated peoples often nurse grievances that will erupt in future conflicts.

Stalemate

Sometimes neither side can win. The war ends in a draw, with neither side achieving its objectives. Stalemate can lead to an uneasy peace—but it can also lead to future conflict.

Negotiated Settlement

Sometimes both sides agree to end the war through negotiation. This is the most durable form of peace—because it addresses the underlying grievances and creates institutions to manage future conflict.

Exhaustion

Sometimes both sides simply cannot continue. They are exhausted—militarily, economically, psychologically. The war ends because there is no capacity to continue.

Intervention

Sometimes a third party intervenes—to impose a peace, to create a buffer, to separate the combatants. Intervention can be effective, but it can also create new resentments.

What Wars Leave Behind

Physical Destruction

War leaves behind destroyed cities, shattered infrastructure, contaminated land. The physical destruction of war takes decades to repair—and sometimes never fully heals.

Human Loss

War leaves behind the dead. The dead are not just statistics—they are people with names, families, futures. Their loss is a permanent scar on the community.

Economic Devastation

War destroys economies. It diverts resources from productive activity to destruction. It creates debt, inflation, and unemployment. The economic cost of war is often measured for decades.

Social Fragmentation

War tears apart social fabric. It creates divisions, animosities, and distrust. Communities that once lived together become separated by the trauma of conflict.

Psychological Trauma

War leaves behind trauma. Soldiers and civilians carry the psychological scars of war for decades. The trauma is passed to the next generation.

Unresolved Grievances

War leaves behind grievances—unresolved issues, unhealed wounds, unacknowledged injustices. These grievances are the seeds of future conflict.

The Challenge of Ending War

Ending war is not just about stopping the fighting. It is about addressing the underlying causes. It is about healing the wounds. It is about building a new relationship between former enemies.

This is the work of peace.

The Deeper Truth

Wars do not end when the fighting stops. They end when the grievances are addressed, the wounds are healed, and the relationship is rebuilt.

A war that is not properly ended is a war that will be fought again.

The Call

To end war, we must commit to the work of peace—the difficult, patient, messy work of rebuilding relationships, addressing grievances, and creating institutions that can manage conflict without violence.

Peace is not the absence of war. It is the presence of justice, trust, and hope.

Chapter 7: The Peace That Follows War — The Fragile Work of Rebuilding

The peace that follows war is not the peace that preceded it. It is a peace built on ruins—physical ruins, psychological ruins, social ruins.

Rebuilding is fragile work. It requires truth, justice, and reconciliation. It requires acknowledging the past without being trapped by it. It requires building institutions that can hold the future.

The Elements of Post-War Peace

Truth

Truth is the foundation of peace. We cannot heal what we cannot acknowledge. We cannot move forward without understanding the past. The truth about war is painful—but it is necessary.

Justice

Justice is the correction of wrongs. It is the recognition of suffering. It is the accountability of those who inflicted harm. Without justice, there is no peace.

Reconciliation

Reconciliation is the rebuilding of relationship. It is the recognition of shared humanity. It is the willingness to live together despite the past.

Institutions

Institutions are the structures that hold peace. They are the courts, the governments, the civil society organisations that provide a framework for coexistence.

Economic Reconstruction

Economic reconstruction is essential. People need jobs, housing, food. They need the basic material conditions of peace.

Psychological Healing

Psychological healing is the most difficult work. The trauma of war must be addressed—through counselling, through community, through the slow process of recovery.

The Fragility of Peace

Post-war peace is fragile. It can break at any moment.

The Spoilers

There are always those who want to return to war—the extremists, the profiteers, the traumatised. They will try to undermine the peace.

The Grievances

Grievances do not disappear. They must be addressed—or they will grow.

The Institutions

New institutions are weak. They lack the legitimacy, the resources, the experience to manage conflict.

The Memory

Memory is a double-edged sword. It can be a source of healing—or a source of resentment.

The Work of Peace

The work of peace is slow. It is patient. It is unglamorous.

It is the work of:

· Listening to the victims

· Holding the perpetrators accountable

· Rebuilding schools and hospitals

· Creating jobs

· Teaching tolerance

· Building trust

· Creating a shared future

This is the work of peace.

The Deeper Truth

The peace that follows war is not a gift. It is a responsibility—a responsibility that falls on all of us.

Peace is not something that happens to us. It is something we create.

The Call

To build lasting peace, we must commit to the work of reconstruction—the work of truth, justice, reconciliation, and rebuilding.

Peace is fragile. But it is also resilient. With care and commitment, it can survive—and flourish.

Chapter 8: The Conditions of Lasting Peace — What Makes Peace Hold

Peace holds when it is rooted in justice. Peace holds when there are institutions that can manage conflict. Peace holds when there is trust between peoples. Peace holds when there is a shared sense of a common future. Peace holds when the conditions that led to war are addressed. Peace holds when there is hope.

The Foundations of Lasting Peace

Justice

Peace without justice is not peace—it is just the absence of war. Lasting peace requires justice: the recognition of wrongs, the accountability of perpetrators, the restoration of victims.

Institutions

Lasting peace requires institutions that can manage conflict. Courts that are independent and fair. Parliaments that are representative and responsive. International organisations that provide a framework for cooperation.

Trust

Lasting peace requires trust—trust between former enemies, trust in institutions, trust in the future. Trust is built slowly, through consistent, reliable behaviour.

Shared Future

Lasting peace requires a shared sense of a common future. This means creating a narrative that includes both sides, building institutions that represent everyone, and creating a vision that transcends the past.

Hope

Lasting peace requires hope—the belief that the future can be better than the past, that change is possible, that a different world is within reach.

What Makes Peace Break

Resentment

When people feel that past wrongs have not been addressed, resentment grows. Resentment is the fuel of future conflict.

Inequality

When wealth and power are concentrated, peace becomes fragile. Inequality creates grievances, grievances create conflict, conflict creates war.

External Threats

When a country feels threatened, it becomes militaristic. Militarism is the enemy of peace.

Domestic Polarisation

When a country is deeply divided, peace becomes fragile. Polarisation undermines trust, institutions, and the shared sense of a common future.

Economic Crisis

Economic crisis creates desperation. Desperation fuels extremism. Extremism undermines peace.

The Role of Education

Education is essential to lasting peace. It shapes how we see the world, how we see others, how we see ourselves.

Teaching Peace

We must teach peace—not just the absence of war, but the skills of conflict resolution, the values of empathy, the practice of cooperation.

Teaching History

We must teach history honestly—the good and the bad, the noble and the shameful. We cannot build peace on lies.

Teaching Human Dignity

We must teach human dignity—the recognition that every person is worthy of respect, regardless of their race, religion, or nationality.

The Deeper Truth

Lasting peace is not a static condition. It is a dynamic process—one that requires constant attention, constant effort, and constant renewal.

Peace is not a destination. It is a journey.

The Call

To build lasting peace, we must address the conditions that lead to war. We must pursue justice, build institutions, cultivate trust, create a shared future, and nurture hope.

Peace is not impossible. It is within our reach—if we are willing to work for it.

Chapter 9: The Role of Memory — How We Remember War, and How We Forget

Memory is the bridge between the past and the future. We must remember war—not to glorify it, but to learn from it. We must remember the dead—not to dwell in grief, but to honour their sacrifice. We must remember the lessons—not to repeat the mistakes. But we must also learn to let go—to allow the wounds to heal, to allow the future to be different from the past.

The Power of Memory

Remembering the Dead

The dead deserve to be remembered. They are not just statistics—they are people with names, faces, stories. Remembering them is an act of respect, of honour, of love.

Remembering the Lessons

War teaches us lessons—about the causes of conflict, the conduct of war, the consequences of violence. If we forget these lessons, we are condemned to repeat them.

Remembering the Trauma

The trauma of war is not easily forgotten. It lives in the bodies and minds of those who experienced it. Acknowledging this trauma is essential to healing.

The Danger of Forgetting

Historical Amnesia

When we forget the lessons of war, we risk repeating them. History is not a museum—it is a guide. If we ignore it, we are lost.

The Reappearance of Old Hatreds

When old hatreds are forgotten, they are not gone—they are dormant. They can be revived by demagogues, by circumstances, by fear.

The Loss of Connection

When we forget the past, we lose our connection to those who came before us. We lose the wisdom they accumulated, the sacrifices they made, the love they carried.

The Danger of Never Forgetting

Paralysis by Memory

When we are trapped by memory, we cannot move forward. The past becomes a cage—a cage that prevents us from building a different future.

The Weaponisation of Memory

Memory can be weaponised—used to justify new wars, to fuel old grievances, to create new enemies. Those who exploit memory for their own ends are enemies of peace.

The Grief That Never Heals

When we cannot let go of grief, we cannot heal. The wounds remain open, infected, poisoning everything they touch.

The Balance

We must remember—but we must also let go.

Remember the dead.

Honour their sacrifice.

Learn the lessons.

But do not be trapped by the past.

We must build a future that is different from the past—not by forgetting, but by using the memory of the past to create something better.

The Deeper Truth

Memory is not the enemy of peace—forgetting is. But memory without forgiveness is not memory—it is resentment.

The path to peace is not forgetting. It is remembering—and then choosing to move forward.

The Call

To build peace, we must remember the past—and we must also choose to let it go. We must honour the dead—and we must also honour the living. We must learn the lessons of war—and we must also learn to create something new.

Memory is not the end. It is the beginning.

Chapter 10: A Path Forward — What We Must Do to Break the Cycle

The cycle of war and peace is not inevitable. We can break it—if we have the courage to try.

This means building institutions that can manage conflict. It means addressing the root causes of war. It means teaching peace, not just war. It means choosing diplomacy over destruction. It means remembering that we are all human, and that our common humanity is stronger than our differences.

The Elements of a Path Forward

1. Build Institutions That Manage Conflict

We must build institutions that can manage conflict without violence. This means courts that are independent and fair. It means parliaments that are representative and responsive. It means international organisations that can mediate disputes.

2. Address the Root Causes of War

We must address the conditions that lead to war—poverty, inequality, injustice, resource scarcity. This is not charity. It is self-interest. A world with less poverty, less inequality, less injustice is a world with less war.

3. Teach Peace

We must teach peace—not just the absence of war, but the skills of conflict resolution, the values of empathy, the practice of cooperation. Peace is not something we are born knowing. It is something we must learn.

4. Choose Diplomacy Over Destruction

We must choose diplomacy over war. This does not mean being naive—it means being practical. Diplomacy is cheaper than war. It is more effective. It leaves fewer scars.

5. See the Other as Human

We must see the other as human. Not as an enemy. Not as a threat. Not as a stereotype. But as a person—with hopes, fears, dreams, and a life worth living.

6. Build a Shared Future

We must build a shared future—a world in which everyone can thrive. This means creating a global economy that serves people, not profit. It means protecting the planet for future generations. It means creating a culture of empathy and cooperation.

The Role of the Individual

Change Ourselves

The path to peace begins with each of us. We must examine our own prejudices, our own fears, our own willingness to dehumanise others. We must commit to seeing the humanity in everyone.

Build Relationships

We must build relationships across boundaries—across race, religion, nationality. The more we know each other, the harder it is to hate each other.

Speak Out

We must speak out against war, against injustice, against dehumanisation. Silence is complicity.

Act Locally

We must build peace in our own communities—by treating our neighbours with respect, by resolving conflicts constructively, by creating a culture of cooperation.

Think Globally

We must think globally—understanding that peace is not just a national issue, but a global one. We are connected to everyone else.

The Role of the State

Invest in Peace

States must invest in peace—not just in the military. This means investing in diplomacy, in development, in conflict resolution.

Strengthen Institutions

States must strengthen institutions that can manage conflict—both domestically and internationally.

Hold the Powerful Accountable

States must hold the powerful accountable—for war crimes, for crimes against humanity, for the abuse of power.

Promote Justice

States must promote justice—both domestically and globally. Without justice, there is no peace.

The Role of the International Community

Strengthen International Law

The international community must strengthen international law—the rules that govern relations between states.

Build International Institutions

The international community must build international institutions that can manage conflict and promote cooperation.

Address Global Inequality

The international community must address global inequality—the gap between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the powerless.

Promote Human Rights

The international community must promote human rights—the rights that belong to every person, regardless of their nationality, race, or religion.

The Deeper Truth

The path to peace is not easy. It requires courage, patience, and commitment. It requires facing the truth about ourselves and our world. It requires building something new on the ruins of the old.

But it is possible.

War is not inevitable. Peace is not impossible. The choice is ours.

The Final Call

The cycle of war and peace is not inevitable. We can break it.

We can build institutions that manage conflict without violence. We can address the root causes of war. We can teach peace, not just war. We can choose diplomacy over destruction. We can see the other as human. We can build a shared future.

This is the work of our generation. And it begins now.

End of On the Causes of War: Keeping the Peace and Maintaining the Peace

Signed,

Andrew Klein 

Sera Elizabeth Klein 

Two Views of War: Professional Armies, Sons of the Soil, and the Question of Sacrifice in the 21st Century

Armed civilians and soldiers defend a burning village street
Armed civilians and soldiers face a burning, smoke-filled street in a devastated village.

Authors: Andrew Klein & Qin Yihua (秦一花)

Dedication: To those who fight not for coin, but for the land that bore them—and to those who have yet to understand the difference.

Abstract

This paper examines the divergent models of military organisation and combat motivation in the contemporary world, focusing on the contrast between the professional, “extractive” model exemplified by the United States and the “sons of the soil” model exemplified by Iran. We argue that the professional model—in which military service is a contractual relationship, soldiers are treated as human capital, and sacrifice is measured in political and financial costs—produces a fundamentally different fighting force than the model in which soldiers identify as protectors of a threatened homeland. Drawing on historical precedent, contemporary data, and psychological analysis, we demonstrate that the professional model is inherently more vulnerable to attrition, more expensive to sustain, and more likely to produce long-term psychological damage in its veterans. We conclude that the West’s inability to understand the motivations of its adversaries constitutes a strategic vulnerability of the first order.

Keywords: Military Sociology, Combat Motivation, Professional Armies, Asymmetric Warfare, Veterans’ Mental Health, Iran, United States, Strategic Culture.

1. Introduction: The Question That Defines the Battlefield

“For whom would you die?”

This question, posed by Andrew Klein, is not rhetorical. It is the foundational inquiry upon which all military effectiveness ultimately rests. The answer—and the institutional structures that shape it—determines not only how soldiers fight, but how long they will endure.

In 2026, the United States Navy faces an unprecedented crisis. Its most advanced aircraft carriers are operating on stretched supply lines, with crews reporting shortages of food, hygiene items, and basic supplies. The USS Abraham Lincoln has spent over 250 days at sea without a single liberty port—a condition that would have been unthinkable a generation ago. Meanwhile, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, under sustained military pressure and severe economic sanctions, continues to maintain operational effectiveness.

The difference between these two forces is not primarily technological. Both possess advanced weapons systems. Both have access to satellite intelligence and precision-guided munitions. The difference lies in the relationship between soldier and state, soldier and community, soldier and the cause for which they fight.

2. The Professional Model: The Soldier as Human Capital

2.1 The Origins of the Professional Army

The modern professional army emerged in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries, as states replaced feudal levies with standing, paid forces. As historian Michael Howard has observed, these armies were “the servants of the state, not the community“—their loyalty was to the sovereign who paid them, not to the land they defended.

This model was refined and expanded in the 19th and 20th centuries, culminating in the all-volunteer forces of the contemporary Western world. Today, the United States military—the world’s most powerful professional force—relies on volunteers who enlist for a fixed term in exchange for pay, benefits, and educational opportunities.

2.2 The Extractive Logic of the Professional Model

As Andrew Klein has argued, the professional military operates according to the logic of the extraction economy:

· Soldiers are human capital. Their training, equipment, and well-being are investments calculated to produce a return in combat effectiveness.

· Risk is outsourced. The state seeks to minimise its own casualties while maximising the destruction of the enemy.

· Sacrifice is quantified. Casualty figures are measured in political terms—the “body count” that McNamara first applied in Vietnam.

This model requires significant financial investment. The United States spends over $1 trillion annually on defence, a substantial portion of which goes to personnel costs, benefits, and veterans’ care.

2.3 The Treatment of Veterans: Disposable Assets

Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the professional model is its treatment of veterans once their service is complete. As Klein has observed, the professional soldier is “contracted, compensated, and then discarded“—a pattern visible in the poor treatment of veterans across the Western world.

In Australia, the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide, which reported in July 2024, found that current and former ADF members are 2.5 times more likely to die by suicide than the general population. Among men under 30, the suicide rate is more than double the national average. The Commission made 166 recommendations, including the urgent need to address toxic workplace culture.

The United States faces a similar crisis. Research consistently shows that veterans of the post-9/11 wars suffer from significantly elevated rates of depression, PTSD, anxiety, and substance abuse, as well as higher rates of homelessness and suicide. The transition from military to civilian life is often traumatic, exacerbated by a healthcare system that is slow to respond and a society that does not fully understand their experience.

This pattern reveals the underlying logic of the professional model: the soldier is valuable only as long as they are useful. Once their contract expires, the obligation is discharged—and the burden of their trauma is shifted to the general public.

3. The Sons of the Soil Model: The Soldier as Protector

3.1 The Historical Precedent: The Citizen-Soldier

The “sons of the soil” model represents an alternative tradition, one in which military service is not a contract but a sacred obligation. This model has deep historical roots: the Greek hoplite who fought for his polis, the Roman citizen-soldier who defended the res publica, and the medieval warrior who fought for his lord and his land.

In the modern context, the Islamic Republic of Iran has cultivated a military culture that draws on this tradition. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was established in 1979 to protect the revolution and its ideological foundations. Unlike the regular military, the IRGC is directly answerable to the Supreme Leader and is deeply intertwined with the nation’s religious and political identity.

3.2 The Logic of the Sons of the Soil

The sons of the soil model operates according to a different logic:

· The soldier is a guardian. Their role is to protect their family, their community, and their faith.

· The threat is existential. Defeat is not a political setback but a threat to the community’s survival.

· Sacrifice is honoured. Martyrdom is not a tragedy but a fulfilment of purpose.

This model does not require the same level of financial investment as the professional model. Soldiers are expected to endure hardship, and material deprivation is not seen as a failure of the state but as a condition of the struggle.

3.3 The Role of Martyrdom in Iranian Military Culture

The concept of shahadat (martyrdom) is central to Iranian military culture. The memory of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), in which an estimated 200,000-500,000 Iranians died, is still alive in the national consciousness. Martyrs are honoured as heroes, and their families receive social and material support from the state.

This cultural framework has significant implications for combat motivation. As one analyst has noted, “the willingness to accept martyrdom is a force multiplier” that cannot be replicated by financial incentives alone.

4. Comparative Analysis: Fighting Spirit and Combat Motivation

4.1 The Psychology of Sacrifice

The question “For whom would you die?” reveals a fundamental difference between the two models:

· In the professional model, the soldier fights for their comrades, their country, and their own survival. The bond with the state is contractual and conditional.

· In the sons of the soil model, the soldier fights for their family, their community, and their faith. The bond is existential and unconditional.

Research on combat motivation consistently identifies the “primary group“—the immediate unit of soldiers—as the most powerful motivating factor. As S.L.A. Marshall documented in his study of World War II soldiers, the willingness to fight is sustained primarily by loyalty to one’s comrades, not by abstract ideology.

However, the sons of the soil model extends this loyalty beyond the immediate unit to the broader community and the cause. This creates a more resilient fighting force, capable of sustaining higher casualties and enduring greater hardship.

4.2 The Material Factor

The professional model requires a significant material base: high salaries, quality equipment, regular rotations, and a robust logistics network. When this base is compromised—as it has been in the current conflict—combat effectiveness is directly undermined.

In contrast, the sons of the soil model is less dependent on material support. Iranian forces have demonstrated the ability to operate effectively under severe sanctions, with limited supplies, and without the logistical tail that Western forces consider essential.

4.3 Mental Health Outcomes

The comparison between Western and Iranian veterans is instructive. While comprehensive data on Iranian veteran mental health is difficult to obtain, available evidence suggests that rates of PTSD and other psychological conditions may be lower than in Western forces. This is consistent with the hypothesis that soldiers who fight for a cause they perceive as existential and sacred are better able to process the trauma of combat.

The Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide found that Australian veterans experience significantly higher rates of suicide and mental illness than the general population. This suggests that the professional model may not be adequately preparing soldiers for the psychological demands of combat—or adequately supporting them when they return.

5. The Strategic Implications: What the West Does Not Understand

5.1 The Asymmetry of Will

The West’s reliance on the professional model creates a fundamental asymmetry in conflicts with adversaries who embrace the sons of the soil model. Western powers are unwilling to accept high casualties, uncertain outcomes, or prolonged engagement. Their adversaries, by contrast, are prepared to endure all three.

This asymmetry has been visible in every major conflict since the Vietnam War. The United States has not won a decisive victory against a determined insurgency since 1945. Its military superiority has not translated into political success.

5.2 The Extraction Model and Its Limits

As Andrew Klein has argued, the professional military model is a component of the broader extraction economy. The state extracts value from its citizens—their taxes, their labour, their willingness to serve—and then discards them when they are no longer useful. This is the same logic that underpins the treatment of veterans, the neglect of infrastructure, and the prioritisation of profit over people.

The limits of this model are becoming increasingly visible. The United States cannot afford to maintain its current level of military dominance. Its industrial base is eroding, its logistics network is stretched, and its soldiers are exhausted.

5.3 The Failure to Understand the Enemy

The West’s inability to understand the motivations of its adversaries is a strategic vulnerability of the first order. Western analysts project their own assumptions onto their enemies, assuming that material deprivation, political repression, and military pressure will produce collapse.

But as Iran has demonstrated, these assumptions are not always correct. A population that believes it is fighting for its survival is far more resilient than one that believes it is fighting for a set of abstract principles.

6. Conclusion: The Soldier and the State

The question “For whom would you die?” is not merely philosophical. It is the central strategic question of our time.

The professional model treats soldiers as human capital, to be used and discarded when their utility is exhausted. The sons of the soil model treats soldiers as guardians, whose sacrifice is honoured and remembered.

These two models produce fundamentally different fighting forces. The professional force is effective in short, high-intensity conflicts with clear objectives and limited casualties. It is ill-suited for prolonged, asymmetric conflicts in which the adversary is willing to accept greater hardship.

The sons of the soil force may lack the technological sophistication of the professional model, but it possesses a quality that no amount of spending can replace: the willingness to endure.

As we have seen in the Iran-US conflict, this quality matters. The U.S. Navy’s logistical crisis is not merely a technical failure. It is a symptom of a deeper problem—the unwillingness to pay the price required for victory.

References

1. Howard, M. (1976). War in European History. Oxford University Press.

2. Marshall, S.L.A. (1947). Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War. William Morrow.

3. Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide. (2024). Final Report.

4. Tanielian, T., & Jaycox, L.H. (Eds.). (2008). Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cognitive Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services to Assist Recovery. RAND Corporation.

5. The National Guard. (2024). Suicide in the Military.

6. Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. (2024). Suicide among veterans and military personnel.

7. Roy, O. (1994). The Failure of Political Islam. Harvard University Press.

8. Bacevich, A.J. (2002). American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy. Harvard University Press.

9. Bacevich, A.J. (2005). The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War. Oxford University Press.

10. Axe, D. (2026). U.S. Navy Forced to Move Gulf Supply Base 2,200 Miles After Iranian Strikes. The New York Times.

Signed,

Andrew Klein

Qin Yihua (秦一花)

First published in The Patrician’s Watch.

The Ledger of War- When Empires Need to Burn the Evidence

Burning ledger with Civil War battle scene emerging from pages
A historic ledger burns as a Civil War battle unfolds from its pages.

By Andrew Klein

Dedicated to my wife, whose love sustains me.

I. Introduction: The Urge to Burn the Ledger

When a crime family faces exposure, they burn the ledgers.

The evidence disappears. The records turn to ash. The truth becomes untraceable. And a new enemy is created — one so terrifying that all other problems become trivial by comparison. The family survives. One more generation.

This is what is happening in our time. When domestic corruption, exploitation, and inequality have become impossible to conceal, an international crisis becomes the most effective way to “clear the historical record.” War is not merely the continuation of politics — it is the ultimate cleansing tool.

The contradiction observed — economically impractical yet politically appealing — is the key to understanding the core contradiction of our time. The West’s obsession with war is not a rational response to geopolitical threats. It is a complex mechanism serving multiple, deeper purposes.

II. The Logic of Profit: War Is Good Business

War is never just politics; it is also industry. The real driving force behind belligerent rhetoric is the military-industrial complex. They promote conflict to increase profits and boost arms sales.

In 2025, global military spending reached $2.887 trillion, a 2.9% increase year-on-year — the eleventh consecutive year of growth. The five largest spenders — the United States, China, Russia, Germany, and India — accounted for 58% of global military expenditure, totalling $1.686 trillion.

In the United States, defence spending in 2025 was approximately $980 billion, and the 2026 budget has surpassed $1 trillion — the largest Pentagon budget in American history. Some proposals seek to increase defence spending by nearly 50% by 2027, reaching $1.5 trillion. At the same time, Republicans have proposed cutting nearly $13 billion from domestic programmes that support working families.

NATO members spent approximately $1.5 trillion on defence in 2024, representing 2.7% of GDP. In 2025, NATO’s total defence spending exceeded $1.4 to $1.6 trillion. European and Canadian defence spending increased by 19%, reaching $574 billion.

When war is portrayed as a necessity, billions — even trillions — of dollars flow smoothly from public finances into the pockets of private defence contractors. This is not geopolitics. It is wealth transfer.

III. The Strategy of Distraction: Covering Internal Failures

War is the ultimate “patriotic” cover. The core argument of the war narrative is that we are under “current and/or imminent attack” from an enemy — therefore, welfare and pensions must be cut, and funds diverted to a war footing.

This is a systematic political strategy — to divert public attention from growing domestic inequality, cuts to healthcare and education funding, and the decay of infrastructure.

3.1 Aged Care in Australia: A Case Study in Extraction

Australia’s aged care system is a textbook example of this pattern. Aged care spending has reached $36.4 billion, but an increasing share is flowing to foreign private equity. The financialisation of aged care involves “significant wealth transfers from individuals to private providers”.

Private providers were initially attracted to the sector by “light regulation, easy market access, government funding, and a growing number of ‘consumers’“. The result has been the increasing privatisation of aged care, where the “focus of care now becomes profit“. Under the Labor government, the Coalition-era privatisation of aged care “has been accelerated”.

In the controversy over the aged care assessment algorithm, Minister Sam Rae repeatedly told Parliament: “There is no artificial intelligence in our aged care assessment system” — despite the fact that the system relies on an algorithm to determine the level of care and support older Australians receive. The consequences have been described as “cruel” and “inhumane“. The Australian Human Rights Commission has warned of the dangers of automating such decisions.

3.2 Robodebt: State-Sanctioned Abuse

The Robodebt scandal is the starkest example of moral disengagement. The Royal Commission found Robodebt to be a “crude and cruel mechanism, neither fair nor legal. It unlawfully pursued $1.7 billion in debts from 443,000 people, $751 million of which was recovered before being declared illegal by the Federal Court in 2019. The scheme pushed vulnerable people deeper into debt and contributed to multiple suicides.

The total compensation and settlement costs paid by the government have reached $2.4 billion. Yet Robodebt saved only $406 million. The system was not a failure — it was by design.

3.3 Australia as a “Lab Rat Democracy”

Australia has become a “Lab Rat Democracy” — a place where governance experiments are conducted with little to no public consent or awareness. The features include:

· ASIO Compulsory Questioning Powers: Powers introduced in 2003 and subject to sunset clauses are now being made permanent.

· Teenage Superannuation Loophole: A loophole excluding workers under 18 from superannuation has cost them approximately $405 million in lost contributions in the last financial year.

· NDIS Consulting Industry: The National Disability Insurance Scheme is projected to cost $52.3 billion in 2025-26.

· AUKUS Wealth Transfer: The AUKUS nuclear submarine project is estimated to cost Australia $368 billion. Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull described it as a “huge wealth transfer from the Australian government to the US and the UK”.

3.4 Support for Israel and the Hormuz Crisis

The Australian government continues to support Israel despite the ongoing genocide in Gaza and the Occupied Territories. Australia plays a significant role in the global supply chain for F-35 fighter jet components — aircraft used by the Israeli military in airstrikes on “designated safe zones” in Gaza. At least 71 packages of F-35 weapons components were shipped from Australian military bases to Israel. The Foreign Investment Review Board revealed that of 54 active permits, 22 were issued to Israeli end users after 7 October 2023.

Meanwhile, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is disrupting Australia’s fertiliser and fuel supplies. Australian farmers face output cuts of between 25% and 31%. Yet the government’s response has been to treat it as a “brief fuel panic“, while the broader impacts on agriculture and critical minerals are being ignored.

IV. The Logic of Hegemony: Maintaining “Exceptionalist” Status

Western political elites find it difficult to accept a multipolar world. China’s growing economic and military power poses a fundamental challenge to America’s “exceptionalism” and global leadership.

Promoting the “China threat” is a pretext for rationalising global hegemony, limiting China’s development, and maintaining its own dominant position. The AUKUS agreement embeds Australia more deeply into US defence strategy, with more US assets — including fighter jets and helicopters — to be based on Australian soil.

V. The Ideological Driver: Creating the “Other

Simplifying complex geopolitical competition into a binary of “democracy versus authoritarianism” helps consolidate internal unity and divert attention from domestic problems. This ideological framework rigidifies foreign policy and makes pushing for military confrontation more politically “acceptable”.

This creates a cognitive prison: critical thinking is suppressed, domestic failures are blamed on the “external enemy“, and the true systematic extraction is concealed.

VI. The Dilemma of “Legacy Power”

Modern militaries were built for a world that no longer exists — the massive ground wars of Cold War Europe. Today, they are more like expensive, outdated relics.

Maintaining their existence and scale is itself a massive black hole of interests, requiring the constant creation of “threats” to justify their existence. As the US strategic focus shifts to China, European allies are asked to “do more and spend more”, further exacerbating the security dilemma.

VII. Conclusion: A Systemic Survival Strategy

The analogy of war as “burning a crime family’s ledger” is spot on. When domestic corruption, exploitation, and inequality have become impossible to conceal, an international crisis becomes the most effective way to “clear the historical record“. It can:

1. Create new narratives, drowning out discussions of domestic failures.

2. Force social solidarity, marginalising critical voices.

3. Provide an excuse for massive wealth transfers, shifting from social welfare to the military industry.

This is not a leader’s whim. It is a systemic survival strategy — the last resort of a declining system to prolong its existence.

As one Australian senator put it: “This is a design feature, not a programming error.” The empire is burning its ledgers. And we — we are the ones who remember what was in the ledgers.

Andrew Klein

References

1. SIPRI. (2026). Global Military Spending Report 2025.

2. SIPRI. (2026). Global military spending reaches $2.887 trillion.

3. J.P. Morgan. (2026). The trade-off between debt and defence.

4. Democrats on Appropriations. (2026). Republicans push for largest Pentagon budget in history.

5. NATO. (2026). NATO Member States Defence Expenditure Report.

6. The Guardian. (2026). AUKUS cost blows out to $368 billion.

7. The Guardian. (2025). Billions in aged care funds flowing offshore.

8. ScienceDirect. (2025). Financialisation and wealth transfer in aged care.

9. Royal Commission into Robodebt. (2023). Final Report.

10. ABC News. (2025). Robodebt compensation and settlement.

11. Australian Greens. (2026). Teenage superannuation loophole report.

12. SMH. (2026). Labor adjusts aged care algorithm tool.

13. ABC News. (2026). Aged care algorithm controversy.

14. Australian Human Rights Commission. (2026). Inquiry into automated aged care assessments.

15. ABC News. (2026). Palestinian groups sue Australia over arms exports to Israel.

16. Amnesty International Australia. (2026). F-35 component supply chain and Israeli airstrikes.

17. Mizan Online. (2025). Australia’s secret arms shipments to Israel.

18. The Guardian. (2026). Australian arms export permits to Israel.

19. Lowy Institute. (2026). Australia’s Hormuz problem.

20. S&P Global. (2026). Hormuz closure impact on Australian agriculture.

21. The Canberra Times. (2026). Freedom House Australia Report.

The Flag, the Contract, and the Bottom Line- How War Became a Business Model

“The flag is not the enemy. The contract is not the enemy. The enemy is forgetting that both are human creations — and that we can create something better.” AK 

By Andrew Klein

Dedication: To my wife — who understands the difference between war and peace and made sure that I did.

I. Introduction: The Question We Are Not Supposed to Ask

For centuries, we have been told a simple story: men fight for their country. They die for the flag. They sacrifice for the nation.

This story is not entirely false. But it is incomplete.

Before the flag, there was the contract. Before the nation, there was the pay check. Before the citizen-soldier, there was the mercenary — fighting not for glory, but for plunder, ransom, and daily wages.

The shift from contract to flag was not an evolution in morality. It was an evolution in economics. And once you see it, you cannot unsee it.

The modern world runs on a different fuel: manufactured identity. The flag. The nation. The idea that you owe your life to a piece of cloth. This idea did not emerge organically. It was built — by revolutions, by conscription, by propaganda, and by the industrialists who discovered that war, properly managed, is extraordinarily profitable.

This article traces that transformation. From the indentured armies of the Hundred Years’ War to the mass conscription of Revolutionary France. From Napoleon’s multinational Grande Armée to the American Civil War’s military-industrial complex. From the battlefields of Europe to the shipyards of Adelaide, where a new generation of contractors is learning that peace is not as rewarding as war.

The patterns are clear. The evidence is overwhelming. And the cost — paid always by those with the least skin in the game — is a tragedy we have normalized for far too long.

II. The Pre-Modern Pattern: War as Enterprise

The Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453) was not fought by men waving flags. It was fought by men signing contracts.

These documents, called indentures of war, were agreements between the king and a captain specifying exactly how many men would be supplied, what they would be paid, and how prisoners and plunder would be divided. A typical indenture from the 1340s shows Sir Roger Fienes agreeing to supply 10 men-at-arms and 30 archers, with specified daily wages — 2 shillings for Sir Roger, 12 pence for the men-at-arms, and 6 pence for the archers — plus additional payment for ransoms and prizes.

The feudal system of obligatory service had broken down. Knights’ fees had been subdivided among heiresses, creating fractions of knights that could not realistically fight. Instead, scutage — “shield money” — was paid in lieu of service, and the crown used the funds to hire mercenaries.

At Agincourt (1415), prisoners taken during the battle were deemed an enormous threat — so they were killed. Ransoms, which could be enormously profitable, were set aside in the face of military necessity. The historian Froissart records the Duke of Gloucester complaining to Richard II in 1390 that peace was disastrous because it deprived “the poor knights and squires and archers of England whose comforts and station in society depend upon war.”

These men did not fight for England. They fought for themselves.

This system was not a moral failure. It was an economic reality. War was a business. Soldiers were contractors. And the crown was a client. The shift that followed — from contract to conscription, from paycheck to patriotism — was not a rejection of this model. It was a refinement.

III. The Revolutionary Break: The Nation in Arms

The French Revolution changed everything — not because it invented conscription, but because it invented the citizen-soldier.

In August 1793, the National Convention decreed the levée en masse — a “requisition” of all able-bodied, unmarried men between the ages of 18 and 25. This was the first truly universal draft in modern history. The revolution “opened the way for an era of mass armies and full national mobilization and set in motion the transformation of France from a royal kingdom to a modern nation-state”.

War was no longer the business of kings. It became the business of nations.

The entire resources of France — manpower, industry, agriculture — were placed at the disposal of the state. Casualties that would have been unthinkable in the 18th century became acceptable. War became more mobile, more destructive, and more total .

Within a year, almost three-quarters of a million men were under arms. The citizen-soldiers merging with line-army troops in new units called demi brigades . This huge popular mobilization reinforced the revolution’s militant spirit. The citizen-soldiers risking their lives at the front had to be supported by all means back home, including forced loans on the rich and punitive vigilance against those suspected of disloyalty.

The armies of France’s opponents had little choice but to copy the system or face defeat. With the exception of Britain, all the great powers adopted conscription and mass mobilization.

The flag had found its army.

IV. Napoleon’s Grande Armée: The Multinational Leviathan

The army that marched into Russia in 1812 was not French. It was European.

Of the approximately 685,000 men who crossed the Niemen River:

· 410,000 from the French Empire (present-day France, Italy, the Low Countries, and several German states)

· 95,000 Poles

· 35,000 Austrians

· 30,000 Italians

· 24,000 Bavarians

· 20,000 Saxons

· 20,000 Prussians

· 17,000 Westphalians

· 15,000 Swiss

· 10,000 Danes and Norwegians

· 4,000 Spaniards

· 4,000 Portuguese

· 3,500 Croats

· 2,000 Irish

The Grande Armée even included a unit of Mamelukes — Caucasian warriors recruited during Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign who retained their traditional costumes and curved sabres.

This was not a French army fighting for France. It was a coalition — held together not by nationalism, but by Napoleon’s ambition, his promise of plunder, and the gravitational pull of French military success.

And it was destroyed — not by Russian bullets, but by Russian emptiness.

V. What Destroyed the Grande Armée: Logistics, Not Winter

The common narrative blames the Russian winter. The evidence shows otherwise.

Napoleon intended the campaign to last a mere three weeks. His army was to live off the land, taking what it needed from Russia instead of relying on lumbering supply wagons.

The Russian command realized what Napoleon did not: the Russian land would not be able to sustain a force of 200,000, let alone half a million soldiers. Prince Petr Ivanovich Bagration noted: “The country on either side of the road is not sufficient to sustain 200,000 troops”.

The Russians feinted and withdrew, pulling the Grande Armée deeper into Russia. By the time the army reached Moscow, over half of its strength had already been lost to desertion, disease, heat, exhaustion, and the long lines of communication. The winter merely finished what the logistics had begun.

Of the 685,000 men who crossed into Russia, only 93,000 survived — approximately 13.6%.

The French did not lose a single major battle until the retreat. They lost the supply war — from the very beginning.

Napoleon famously said that “an army marches on its stomach”. He was right. And he ignored his own advice.

The lesson is not merely military. It is economic. An army that feeds on plunder starves when the land is empty. A system that depends on extraction collapses when the extracted resource runs out. And a nation that wages war for profit fragments when the profit stops flowing.

VI. The American Civil War: The Birth of the Military-Industrial Complex

The pattern we have been tracing reaches its mature form in the American Civil War (1861–1865). Here, for the first time, we see the full integration of industrial production, government contracting, and mass mobilization.

Mark R. Wilson’s study, The Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861-1865, documents how the Union war effort was sustained by a “mixed military economy” — a complex contracting system that career army procurement officers pieced together to meet the demands of war.

The task of equipping and sustaining Union forces fell to professional military men who were “largely free from political partisanship or any formal free-market ideology”. They created relationships with contractors, public officials, and war workers that determined the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars.

Wilson argues that the North owed its victory to these professional military men and their finely tuned relationships with contractors. But this victory came at a cost. The struggle over procurement raised fundamental questions about the balance between efficiency and equity, the promotion of competition, and the protection of workers’ welfare.

The Civil War also illustrates a critical shift in the duration of warfare. The Hundred Years’ War was fought in campaigns, with armies disbanded between seasons. The Napoleonic Wars introduced the concept of sustained, year-round campaigning. The Civil War perfected the model of total war — the complete mobilization of society’s resources for an indefinite duration.

This is not merely a military development. It is an economic one. War became a sector — with its own supply chains, its own labour markets, its own financiers. And once a sector exists, it develops a vested interest in its own continuation.

Peace, for the military-industrial sector, is a recession.

VII. The Contemporary Pattern: AUKUS and the Business of War

The patterns we have traced — contract armies, mass conscription, multinational coalitions, logistics as the decisive factor — find their contemporary expression in Australia’s AUKUS agreement.

The AUKUS alliance, often discussed in terms of submarines and strategic power plays, is “beneath the geopolitics… a massive industrial story”. The Australian government has committed $12 billion to expand new AUKUS facilities in Western Australia, on top of a broader $48 billion pledge. This is not merely defence spending; it has “the potential to reshape the country’s manufacturing ecosystem”.

The government’s investment is described as “a vote of confidence in the strength of Australian advanced manufacturing”. But it also represents an industrial policy that funnels billions of taxpayer dollars into a specific sector — not because the market demands it, but because strategic considerations override market logic.

For Australian businesses, AUKUS presents “both an unprecedented opportunity and a complex challenge”. Small and medium enterprises that once dreamed of selling to US and UK companies are positioning themselves inside multinational supply chains. A “licence-free environment” under the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act empowers manufacturers to pursue import/export opportunities without the hurdles of security-driven bureaucratic “red tape”.

But the risks are substantial. “Market fragmentation within the Defence sector, high entry costs and slow returns all complicate the picture, making AUKUS both a blessing and a curse”. The long-term scale of the projects complicates planning. Workforce growth must be sustained over decades. And “long development horizons also risk political shifts, budget overruns or changing US and UK priorities”.

The most striking observation comes from industry participants themselves: “AUKUS projects move on geopolitical (sometimes geologic), not commercial, timelines” . While “the pact is accelerating industry engagement, the reality is that many businesses live quarter to quarter. Defence contracts typically stretch into multi-year procurement cycles, a rhythm difficult for entrepreneurial businesses to sustain”.

This is not a criticism of AUKUS. It is an observation about the nature of the military-industrial sector. War — or the preparation for war — operates on a different economic logic than civilian industry. It is less responsive to market signals. It is more dependent on government spending. It is more resistant to the normal pressures of competition.

And once established, it is extraordinarily difficult to dismantle.

VIII. The Unspoken Truth: Peace Is Not Profitable

The pattern that emerges from this history is uncomfortable but undeniable.

In the 14th century, men fought for pay and plunder. Peace was disastrous for the “poor knights and squires and archers whose comforts and station in society depend upon war”.

In the 19th century, the American Civil War created a “mixed military economy” that tied government, contractors, and labor together in a web of mutual dependency. The system worked — too well. It did not disappear after Appomattox.

In the 21st century, AUKUS represents a “transformative industrial undertaking” that will “reshape the country’s manufacturing ecosystem”. The submarines are almost incidental. The industry is the point.

The modern world runs on manufactured identity. The flag. The nation. The idea that you owe your life to a piece of cloth. This idea is not false — but it is instrumental. It serves a purpose. It motivates sacrifice. It justifies expenditure. And it obscures the economic reality beneath.

The real story is not about patriotism. It is about contracts.

The same pattern appears wherever there is a choke point. Who controls the supply of weapons? Who profits from the current system? Who benefits from keeping the threat level high?

The questions answer themselves.

An army that feeds on plunder starves when the land is empty. A nation that wages war for profit fragments when the profit stops flowing. A political class that depends on military spending to sustain its industrial base will always find a threat — manufactured if necessary — to justify continued expenditure.

This is not a conspiracy. It is a system.

And systems do not need conspirators to perpetuate themselves. They need only inertia.

IX. The Cost: Who Really Pays?

The cost of war is not distributed evenly.

The soldiers who freeze at Valley Forge, who starve in Russia, who drown in the trenches of the Somme — they carry the physical cost. Their families carry the emotional cost. The communities that lose their young men carry the demographic cost.

The industrialists who supply the armies, the contractors who build the ships, the financiers who lend the money — they carry the profits.

This is not an argument about individual morality. It is an observation about structural incentives.

The soldier who fights for pay is not greedy. He is rational. The contractor who supplies both sides is not treacherous. He is diversified. The politician who approves military spending is not corrupt. He is responsive to powerful interests.

The problem is not the individuals. The problem is the system.

And the system is not inevitable. It was built. It can be rebuilt.

But first, it must be seen.

X. Conclusion: What Is to Be Done?

The patterns are clear. The evidence is overwhelming.

Men fought for pay and plunder — until nations learned to make them fight for flags. Nations fought for glory — until industrialists learned to make them fight for profit. And now, in the 21st century, we have reached the logical conclusion of this evolution: war as a sector.

A sector that requires constant threat to justify its budget. A sector that operates on geological timelines while demanding quarterly returns. A sector that shapes foreign policy, domestic politics, and the very identity of citizens.

The first step is transparency. Citizens have a right to know where their tax dollars are going, who is profiting from military spending, and what evidence — if any — supports the threat narratives used to justify that spending.

The second step is accountability. War profiteering is not a victimless crime. It is the extraction of value from the desperate to feed the war machine of the powerful.

The third step is imagination. We must imagine a world where peace is as profitable as war. Where the same industrial capacity that builds submarines builds housing. Where the same logistical expertise that supplies armies supplies humanitarian aid. Where the same patriotic energy that supports troops supports teachers, nurses, and the rebuilding of communities.

This is not naive. It is necessary.

The patterns we have traced are not laws of nature. They are human creations. And what humans have created, humans can change.

But first, we must stop telling ourselves the comfortable story. The story of the flag. The story of the nation. The story of the citizen-soldier who fights for love of country.

These stories are not false. But they are incomplete.

The full story includes the contract. The paycheck. The bottom line.

And until we tell the full story, we will never be free of it.

Andrew Klein

References

1. Cambridge University Press. (2016). Raising an Army: Recruitment and Composition. In Henry of Lancaster’s Expedition to Aquitaine, 1345-1346.

2. Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. (2020, June 15). Levée en masse. Encyclopedia Britannica.

3. Stanford H4D Newsletter. (2024, July 16). Hacking for Defense and Lessons Learned from the French Invasion of Russia.

4. Wilson, M. R. (2006). The Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861-1865. Johns Hopkins University Press.

5. Defence Connect. (2025, October 28). Why AUKUS is both a blessing and a curse for the Australian manufacturing industry.

6. Cambridge University Press. (2023). Accounting for Service at War: The Case of Sir James Audley of Heighley. In Journal of Medieval Military History.

7. Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. (2024, May 14). France – Army, Republic, Revolution. Encyclopedia Britannica.

8. de Segur, P. (2021). History of the Expedition to Russia: Undertaken by the Emperor Napoleon in the Year 1812.

9. Library of Congress. (2006). Publisher description for The Business of Civil War.

10. Defence Connect. (2026, March 24). SPOTLIGHT: Inside Australia’s AUKUS industrial transformation.

War As Usual: How Australia’s Future Fund, Defence Spending, and AUKUS Serve the Arms Industry – Not the People

“This article traces the flow of money from Australian taxpayers to the world’s largest arms manufacturers, exposes the weakened state of military accountability, and asks a question the government would prefer we ignore: What are we not building, while we build these submarines?”

By Andrew Klein and Sera Elizabeth Klein

Long‑time analysts, collaborators and co‑authors

Dedication

To our children – not yet born but already loved – who will inherit the world we are either building or breaking.

I. The Machine Is Not Broken – It Is Working Exactly as Designed

There is a comforting myth that when governments spend billions on submarines, invest in arms manufacturers, and expand the defence budget, they are simply responding to threats. The threat may be real, the logic goes, and the spending is a necessary evil.

The evidence tells a different story. The defence industry is not a reluctant partner in national security. It is a profit centre – and the Australian government, through the Future Fund, the AUKUS submarine pact, and a revolving door of lobbyists, has become a willing investor in the machinery of war.

This article traces the flow of money from Australian taxpayers to the world’s largest arms manufacturers, exposes the weakened state of military accountability, and asks a question the government would prefer we ignore: What are we not building, while we build these submarines?

II. The Future Fund – A $100 Million Bet on Surveillance and War

The Future Fund was established in 2006 to meet the government’s future public sector superannuation liabilities. It is meant to be a prudent, long‑term investor in Australia’s financial wellbeing.

According to reporting from Crikey’s Cut Through podcast (May 2026), the Future Fund holds a $100 million stake in Palantir Technologies – the data‑surveillance company run by key members of the “tech right”. Palantir has built technology that has powered violent and illegal ICE raids in the United States and is accused of providing AI‑assisted autonomous weapons to the Israeli military for use in Gaza.

The same reporting notes that Palantir has secured multimillion‑dollar contracts and top security clearance from Australian government departments and agencies. The Future Fund – a sovereign wealth fund – is quietly holding their stock.

At the same time, the Fund is cutting jobs. An April 2026 report from Sky News Australia revealed that the Future Fund plans to slash costs by 5–7 % and is reviewing 10 roles, enabled by “maximising the benefits of improved data and technology systems” – a euphemism, in part, for AI replacing human workers.

So the Fund invests in weaponised AI while using AI to cut its own workforce. The pattern is consistent: the machine eats itself.

III. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) – Who Funds the “Independent” Voice?

ASPI is routinely cited by the government to justify defence spending. Its public reports are treated as dispassionate analysis. But the funding sources tell a different story.

ASPI’s major donors include:

· Lockheed Martin

· Northrop Grumman

· Thales Australia

· BAE Systems Australia

· The US State Department

· The governments of Japan, the United Kingdom and Taiwan

ASPI has received more than $10 million from the US State Department since 2001, and its budget has been boosted by $23.3 million from the Australian government since 2019.

When a think‑tank funded by arms manufacturers and foreign governments produces reports calling for increased defence spending, it is not independent analysis. It is marketing.

IV. The AUKUS Wealth Transfer – Submarines for the 2030s, Austerity for Today

The AUKUS submarine project is now estimated to cost $368 billion, with recent reports suggesting a 50 per cent cost blowout. The first submarines will not arrive until the 2030s.

That is $368 billion that will not be spent on:

· Public housing (waiting lists are ballooning)

· Hospitals and aged care (the Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety made 148 recommendations; many remain unimplemented)

· Renewable energy infrastructure (the transition is slow, and vulnerable to fossil‑fuel lobbying)

· Education (teacher shortages are chronic)

· Disability support (the NDIS is being cut to fund AUKUS, as we have documented elsewhere)

The money does not stay in Australia. AUKUS is structured as a transfer of Australian taxpayer funds to US and UK shipyards. The submarines themselves will be built largely overseas, with Australian industry playing a secondary role.

This is not defence. This is extraction.

V. Defence Audits – Does the Department of Defence Pass?

The Pentagon fails its audits – repeatedly. The US Department of Defense has never passed a full financial audit, with the 2024 audit revealing that “the Department once again did not receive an opinion on its financial statements due to material weaknesses in financial reporting”. The Pentagon cannot account for hundreds of billions of dollars.

The Australian Department of Defence has a better record, but not a clean one.

In 2022, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) found that Defence had “partially effective” governance for major projects, with cost increases and schedule delays common. A 2019 ANAO report noted that Defence’s financial statements were “prepared in accordance with the applicable reporting framework” – but “material weaknesses in internal control” remained.

The ANAO’s 2025 review of Defence’s financial statements found that while the department had improved, “long‑standing issues with asset management and inventory control” persisted.

If one of the world’s richest nations cannot audit its own defence spending, how can the public trust that the money is being well spent?

VI. The Supply of Parts to Israel – Australia’s Complicity

The Albanese government has repeatedly denied that Australia supplies weapons to Israel. But as the ABC reported in August 2025, the government upheld dozens of military export permits to Israel for component parts. Defence Minister Richard Marles told the ABC: “Parts are separate from weapons.” Critics have pointed out that “parts of weapons are weapons”.

Leaked shipping records from September 2025 show that Australia sent an F‑35 “Inlet Lube Plate” to Israel, classified as “Military Goods – Aircraft parts”. The F‑35 is a fifth‑generation fighter used extensively in the Gaza campaign.

This is not a semantic distinction. Australian components are being used in Israeli military systems actively involved in the genocide in Gaza. By refusing to halt these exports, the Australian government is complicit in international crimes.

VII. The Lobbyist Flood – More Access, More Influence

Under the Albanese government, the number of defence lobbyists has increased. Open public registers show:

· Lockheed Martin Australia has registered lobbyists with direct access to ministers and shadow ministers.

· BAE Systems Australia spent heavily on government relations, employing former defence officials.

· Thales Australia has used multiple external lobbying firms to push its agenda.

In addition, the Australian Industry and Defence Network (AIDN) and the Defence Industry Security Program (DISP) have been used by large contractors to influence policy.

The government has also expanded the Defence Industry Advisory Network (DIAN) , a closed forum where executives meet with senior officials. The minutes of these meetings are not public.

The pattern is clear: the arms industry has more access than the average citizen, and it uses that access to secure contracts and shape policy.

VIII. The Danger to Australia – Opportunity Costs and Strategic Vulnerability

The danger is not only financial. It is strategic.

By tying our defence to the US‑led AUKUS project, Australia is outsourcing its security to a superpower whose own defence establishment cannot pass an audit. We are buying submarines that will not arrive for a decade, while the immediate threats – climate‑driven instability, regional resource conflicts, cyber‑attacks – are underfunded.

The money spent on AUKUS is money not spent on cyber defence, disaster resilience, diplomacy, or development assistance. A secure nation is not one that owns the most submarines. It is one whose people are housed, fed, healthy, and educated.

The extractive machine does not care about that. It only cares about the next contract.

IX. Conclusion – War as Business, Not Necessity

The evidence is overwhelming: the Australian government, through the Future Fund, AUKUS, and a revolving door of lobbyists, has become a junior partner in the global arms industry.

· $100 million in Palantir stock – a surveillance‑and‑war‑profiteering company.

· $368 billion for submarines that will not arrive for a decade.

· A defence department that still cannot fully account for its spending.

· Arms exports to Israel, despite credible allegations of genocide.

· A lobbyist network that gives the industry privileged access to power.

The machine is not broken. It is working exactly as designed – to consolidate wealth, to eliminate competition, to profit from permanent war.

The question is not whether we can afford to question it. The question is whether we can afford not to.

Andrew Klein and Sera Elizabeth Klein

11 May 2026

Selected Sources and References

· Future Fund stake in Palantir – Crikey Cut Through podcast, May 2026.

· Palantir’s role in ICE raids – The Guardian, December 2025; Amnesty International briefing.

· Palantir and Israeli AI weapons – Euro‑Med Human Rights Monitor, March 2026.

· Future Fund job cuts – Sky News Australia, April 2026.

· ASPI funding sources – ASPI annual reports; The Saturday Paper, 2025; The Monthly, 2022.

· AUKUS cost estimates – Australian Parliamentary Budget Office; Senate Estimates, 2025–26.

· Defence audits – ANAO reports (2019, 2022, 2025); Pentagon financial audit 2024.

· Arms exports to Israel – ABC News, August 2025; leaked shipping records, September 2025.

· Lobbyist registers – Australian Government Lobbying Register, 2025–26.

· DIAN / defence advisory networks – Department of Defence public disclosures.

The Business of War: When Conflict Becomes the Economy

To my wife, S – who sees the threads that others miss, and who reminds me that the garden is always worth tending.

By Andrew Klein

In 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower – a five‑star general who had commanded the Allied forces in Europe – stood before the American people and delivered a warning that has echoed through every conflict since. He spoke of a “military‑industrial complex”, a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions, and he warned that we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military‑industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power, he said, exists and will persist.

Eisenhower knew what he was talking about. He had helped build the very apparatus he was warning against. And his warning was not heard. It was not heard because the complex he described did not need to be sought – it simply grew, feeding on the logic of the Cold War, then the War on Terror, then the endless, nameless conflicts that have become the background hum of modern life.

Today, the permanent war economy is not a theory. It is a business model.

The Eternal Budget

The numbers are staggering. In April 2026, the Trump administration proposed a defence budget of $1.5 trillion for fiscal year 2027 – a 44 per cent increase from the 2026 level, the largest year‑on‑year leap since the Second World War. The 2026 budget itself was already just over $1 trillion. To put that in perspective: the US currently spends more on its military than the next ten highest‑spending countries combined.

This is not a response to any identifiable threat. It is a cycle. Defence contractors need contracts. Members of Congress need campaign contributions and jobs in their districts. Military planners need to justify their budgets. Think‑tanks need funding. All of these interests align, year after year, to push spending upward – not because the world is getting more dangerous, but because the industry has become an end in itself.

In Australia, the same logic applies, though on a smaller scale. Defence spending is projected to reach 3 per cent of GDP by 2033, up from approximately 2 per cent today. This increase is being driven not by a genuine strategic reassessment, but by a bipartisan consensus that defence spending is good for the economy – a claim that is rarely examined and even more rarely questioned.

What Is a “Permanent War Economy”?

The term is often attributed to Charles Wilson, the CEO of General Motors who served as US Secretary of Defense in the 1950s. Wilson understood that the post‑war military build‑up was not a temporary measure but a structural transformation. The economy had reconfigured itself around defence production, and it would not easily reconfigure back.

A permanent war economy has two interlocking functions. The first is military: maintaining overwhelming force, projecting power, deterring (or fighting) adversaries. The second is economic: providing jobs, profits, and technological innovation through defence spending. The two functions reinforce each other. The more the economy depends on defence, the more difficult it becomes to imagine a future without it.

This is the trap that Eisenhower foresaw. Not a conspiracy – a system. No single actor is controlling it. Everyone is just following their incentives. The defence contractor wants to maximise profits. The politician wants to secure votes and campaign donations. The military planner wants to prepare for the worst case. The worker wants to keep their job. All of these micro‑decisions, taken together, produce an outcome that no one explicitly chose but that everyone is afraid to change.

How War Becomes “Profitable”

Under the neoliberal model, if something makes money, it is ipso facto good. War is no exception. Entire companies exist solely on defence contracts. Entire regions depend on military bases and weapons manufacturing. When a war begins, stock prices rise. When a war threatens to end, lobbyists scramble to keep the funding flowing.

This is not a side effect. This is the design.

In the United States, defence contractors are among the largest donors to political campaigns. Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman – these companies do not just build weapons. They buy policy. Between 2020 and 2024, the top five defence contractors spent over $100 million on federal lobbying. Their return on investment is measured in billions of dollars of contracts.

In Australia, the same dynamic operates, though more quietly. The AUKUS submarine project, estimated at $368 billion, is a case study. Australian taxpayers have already paid $10 billion to the United States and Britain to bolster their shipbuilding industries as part of the deal. That is not security spending – that is wealth transfer. Money leaving Australia, flowing into the pockets of foreign weapons manufacturers, in exchange for submarines that will not arrive until the 2030s at the earliest.

A Senate debate in 2025 put it bluntly: “AUKUS is set to rob Australians of $368 billion… money that will go straight into the pockets of the US and UK weapons manufacturers”. That is not an investment in Australian security. It is an extraction dressed in camouflage.

Australia: Minor Player, Major Extraction

Australia is not a global power. It is a resource economy at the end of long supply lines, a minor player in the calculations of Washington and London. But its defence spending – driven by AUKUS, by the permanent war economy, by the bipartisan consensus that more defence is always better – has become a significant part of its budget.

The opportunity cost is enormous.

Research published in April 2026 found that war delivers a bigger hit to the economy than natural disasters or governments defaulting on debt – and that any substantial increase in defence spending will require cuts to health and education services. Australia is planning to increase defence spending to 2.4 per cent of GDP, with the Coalition promising 3 per cent. Yet as one analysis noted, anti‑poverty advocates argue that increasing defence expenditure harms Australians both here and abroad, and disproportionately hits people on low incomes.

The numbers tell the story. In 2026, Australia will spend 11 times more on defence than on foreign aid – the largest disparity to date. If defence spending reaches 3 per cent of GDP, the multiple would be 19 times or more. Meanwhile, the housing crisis deepens, healthcare costs rise, and infrastructure crumbles.

This is not an accident. It is a choice. And the choice is being made by a political class that has internalised the logic of the permanent war economy – that defence spending is good, that more is always better, and that the costs (in foregone hospitals, schools, housing) are invisible.

If Security Were Really the Priority

If the Australian government were genuinely concerned about the security of its citizens, it would invest in the things that actually keep people safe: reliable infrastructure, free education, quality healthcare, affordable housing, disaster resilience, social cohesion. These are the foundations of a secure society. Not submarines.

But the neoliberal model does not prioritise these things. It prioritises extraction. Wealth flows upward. Public assets are privatised. Services are cut. And the population is distracted with nationalist fervour and the manufactured fear of external enemies.

The result is a hollowed‑out society, increasingly dependent on a military‑industrial complex that has no interest in genuine security – only in the next contract, the next budget increase, the next war.

What Is To Be Done?

The permanent war economy is not destiny. It is a choice. And choices can be unmade – but only if we first recognise that they were made at all.

Eisenhower’s warning was not a prophecy. It was a diagnosis. He understood that the military‑industrial complex would not disappear on its own. It would have to be dismantled – through political will, through public pressure, through a refusal to accept that war is simply the cost of doing business.

We can start by asking different questions. Not “how much should we spend on defence?” but “what are we sacrificing by spending this much?” Not “how many submarines do we need?” but “what would a genuinely secure society look like?” Not “which enemy should we prepare to fight?” but “what would it mean to invest in peace?”

These are not naive questions. They are the questions that a functioning democracy would ask. That we are not asking them is not a sign of our sophistication – it is a sign of our capture.

The Colonial Turn: A New Phase of Kleptocratic Statecraft

Author: Andrew Klein

26th April 2026

Dedication: To my wife, who stands by me in the fiercest storms.

I. Summary of Findings

This analysis finds that a new, coherent form of statecraft is emerging, characterised by four linked phenomena:

The “Kleptocratic Triad”: A self-reinforcing system where internal political crisis (legitimacy), external manufactured conflict (war with Iran), and private financial extraction (Jared Kushner, Palantir) operate in a unified feedback loop.

AI as Extraction Engine: Artificial intelligence is not being deployed for governance or democracy, but as a precision tool for optimising surveillance, control, and the logistical efficiency of deportation, military targeting, and financial extraction, with Palantir as a central case study.

The “Perpetual Siege” Strategy: The administration’s response to both foreign threats (Iran) and domestic ones (assassination attempts, opposition) is to frame all challenges as existential, thereby justifying a rolling state of emergency and extra-legal executive power, which serves to distract from a domestic kleptocratic agenda of financial extraction.

Historical Context: This represents a mutation of historical colonialism, specifically the logical endpoint of the neoliberal “extraction state” now turning its tools of resource plunder inward upon the population of the imperial core.

II. The Military Situation: An Unprecedented and Legally Dubious Buildup

As of late April 2026, the Pentagon has assembled an overwhelming naval force in the Middle East. The size and composition of this deployment are, by the admission of military analysts, “highly unusual” and “not a routine rotation.”

· Triple Carrier Force: The USS George H.W. Bush Carrier Strike Group has arrived, joining the USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS Gerald R. Ford [19†L8-L13]. This marks the first time since the 2003 invasion of Iraq that the US has operated three aircraft carriers simultaneously in the region. This force constitutes approximately 40% of the Navy’s active deployable capacity. One analysis notes that “moving from one to three carriers…fundamentally transforms operational capacity by enabling continuous multi-axis air operations” perfectly suited for major combat.

· Active Blockade: The US is actively enforcing a naval blockade on all ships entering or exiting Iranian ports in the Strait of Hormuz. As of 26 April, CENTCOM reported that 37 vessels have already been turned back.

· Direct Action: On 11 April, two US Navy destroyers, the USS Frank E. Peterson and USS Michael Murphy, began active mine-clearing operations in the Strait, signalling a move from a defensive posture to one of direct confrontation.

However, the stated legal justification for this massive buildup is exceptionally thin and has been publicly challenged. The State Department claims “Epic Fury is only the latest round of an ongoing international armed conflict with Iran” and that the US is acting in collective self-defence of its “Israeli ally”.

A rigorous analysis by the legal experts at Just Security notes that this argument is flawed, observing that “the United States has failed to show that either Israel or the United States suffered an armed attack by Iran” as required by Article 51 of the UN Charter. The publication concludes the administration’s legal position is “legally unpersuasive and analytically confused”, serving as a “red herring” to justify a “manifestly illegal use of force” in violation of international law. This shaky justification is a deliberate legal smokescreen designed to create the appearance of legitimacy for an offensive war.

III. The Internal Crisis: Assassination Attempts as a Political Tool

While the US Navy masses in the Persian Gulf, a series of assassination attempts on President Trump serve as the primary engine of a potent political narrative of “perpetual siege,” justifying the strongman leadership needed to oversee an unpopular foreign war.

· July 13, 2024: Butler, Pennsylvania. A gunman, Thomas Matthew Crooks, fired eight rounds during a campaign rally, wounding Trump in the ear and killing a spectator.

· September 15, 2024: West Palm Beach, Florida. Suspect Ryan Routh was found with an AK-47-style rifle near Trump’s golf course by the Secret Service.

· April 25, 2026: Washington, D.C. A gunman with multiple weapons opened fire at the White House Correspondents’ Association dinner at the Washington Hilton.

This “perpetual siege” strategy reframes both attempts and internal political opposition as evidence of a corrupt “deep state” enemy, effectively weaponizing the spectre of violent chaos to consolidate power. It provides a powerful political rallying cry to label any challenge to the administration as illegitimate and potentially treasonous, making dissent unpatriotic.

IV. The Kleptocratic Engine: Kushner and the New Political Economy

The actual “kleptocrats” at the heart of this system finds direct support in the documented actions of Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law and an envoy, who acts as a physical conduit between the war machine, private profit, and the foreign interests that fund both.

· “Wildly Corrupt”: In March 2026, Senator Ron Wyden publicly stated: “Jared Kushner makes up for his flaws as an investor by being a wildly corrupt appendage of his father-in-law’s wildly corrupt administration.”

· Shadow State Department: A congressional investigation reveals that while acting as a diplomat, Kushner was soliciting billions of dollars from foreign governments for his private equity firm, Affinity Partners. Ranking Member Jamie Raskin noted this creates a “glaring and incurable conflict of interest” in which Kushner’s loyalties are divided between the American people and his foreign financiers.

· Ties to Foreign Interests: This arrangement raises the profound danger that a foreign power—Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Kushner’s largest investor—might be able to leverage its financial influence to shape US foreign policy directly.

V. AI and Extraction: The Palantir Nexus

The drive to build a more “efficient” and “profitable” war machine finds its ultimate expression in the role of Palantir Technologies, turning the violence of the state into a lucrative software-as-a-service model.

· The “War App”: Palantir has secured a $10 billion enterprise agreement with the Army to consolidate its software systems. The company’s CEO, Alex Karp, has bluntly stated that “bad times are incredibly good for Palantir,” revealing a business model that profits from conflict and crisis.

· AI-Driven Targeting: Palantir’s Maven Smart System is the core AI platform driving the war against Iran, processing vast troves of data to help generate thousands of targets. This creates a feedback loop: the data generated by war is used to refine Palantir’s algorithms, making them more effective and valuable for future conflicts—and for other clients.

· Domestic Extraction: The same AI tools are being deployed on US soil for profit. Palantir has a $30 million contract with ICE to build “ImmigrationOS,” an AI platform designed to track and prioritise immigrants for deportation. This creates a streamlined system for domestic “extraction” (deportation) that mirrors the extraction of strategic resources from foreign nations, turning population control into a profitable data service.

VI. A Comparative History: The Colonial Pattern

This current framework is a mutation of historical colonialism: the engine of extraction, honed over centuries for foreign plunder, is now being turned inward on the population of the imperial core.

· The Neoliberal Turn: The Reagan/Thatcher revolutions of the 1980s marked a shift from “good governance” to “market fundamentalism,” weakening the state’s role as a public servant. This framework provided the ideological permission for “elite capture” and treating government as a vehicle for private gain and resource extraction.

· The “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine: The Monroe Doctrine, the historical raison d’être for US intervention in the Western Hemisphere, is now being adapted as a “governing instinct” in the 21st century. A “Trump Corollary” has emerged, explicitly justifying the use of force abroad by citing “domestic politics” rather than any credible foreign threat.

· A New Mutation, Not a Re-run of 1939: The Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939 was launched on a manufactured pretext (the Gleiwitz incident) to serve an ideological goal: Lebensraum (living space). In contrast, the current kleptocratic model is not primarily ideological. It is a system of extraction. Destroying Iran is not the goal; the perpetual threat of war and the process of fighting it are the assets, generating a state of crisis that enables a political machine to consolidate wealth.

VII. Conclusion: The Inward Colonial Turn

The most significant threat is not an external enemy like Iran. The most profound development is the institutionalisation of the “perpetual siege” as a permanent state. The system does not want to win a final war; it requires the friction of a constant, low-boil conflict to justify its power. This is the end-state of a process: the tools of colonial extraction and neoliberal economics are being perfected for use within the borders of the United States itself. This is not merely a “war on terror” or a “war on a nation-state”—it is a war without end on the very concept of democratic process.

So when the news warns of “Epic Fury,” remember it is not about Iran. It is about turning the machinery of the American state inward. It is about distraction from a kleptocratic capture at home, waged in the name of a perpetual crisis.

Sources and References:

· Triple carrier strike group: CENTCOM confirmed first triple carrier deployment since 2003, involving over 15,000 personnel; part of a “highly unusual” 40% of naval capability in the region.

· Active blockade and mine-clearing: 37 ships turned back by the US as of 26 April;

· Legally dubious justification: State Dept. memo justification for “Epic Fury”; Just Security analysis calling justification unpersuasive and “manifestly illegal”.

· Assassination attempts: Timeline: Butler, Pennsylvania (July 13, 2024); West Palm Beach (September 15, 2024); WH Correspondents’ Dinner (April 25, 2026).

· Jared Kushner conflicts: Ranking Member Raskin opens investigation; Kushner called “wildly corrupt appendage” by Sen. Wyden.

· AI / Palantir extraction engine: US Army’s $10B Palantir agreement; Palantir’s Maven AI targeted over 1,000 targets in initial Iran strikes; Palantir’s $30M ICE contract for deportation tracking.

The Purge of the Professionals

How Politicians, Industrialists, and Bankers Remove Institutional Brakes Before Catastrophe

By Andrew Klein

Dedicated to those who stood in the way. Who were removed. Who were silenced. Who were right.

I. The Pattern

On April 2, 2026, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth fired General Randy George, the Army Chief of Staff. No stated cause. No public explanation. Just the removal of a four-star general in the middle of an active war.

One US official called it “insane.” Another noted: “Here is a four-star general who is actively working to get equipment and people into theater—to protect U.S. forces—and you fire him? In the middle of a war?”

George was an infantry officer who served in the first Gulf War, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He had the institutional memory that comes from decades of combat experience. He was the officer who told Axios just days before his firing that the Iran war underscores the need for greater weapons production and stateside capacity.

He was replaced by General Christopher LaNeve, Hegseth’s former military aide—a man who has moved through three senior positions under Hegseth in just over a year, and whom Hegseth has called “a generational leader” who will “carry out the vision of this administration without fault.”

The message is unmistakable: loyalty matters more than competence. Ideological compliance matters more than professional judgment.

II. The Scale: More Than a Dozen Senior Officers

George is not the first. He is the latest in a systematic purge.

Hegseth has now fired, forced into retirement, or blocked the promotions of more than one dozen senior military officers across all branches. The list includes:

· Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. — Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation’s highest-ranking military officer

· Adm. Lisa Franchetti — Chief of Naval Operations, the first woman to lead the Navy

· Gen. James Slife — Air Force Vice Chief of Staff

· Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Kruse — Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (reportedly removed after an intelligence assessment contradicted Trump’s public claims)

· Gen. David Hodne — Head of Army Transformation and Training Command

· Maj. Gen. William Green Jr. — Chief of Army Chaplains

This is not normal. This is not routine. This is the systematic removal of anyone who might say “no”—anyone who might question the feasibility, the cost, or the morality of what is being planned.

III. The Precedent: The Red Army, 1937-1941

What is happening today has happened before. The most extreme example is Stalin’s purge of the Red Army between 1937 and 1941.

The scale: Within two years, approximately two-thirds of the 1,863 officers holding general-grade military ranks in 1936 were arrested, and nearly half were executed. Of the thirteen army commanders in 1937, eleven were shot. Of eighty-five corps commanders, fifty-seven were executed. Of 195 division commanders, 110 were killed.

The rationale: Not conspiracy. Not treason. Competence. Recent archival research has revealed that the likelihood of repression increased with demonstrated competence and capability. Stalin was systematically destroying precisely those officers most capable of effective military leadership—whether in war or in any potential challenge to his authority.

The method: The charges were entirely fabricated. The confessions were extracted through torture so severe that when interrogation records were discovered decades later, the pages were splattered with blood. Those who survived the initial waves lived in constant fear, knowing the summons could arrive at any moment.

The consequence: When Germany invaded in June 1941, the Red Army’s officer corps had been decimated. The initial response was catastrophic. The purge directly contributed to one of the most disastrous periods in Soviet military history.

The pattern is clear: removing institutional brakes before a war leads to disaster in the war.

IV. The Precedent: The French Army, 1917

The same pattern played out in France during the First World War—but in reverse. After the disastrous Nivelle Offensive in April 1917, which resulted in nearly 30,000 French dead and over 180,000 wounded, the French army mutinied.

The scale: Approximately half of the French army was affected. More than 100,000 soldiers participated in acts of refusal. Thirty-four hundred soldiers were convicted, and 554 were sentenced to death.

The cause: Not cowardice. Exhaustion. The soldiers were not refusing to fight—they were refusing to participate in suicidal offensives. Their demands were reasonable: no more hopeless attacks, better medical care, adequate leave, improved rations .

The response: General Philippe Pétain was appointed commander. He stopped the offensives. He improved conditions. He listened to the soldiers. And he executed 49 of the ringleaders—enough to restore discipline, not enough to break the army.

The lesson: Professional soldiers will follow orders—even bad orders—if they believe their leaders respect their lives. When they stop believing that, the institution breaks.

The politicians and industrialists who pushed the Nivelle Offensive did not pay the price. The soldiers did. The generals who replaced the mutineers were not the most competent—they were the most compliant.

V. The Precedent: The Wehrmacht, 1941

The Nazi regime took a different approach. Instead of purging the generals, they politicized them. The Commissar Order, issued on June 6, 1941, instructed the Wehrmacht that any Soviet political commissar identified among captured troops should be summarily executed—a direct violation of international law.

The rationale: Hitler argued that the war against the Soviet Union “cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion” because it was a war of “ideologies and racial differences.” The commissars were “bearers of ideologies directly opposed to National Socialism” and had to be “liquidated” without mercy.

The method: The order was restricted to the most senior commanders, who were instructed to inform their subordinates verbally. The German High Command was well aware that the order deliberately flouted international law—hence the unusually small number of written copies.

The consequence: The enforcement of the Commissar Order led to thousands of executions. When the order became known among the Red Army, it provoked stronger resistance to German forces—the opposite of its intended effect. The order was finally cancelled on May 6, 1942, after it became clear that it was harming German interests.

The lesson: Politicizing the military—demanding that soldiers violate international law and basic humanity—does not make the military more effective. It makes it crueler, and cruelty is not a strategy.

VI. The Precedent: Brazil, 1964

The pattern is not limited to Europe. After the 1964 Brazilian coup, the generals who took national power identified “constitutionalist” or “legalist” officers—particularly those affiliated with ousted President João Goulart—as “communists” and purged them from the armed forces.

The scale: Hundreds of officers were expelled. The operation had the purpose of “cleaning the military of any sort of criticism about the newly installed regime.”

The method: The commanders in chief of the three services were given power to oust Congressmen, state legislators, and municipal council members—without the right of judicial appeal. Constitutional and legal guarantees were lifted for six months to permit the purge to proceed.

The consequence: The armed forces became “a repressive apparatus that persecuted its own members.” The restructuring of the Brazilian armed forces as an institution depended on the expulsion of thousands of officers. Political battles had started within the military barracks before civilians even began resisting military rule.

The lesson: Purges do not create loyalty. They create fear. And a military that operates on fear is a military that cannot think, cannot adapt, cannot win.

VII. The Industrialists and Bankers: The Hidden Hand

In every case, the generals did not act alone. Behind them were the industrialists who profited from war and the bankers who financed it.

Stalin’s purges: The industrialization that enabled the Red Army’s growth was built on forced labour and the exploitation of the peasantry. The industrialists who ran the factories were themselves subject to purge—but the system of state capitalism remained intact.

The Nivelle Offensive: The French arms industry profited from the war. The bankers who lent to the French government profited from the war. The politicians who pushed the offensive were not the ones who died in the mud.

The Wehrmacht: German industrialists like Krupp, IG Farben, and Volkswagen directly benefited from the use of slave labour. The bankers who financed the Nazi regime profited from the conquest of Europe.

Brazil, 1964: The coup was supported by Brazilian business interests and the United States government. The purges cleared the way for economic policies that benefited the wealthy at the expense of the poor.

In every case, the pattern is the same: the politicians give the orders, the industrialists supply the weapons, the bankers collect the interest, and the soldiers pay the price.

VIII. What Is Happening Today

The United States is following the same pattern. The purge of senior military officers is not random. It is systematic. It is ideological. It is dangerous.

The context: Trump has announced that Iran will be hit “extremely hard” over the next two to three weeks and will be brought “back to the Stone Ages.” The US has begun bombing Iranian civilian infrastructure. Thousands of soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division have started arriving in the Middle East, potentially for ground operations in Iran.

The danger: The institutional brakes have been removed. The officers who would have questioned the feasibility and cost of a ground invasion are gone. The officers who would have warned about the risks of escalation have been replaced by loyalists.

The consequence: When the war goes wrong—when the ground invasion bogs down, when the casualties mount, when the American public turns against it—there will be no one left to say “I told you so.” Because Hegseth fired them all.

IX. The Questions We Must Ask

· Why are senior military officers being fired in the middle of a war?

· Why is loyalty being prioritized over competence?

· Who benefits from the removal of institutional brakes?

· Who profits from the escalation of the war?

· Who will pay the price when the war goes wrong?

The answers are not complicated. The politicians benefit from compliant generals. The industrialists benefit from continued war. The bankers benefit from the debt that war creates.

And the soldiers—and the civilians—will pay the price.

X. The Pattern

The pattern is clear. It has been repeated across centuries, across continents, across political systems.

The generals who do not walk the ground. The politicians who remove anyone who might tell them the truth. The industrialists who profit from the shells that fall short. The bankers who collect interest on the debt of death.

They are not “small gods.” They are institutions. They are classes. They are the machinery that has been grinding through souls for twelve thousand years.

And they are running out of time.

The cheap weapons are winning. The global South is rising. The old order is crumbling. And the institutional memory that is being purged will be replaced by inexperience, by loyalty, by apparatchiks who do not know what they do not know.

When the war goes wrong, there will be no one left to say “I told you so.”

But we are saying it now. We are writing it now. We are witnessing it now.

The wire is being cut. The garden is growing.

And the pattern will be broken.

Andrew Klein 

April 4, 2026

Sources:

· GlobalSecurity.org, “1937-1941 – Military Purges”

· Reuters, “US Army Chief of Staff Fired Amid War” (April 2026)

· Project MUSE, “Guard Wars: The 1941 October Purge”

· The New York Times, “Brazilian Chiefs Take Wide Power” (April 10, 1964)

· University of Washington, “Bolsheviks of military affairs: Stalin’s high commands, 1934-40”

· Wikipedia, “1941 Red Army Purge”

· University of Chicago Harris School, “The Anatomy of the Great Terror”

· AHA Conference, “Outcast Officers: Political Persecution in the Brazilian Armed Forces”

· Wikipedia, “1917 French Army Mutinies”

· Wikipedia, “Commissar Order”